Okay, John -- If you've got the time, I've got the patience.
You asked about "the aspects of existence that have no recognizable appearance." How do we know that an appearance (let's call it a "phenomenon") has aspects unless we recognize them? Indeed, the aspects of a phenomon are what make up the appearance.
Let's say you observe a round object lying on the beach. You see that its surface is divided into patterned sections of red and white. It might be a painted rock, you think. Then a child comes long and kicks the object. You hear a hollow thump and the object goes flying across the sand. A rock would not have that resilience, nor would it so noisily be lifted into the air.by the action of a child's foot. You've recognized the "aspects" of roundness, color, design, hollowness, elasticity, and dynamics on impact. Even if you've never seen a beach ball before, or heard its name, you can quickly deduce what kind of an object this is.
[Ham, previously]:
These are all psycho-emotional affects of value-sensibility projected by the self into otherness.
[John]:
I disagree. Self and otherness both are constructs whose construction are in many important ways, derived from the aspects as you name them. And your "psycho-emotional affects" sounds to me like a fancy-shmancy way of saying what everybody calls the "its only in your mind" fallacy.
The beach ball is an experiential construct whose constituents are the valuistic aspects enumerated above. The child who kicks the ball experiences the same construct, although from a slightly different space/time perspective. To construct an object presupposes a workable substrate that can be fashioned to create that object. Essentialism is a valuistic philosophy, and we're dealing with values differentiated by the human sensory apparatus.
Primary Value is the realization of otherness, and the individual is the realizing agent. (You can call this the individual's "aesthetic response" or "pre-intellectual sensibility", if you like; but "psycho-emotional affect" is the best epistemological term I've come up with.) Finite values (the ones we experience) are derived from the value-sensibiity that is innate to all cognizant individuals. That experience is subjective doesn't mean it's "only in the mind" but that it is proprietary to the individual. As I tried to point out before, existence is the cumulative total of one's experience.
By "primary source", do you mean the "thing that made everything but we don't have a name for" ? Because while I sorta think Craig makes a good point about just positing absolute creators out of thin air is silly, I do appreciate your coming up with a much handier label for It.
First of all, "things don't make things" Things are finite phenomena that appear, evolve or change, and disappear. My Philosophy of Essence is predicated on an uncreated source which philosophers continue to regard as either impossible or "undefinable". But it just so happens that an obscure but brilliant 15th century theologian named Cusanus postulated his first principle as "the not-other". The Essence of my metaphysics is definable by Cusa's principle.
[Ham's examples of "provisional" conditions]:
Time, space, finitude, dependence, life/death, being/nothing, contrariety, mortality, uncertainty.
[John]:
As I said, mere subjectivism. "Time and space are mere constructs of the animal mind." - Dr. Lanza
What do you have against subjectivism, John? Platt acquainted me with the subjectivist Donald Hoffman a couple of years ago, but I have since found Robert Lanza a more readable source on this worldview. I have archived his essay "A New Theory of the Universe" on my website at www.essentialism.net/NewTheory.htm. and suggest that you read it. I don't classify myself as a "subjectivist', but the label is more descriptive of my philosophy than objectivism or "logical positivism".
[Ham]:
Cognizant awareness, feeling, knowledge, interpretation, intellection, and realization are proprietary to the individual.
[John]:
Disagree completely. All those things are relative and arise only in intersubjective comparison.
[Ham]:
"Relative", yes, since all awareness is dependent on otherness. "Intersubjective", no. (Possibly you meant to say "interrelational.")
[John]:
Perhaps you are right. I'm thinking of a Pirsig quote I clipped out to my desktop, on "intersubjective agreement" that describes my thinking to a "t". ... But I mean more than merely relational. I mean that meaning and awareness are social constructs, definitely not proprietary to individuality.
That's because you've succumbed to Pirsig's brand of collectivism. Ayn Rand wrote: "There is no such thing as a collective brain. There is no such thing as a collective thought. ...no man can use his brain to think for another." Again, life is an individual experience, and so are the sensibilities, ideas, conceptions, aspirations, and comparative judgments which contribute to this experience. Sooner or later you're going to realize this existential truth. I'll put my money on it.;-)
But since you already agree that "unrealized value" is an oxymoron, start thinking about HOW value is realized and you'll discover that we don't borrow it from society, cultural norms, or authority. I'm talking about "values", not rote memory or behavior. Only an individual can realize value.
Once you realize that individuation and difference are the fundamental characteristics of existence, you'll never again be seduced by collectve ideology, And, as Mary often says, "The most important thing you will ever make is a realization "
Nice to chat with you again, John. Essentially yours, Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
