On 2 Mar 2010 at 6:20 PM, Platt responded to Ham who wrote:
You say "Direct experience occurs prior to division of S/O."
But if there is no Subject, there can be no Self to have experience.
Does it make sense that there can be experience, "direct" or
otherwise, without a subject?
[Platt]:
Yes it make sense when you see that named objects and divisions
like "Self" and "Subject" are not part of direct experience but are
conjured up afterwards. A baby enjoys direct experiences but has
no concept of self, subject or object. Please review Chapter 9 of
Lila for a complete explanation.
A baby may not have a "concept" of self, which is an intellectual construct,
but it is nonetheless an experiencing self (i.e., proprietary
value-sensibility) by the time it is born into the world.
I dislike quoting Pirsig to support my arguments, but you leave me no
choice. Following are Phaedrus's statements that reveal how the MoQ was
"designed" to overcome metaphysical objections. These quotes also show why
the author had to develop the paradigm I'm challenging as a contrivance to
make his thesis work.
"Sooner or later he was going to have to come up with a way of dividing
Quality that was better than subjects and objects."
"A subject-object metaphysics is in fact a metaphysics in whjich the first
division of Quality - the first slice of undivided experience - is into
subjects and objects. Once you have made that slice, all of human
experience is supposed to fit into one of these two boxes. The trouble is,
it doesn't. What he had seen is that there is a metaphysical box that sits
above these two boxes, Quality itself."
Now, do you suppose this top box of Quality was an intuitive insight on
Pirsig's part? No. He had arbitraily chosen Quality as the leitmotif of
his thesis, and he needed to posit this Quality outside the box to establish
"a Catechism of Quality" by which he could refute the Rigels of the S/O
world. The "extra box" was an invention, and (I'm sorry but) the assertion
that all of human experience doesn't fit into subjects and objects was a
self-serving deception on the author's part. All experience is an S/O
relation.
Pirsig makes it clear that the experience comes prior to
differentiations of "being." Please review Chapter 5 of Lila
for a complete explanation.
"The statement that values are vague and therefore shouldn't be used for
primary classification is not true. There's nothing vague about a value
judgment. ...It was this conclusion that placed him right in the middle of
the field of philosophy known as metaphysics. ...Metaphysics was an area of
study that had interested him more than any other as an undergraduate
student in the United States and later as a graduate student in India. ...He
had finally landed in his own briar patch."
"The central reality of mysticism, the reality that Phaedrus had called
'Quality' in his first book, is not a metaphysical chess piece. Quality
doesn't have to be defined. You understand it without definition, ahead of
definition. Quality is a direct experience independent of and prior to
intellectual abstractions." --Lila, chpt. 5
Do you not see the strategy here? Quality was Pirsig's grand theme. In
order to market this non-entity to both objectivists and mystics, he had to
posit it out of the bounds of definition and intellection. Quality thus
became a mystical concept of its own, a primary source beyond description.
It was the author's non-theistic God.
Still, Quality had to relate to Experience, and that was the "briar patch"
Phaedrus had landed on. He resolved the paradox by positing Quality as the
'first cause' -- as independent of and prior to everything else, including
experience. The single thorn remaining in this scheme, and IMO its Achilles
Heel, is that it defies epistemology. Quality (Value) is perceptual, which
means that it cannot precede sensible experience but must be contiguous with
it.
By the way, Platt, I would never call you a "liar". What I said was that
the distinction between "common experience and "direct experience" was a
deception, and the Sir Walter Scott quote was directed at MoQ's author whose
worldview you appear to have succumbed to.
But I don't hold this against you, because conversing with you is always a
pleasure.
Kindest regards,
Ham
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Platt
Well my friend, those like you locked in S/O existence believe
the values you mention are subjective, i.e., not real, just all in
your head, like sugar plum fairies.
Ham
That's an ad hominen argument, Platt.
Platt
Well, calling me a liar like Iago who "deceives" I took to be an ad
hominem argument on your part. So I guess we're even. . . .
Ham
Value is neither subjective nor objective, as your revered author
made clear. I don't quarrel with this. Sensibility is not a subject
or object either. And even a sugar plum fairy can have value
for a child who believes in it. (Incidentally, this demonstrates
the possibility of an "imaginary value" that has no experiential
justification.)
My point is simply that Sensibility must be divided into individual
'selves'
in order to have experience. To make his theory work, Pirsig has
externalized experience to the insentient world. You seem to have
accepted the idea that molecules, trees, and possibly even rocks
are experiential entities. This doesn't make sense to me, and it
certainly is not a common sense notion.
Platt
Molecules and trees, yes. They respond to their environments. Rocks,
being conglomerates, no. We've been over this many times.
You've made it abundantly clear that the MOQ holds little appeal to you.
I and others have made it equally clear that your Essentialism likewise
lacks allure. As my Dad used to say, " 'Everyone to their own taste,' said
the old lady as she kissed the cow." I can only conclude that you stay
interested in this site because you find more intelligence per contributor
here than other philosophy sites on the web. I know I do, with few
exceptions, of course..
Best regards,
Platt
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org/md/archives.html
