On 5/26/10 1:10 AM, "[email protected]" <[email protected]> wrote:
<snip> >> This information was called subject/object metaphysics. Thing, one, >> true, good, were transcendentals in that they could be said of >> everything existing. > > But trust Joe to turn enigmatic :-) > > At least the Greek SOM came to put its stamp on Christendom > through Aristotle by way of Aquinas, humankind got a Soul which was > the primary, eternal part while the Body was secondary and > perishable. My long-standing assertion is that Christendom is deeply > intellect-influenced in contrast to Judaism & Islam as continuations of > the old Social reality. Thus the Renaissance and Enlightenment did > NOT emerge in spite of Christendom but because of it and the big > question is why the Muslim world can't become "modern" and why the > Jews forever must be torn between their orthodox and secular > factions? > > Bodvar > Hi Bo and all, I was not trying to be enigmatic. There has to be a basis for mathematical logic. That basis is a defined 1. There is no function for definition at the inorganic, organic 1 & 2 levels as there is no capacity to define 1. At the emotional level there is no SQ, and the capacity to define 1 is still missing. At the intellectual level 1 is definable SQ and applies to everything, since the intellectual level is a higher level and contains the previous levels and adds its own distinctive characteristic SQ. True, and Good are relationships to mind and will respectively in SOM. Thing, is a description of gravity at a sense level. Lower levels react to touch, e.g. a vine growing up a wall. I would argue with your sense of an ³old Social reality² in a metaphysical sense. Social reality is not a characteristic of an individual, but only a family, which is better characterized by sex distinctions for procreation, father and mother. Joe Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
