Ron said:
I think we both took you as saying that truth statements
have no utility besides the rhetorical value.
Matt:
I have trouble understanding what your point is here, but
let me reiterate Pirsig's claim that rhetoric all the way
down ("analogues upon analogues upon analogues").
Ron:
This is where the preconceptual/conceptual distinction
is useful in determining the kind of analogues one is
talking about. What types of meaning are we ascribing to
"truths".. are they predicated on immediate experience or the experience
of social persuasion?
This is the utility that I'm stressing that the distinction provides to us in
meaning.
Pirsig, to me, stresses empirical meaning (analogues) over rhetorical
(analogues) .
I don't mean this in a primacy of cause and effect sort of sytematic purity but
that "meaning" or
"mean" being an average of measure and measure to limit ,and what is experience
but
a limit ...
what all our analogues are predicated apon.
Aristotle made a statement that the good is a limit, it is that on which we are
prepared to act apon.
Which to me falls in with what I think Pirsig and James say.
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