Ron said:
You may have a point if you take this distinction as some
sort of metaphysical split..but it doesent. It is a useful
practicle distinction in experience.
Matt:
Sure, but it's the utility I'm not quite sure about. In an
off-hand way, the idea has been that a number of other
distinctions can take the pre-conceptual/conceptual
distinction's place (e.g. "difficult/easy to articulate")--not
all at once, but chopping up all the work to be done, the
different practical purposes and whatnot.
Ron:
Aristotle used unity and plurality, Socrates the cave, but if they all "mean"
the same distinction, and they take the place, then perhaps
it is the same but within varying cultural contexts. Then the utility
would vary.
Maybe you look to a universiality of unity when it's more
of a plural of consistancy in meaning.
Matt:
The risk of systematicity, where you boil things done to a
small set of conceptual items, is always "metaphysical
dichotomy" (in the Platonic bad sense of "metaphysics," not
in the sense where it is synonymous with "system")
because of the risk of reductionism, but more especially
because of the risk of hiding the number of purposes to
which the distinction must serve--hiding the Platonism
behind a blur of quality purposes (as it were).
Ron:
Emerson defines
the platonic forms, the unity we ascribe by limit, to the plural
of experience, as being universal just because of this consistancy
in experience in the now.When I read Plato, thats what I get too.
But also I must respect the long held tradition of the sort of ideas
that are typically asssociated with the term in the context of what
I think you are trying to convey. But is that what we are really talking about?
or do we mean to get closer to the utility of the distiction or the place holder
for this distinction. Do we mean to discuss the utility of truth statements.
Matt:
My reticence to use the pre-conceptual/conceptual
distinction myself, or suggest it as a good idea, is not
because people occasionally use Platonic techniques of
argument ("that's just the way things are," as if there
were a method of demonstration lying around) as you did
not, but because after we distinguish purposes, the only
ones I see left are ones created by taking on the Platonic
problematic (like the unrepresentability of pure experience).
These we might call "metaphysical purposes," and the only
way to fix them are with "metaphysical splits." I don't see
the need for taking on the problematic, see those
purposes as "false needs" (in Marcuse's sense), and so
don't see the utility of the distinction.
Ron:
Well, since the whole understanding of the term "metaphysics"
is a misnomer, and generally has the same meaning then as philosophy
or world view, that taking on that problematic in a metaphysical manner
no longer takes on the same sort of consequences. Therefore the utility
is one purely of the pragmatic, the concept of "true" and truth statements.
The good.
Matt:
I certainly wouldn't claim that there aren't people out there
making strong claims to the contrary (John McDowell in
Mind and World is one), but as largely a spectator to the
sport, I still can't see the point that's being made. The
issue that Dave has with me, I think, largely surrounds
this--he perceives me as evacuating philosophical space.
But there's a tough practical dilemma here for amateur
philosophers--how do we both respect the professional
philosopher for putting the time they do into certain
problems with also reserving the right to disagree in
certain ways (for example, in thinking the problem is not a
problem)? How do we suggest to other philosophers that
while we don't have a systematically articulated response
to their arguments, we also don't "feel," on the inside,
that the argument was successful--the sense in which
we've "been successfully persuaded to change our
opinions"? It would be lying, wouldn't it, to say because
you can't think of anything cogent to say, that you've
been persuaded by their arguments? Or, because of your
quasi-inarticulacy, to begin to repeat their positions
because you can't articulate your own up to high enough
standards?
Ron:
I think we qought to understand how people tend to invest
theselves into an idea emotionally as well as intellectually.
Often people tend to define themelves in terms of their
convictions. Which is why rhetoric, even the most cunning
and convincing, smacks of a personal attack. Socrates was
smooth yet he still pissed people off
Matt:
This may seem like pure evasion, but to me it is a
description of the first-person difficulty of negotiating the
argumentative process--how it _feels_ to argue and be
persuaded. If you don't _feel_ persuaded, what do you
do? What is the proper response? What is the best
rhetorical presentation to give each side their due?
Ron:
The realization of both that the intent is to learn more about
the situation at hand not to be convinced or convince but
to gain a clearer understanding.
Matt:
As I've moved further away from certain problems, I've
tried harder and harder to articulate the honesty that I
think is a necessary component of the argumentative
process. How, on the one hand, there are arguments
and, on the other, there is being persuaded by one. It's
difficult, but the affective dimension of argumentation
has long been lacking in the structure of presentation in
professional philosophy. More attention to it would
perhaps do some good.
Ron:
I think that is the momentum behind why we make this sort of distinction
and that the love of wisdom be the prevailing emotional attachment.
The dialectical analytic which has dominated and defined what it means
to have a philosphical debate for so long that it has come to equate to it,
overshadows what the original intent was. But I think Dave is saying that
the spirit of the times has moved in this direction which is cause for
atleast some hope, brought brighter if we practiced it ourselves.
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