On 2 Mar 2010 at 13:36, Ham Priday wrote: Hey, Platt --
> Direct experience occurs prior to division of S/O. This is all > basic MOQ stuff. No wonder others question whether you > have read Lila. I own a copy of Lila and have read it. I just don't happen to agree with the implied ontology, at least as it has been interpreted. When I suggested that there is no such thing as "direct experience", that all experience is subject/object experience, you said: > Wrong. Prior to "differentiation of values into things and events," > we experience "value per se." You can't differentiate something > that hasn't been experienced first. > That's just common sense. ;-) Okay, since "common experience" isn't good enough for you, let's see if what you say makes common sense. You say "Direct experience occurs prior to division of S/O." But if there is no Subject, there can be no Self to have experience. Does it make sense that there can be experience, "direct" or otherwise, without a subject? Platt Yes it make sense when you see that named objects and divisions like "Self" and "Subject" are not part of direct experience but are conjured up afterwards. A baby enjoys direct experiences but has no concept of self, subject or object. Please review Chapter 9 of Lila for a complete explanation. Ham You say "You can't differentiate something that hasn't been experienced first." I say you can and you do. That's exactly what esperience does: It differentiates Value into finite 'beings' -- something here, something there, something now, something then. It even defines the attributes and properties of the things experienced. Does Pirsig not call these phenomena "patterns of value"? Platt Pirsig makes it clear that the experience comes prior to differentiations of "being." Please review Chapter 5 of Lila for a complete explanation. Platt > Well my friend, those like you locked in S/O existence believe > the values you mention are subjective, i.e., not real, just all in > your head, like sugar plum fairies. Ham That's an ad hominen argument, Platt. Platt Well, calling me a liar like Iago who "deceives" I took to be an ad hominem argument on your part. So I guess we're even. . . . Ham Value is neither subjective nor objective, as your revered author made clear. I don't quarrel with this. Sensibility is not a subject or object either. And even a sugar plum fairy can have value for a child who believes in it. (Incidentally, this demonstrates the possibility of an "imaginary value" that has no experiential justification.) My point is simply that Sensibility must be divided into individual 'selves' in order to have experience. To make his theory work, Pirsig has externalized experience to the insentient world. You seem to have accepted the idea that molecules, trees, and possibly even rocks are experiential entities. This doesn't make sense to me, and it certainly is not a common sense notion. Platt Molecules and trees, yes. They respond to their environments. Rocks, being conglomerates, no. We've been over this many times. You've made it abundantly clear that the MOQ holds little appeal to you. I and others have made it equally clear that your Essentialism likewise lacks allure. As my Dad used to say, " 'Everyone to their own taste,' said the old lady as she kissed the cow." I can only conclude that you stay interested in this site because you find more intelligence per contributor here than other philosophy sites on the web. I know I do, with few exceptions, of course.. Best regards, Platt Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
