Ahoy there, John --
[John]:
I see.
I think.
Seeing that I think, I infer an existence.
Thinking that I see, I infer an essence.
Interesting analysis. But the premise you should be analyzing is:
Does the precept "I" (as in "I see" and "I think") infer that the essence is
you?
Being and nothingness are attributes of existence or appearance.
Sounds a bit like percepts and concepts to me.
And so?? You're talking philosophy, and it's based on precepts and
concepts.
If it were based on empirical evidence it would not be philosophy.
Since I've gotten into pondering Absolutes lately Ham, I wonder
whether you see your "Essence" as essentially, an absolute. And if so,
how does that compare in the continuum between Royce's Absolute,
and Bradley's. To wit:
For Bradley, the self is appearance and not reality. The Absolute is
not a self, and is without selfhood. For Royce, the self is an individual
within the Absolute Self, and the Absolute must have selfhood.
Royce says that Bradley’s Absolute cannot be aware of itself, because
this would mean being aware of itself as appearance, and not as a reality.
Royce says that this is an aspect of inconsistency in Bradley’s
philosophy.
Royce also describes Bradley’s Absolute as a self-representative system.
A self-representative system represents itself together with the other
elements that it represents. Royce argues that Bradley’s Absolute brings
the whole world of Appearance into a unity of Absolute Reality.
Thus, Bradley’s Absolute must have selfhood.
Now you're talking philosophology. How does Essentialism stack up against
Bradley and Royce? Since there can be only one Absolute, I assume the
"absolutes" you are pondering are really various conceptions of the
Absolute.
I find 'selfness' somewhat anachronistic in the context of 'absoluteness',
and generally reserve this term for the proprietary (i.e., differentiated)
subject. However, I can empathize with man's tendency to "personalize" God
or the Creator, as is usually the custom in religion. I do not regard
Essence as a "system" for the simple reason that it has no elements or
components.
If "awareness" infers an object, then it is appearance, and Royce is correct
about Bradley's notion of "selfhood". This doesn't mean that Essence is
insentient, however. I use the term "Sensibility" existentially and
essentially to mean "self-awareness" where objective experience is not
implied. Value, for example, is a sensibility. I see no reason why
Sensibility cannot be considered an attribute of Essence from the individual
perspective. From the absolute (unified) perspective, of course, Value,
Sensibility, and Potentiality are of one nature or essence. (This is not an
endorsement for either Bradley or Royce, just an attempt to categorize the
ontologies as you've presented them.)
Naming is differentiation. In nature, we pick apart those aspects of
difference that catch our attention, and label them creatively.
Thus the fabled Inuit's hundred different words for "snow", whereas
I only see snow. In other words, I see no functional difference
between differentiation and naming.
In other words, I agree.
Naming is one kind of differentiation, which may suffice for a writer. But
unless the object or phenomenon being named is perceptual, that is, viewed
or experienced independently of nomenclature, it is not differentiated in an
ontological sense. For most adults, the Tooth Fairy and Easter Bunny are
named characters. This differentiates them in fictional references but not
as existents.
[Ham]:
Value is the primary relation of S to O. It is "fundamental" inasmuch as
it is the inextricable link between them. We are bound to Otherness
(being) by its value to us. But this is a provisional relationship, for
both
self (subject) and other (object) are negated essents. Value sensed is
existential; value as "the absolute whole" is Essence.
[John]:
Ok, that sounds to me like a variance of Royce and Bradley's Absolute
Idealism indeed - with different labels.
I suppose Essentialism is a kind of Idealism, mainly due to its absolutist
premise. I wonder, though, if Pirsig's Qualityism is not also
idealistic--despite its "pluralistic" foundation.
What thinkest thou, John?
As far as Interpreting Royce, I'll get back to you. I've been meaning to
read his supplementary essay to The World and the INdividual which is
entirely a commentary and criticism of F.H. Bradley. After I've got that
under my belt, I'll feel more confident in explaining Absolute Idealism
from the American AND British side.
Although I recently learned one interesting bit of philosophical trivia
concerning Bradley's philosophy, that might explain Pirsig's affinity a
bit
for his Absolute Idealism as a "middle way":
"In a way the Bradleyan Absolute is a model of the official ideal of the
British Empire - a unity which manifests itself in an indefinite plurality -
and so it provided a vehicle through which Indian philosophers could make
contact with the imperial culture without sacrificing their own traditions.
And Bradley's philosophy was close enough to the main themes of the
Vedantist traditions, so that he could be used as a bridge between modes of
thought by Indian philosophers who wanted to show Englishmen that their own
traditions much in them from which Europeans might learn.
"But in a very precise way Bradley, in fact addresses some traditional
concerns within Indian philosophy. He could be used by those seeking a
middle ground in the ancient controversy between the followers of Sankara
and the followers of Ramanjus - between the Absolute monists an those who
wanted to allow a measure of pluralism."
-- Philosophy after F. H. Bradley: A collection of Essays.
Sounds like a fascinating study, John. Let me know what conclusions it
leads you to.
Thanks, and best regards,
Ham
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