Hi Ron,
Ron said:
In fact I'd say that any understanding is a theory of truth,
the power of explaination lies in how one uses the word
"justifies", what types of experience are truth claims based
apon?
Matt:
Davidson, I think, got pretty close to saying that a person,
in generating an understanding (of a situation, thing,
sentence, whatever), was wielding a theory of truth (which
on Davidson's view was also a theory of meaning, extension,
reference, and a lot else)--which is pretty much like saying
a (linguistic) person is an instantiation of a theory of truth.
Rorty, while accepting pretty much Davidson's entire
philosophy of language, always thought it was a little silly
to call us that. It seems a little highfalutin to say people
who learn English are also learning a theory of truth. But,
to each their own.
Ron said:
You seem to be saying that the pursuit of and theory of
truth is meaningless and futile
Matt:
Really? I guess I don't understand why people think I (or
Steve, or more often Rorty) seem to be saying this.
For example, if you gerrymander "theory of truth" the way
you have above (a way I've attributed to Davidson, too),
then why on earth would Rorty disagree (except quibbling
with calling the process of understanding a "process of
wielding a theory of truth")? Why would you think I would
continue on with a certain line of argument? The way we
_delimit_ the purview of what we are arguing about, I
would hope, is what might delimit what people think we
seem to be saying.
Ron said:
Where Dave and you and Steve seem to differ is on an
either/or explaination of "truth"(s). I may have you wrong
but it seems that your side is that no type of justification
may be collapsed, there always is a distinction between
truth and justification which basically boils down to "truths
are justifications" because you assert that truths are
ultimately everchanging making some sort of theory about
their consistancy in certain contexts as then yielded
meaningless.
Matt:
I'm not sure I follow you (e.g., I don't know what "no type
of justification may be collapsed" means), but the reason
there is always a distinction between truth and justification
is because of what I will now dub the Truth Fact:
"you might be justified in thinking X, but X might not be true."
Steve has endlessly reiterated this fact about the
experience of truth, and what neither of us are sure about
is why people wish to deny this fact--or rather, how you
acknowledge this fact while collapsing the distinction
between justification and truth. It just seems less
abstruse when describing the experience of truth to say
that truth and justification are not the same thing for the
same reason that mirages and water are not the same
thing. The only way to find out whether it's water or not
is to go over there, just in the same way that the only
route to truth is justification--but we just find it easier to
say, after finding out it is a mirage, that in retrospect, you
say "I saw a mirage, but thought it was water" not "I saw
water, and that goddamn magical water turned into a
mirage when I got closer!"
So, "some sort of theory" about the consistency of truths
in their contexts is, on the Rortyan view Steve and I are
promulgating, not a theory of _truth_, but--as you point
out with "truths are justifications"--a theory of justification,
which as you also point out requires an enumeration of
"certain contexts" and whatnot. I don't think anything
Steve and I are saying about truth and justification requires
us to forego inquiry into inquiry--inquiry into paths of
justification that have proved efficacious.
Ron said:
Exactly why isn't it helpful? why must eternal sufficiency
be met? I think this is where Dave's criticism is leveled.
Matt:
Sure, but what neither Steve nor I are clear on is how one
both collapses truth into justification and acknowledges
the Truth Fact. When you collapse the distinction, it
makes it seem like one is saying that one is saying, with
every claim of truth, that it is both true and not true at
the same time. (Watch the verb "to be": "X _is_ true, but
might not _be_ true." One might be comfortable with
this--Marsha is. And with the swimminess of language,
where words change their stance and meaning depending
on context, it's easy to treat "X is true" as "X is justified."
But for the purposes of getting straight about what truth
is--a theory of truth--the Davidsonian/Rotyan tact is to
make a distinction between things. What we're confused
about is where people think the harm is.)
Here's Davidson's theory of truth (which is Alfred Tarski's
semantic conception of truth): "the sentence 'X' is true if
and only if X is true." It tells you exactly when and where
something that is true is true. It is, however, not helpful
at all in making the determination. "Eternal sufficiency" is
perhaps a bad choice of words, because us Rortyan
pragmatists agree that eternity isn't a practical experience,
but in distinguishing between the transitory nature of
justification and truth as the circle that sentences keep
popping in and out of, why move the circle _and_ the stuff
in and out of the circle (particularly when I outlined a
definitive--if exasperatingly unhelpful--circle above in the
semantic theory of truth). The circle doesn't change, only
what's in the circle.
Ron said:
That circle you speak of IS the eternal sufficiency, the
eternal sufficieny of what is meant by the justification. The
simple recognition of shit popping in and out of it defines it's
form. The good. Value. The true is a species of the good.
Matt:
Right--now how does the form of truth ("'X' is true iff X is
true") help you find about what claims are true? This may
seem like a parlor trick, but it is what G. E. Moore called
the naturalistic fallacy about good--defining "good" by a
list of "things that are good." That doesn't define good, it's
just a list. Moore, rather, said "good" is indefinable.
Davidson says truth is indefinable. Pirsig says value is indefinable.
Ron said:
The sheer fact you make the distinction confirms that you
think there is something that changes, to assert change one
must be able to make distinctions of what does and what
does not qualify as true.
Matt:
Right, Steve and I make a distinction between
justification (changes) and truth (does not change).
Ron said:
The act of value is the form of truth. Therefore any theory
of truth is theory on how we live our lives, and if there is
not much point in that then why delve into philosophy at all?
Matt:
I'm commenting on this just to reiterate my plea that
philosophical communication is only aided by not swapping
in one philosopher's delimited object of argumentation for
your own. Communication occurs by comparing them, but
such a grand bafflement as "Jeez-ez, you seem to be
saying (according to my terms that I'm swapping into your
argument) that there's no point in talking about how we
live our lives! That's gotta' be a reductio!" is basically just
gesticulation.
Swapping helps the comparison project, but with something
that absurd (and to avoid strawman charges) better at
that point to wonder where it is, exactly, the two views
diverge (for example, in the other guy _not_ thinking a
"theory of truth is a theory on how we live our lives").
Matt
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