dmb said to Krimel:
I think it's important to realize that words like "perception" and "experience"
are terms that are also used by traditional SOM empiricists, sensory
empiricists. In that case, it is assumed that we're talking about the
perceptions and experiences of a subject who is set over against an objective,
pre-existing reality. Since these radical empiricists are rejecting that
premise, it has to be understood that they do NOT mean the feelings or
sensations of a subject. It wouldn't make any logical sense to say that
subjects are derived from subjective experience, would it? The notion that
there is experience without a subject is going to seem quite strange to a SOMer
but there is no way to make sense of these quotes unless you can grasp that
notion.
Krimel replied:
... I don't see James saying anything like, experience is not happening to some
particular person at some particular location. ... I fear it also jibes with
your romantic notion that 'the immediate flux of life' is "better" and not
equivalent term for perception because it sounds all vague and touchy feel, new
agey; or perhaps some irreducible concept. Whereas perception actually is a
meaningful and specifiable term, we wouldn't want that since that would mean
taking seriously the vast literature on the subject that in many respect
originates with James. Least you start your usual rant about young and old
James let me note that James cites his own Principles of Psychology throughout
both Some Problems... and in Essays... The older James hardly seems to be
repenting of his earlier work.
dmb says:
Well, this is what it really comes down to, isn't it? You don't see how James
the psychologist differs from James the philosopher. And our disagreements flow
from that fact. You're the psychologist but you don't believe that I'm really
doing philosophy, right? My perspective is just vague, romantic, new-age
nonsense whereas you use meaningful and specifiable terms. Okay, Mr.
Know-it-all, strap yourself in and prepare to be surprised. Shocking as it may
seem, you might actually learn something from little ole me. Wiki has made it
very easy to demonstrate that you are mistaken:
"Sciousness, a term coined by William James in The Principles of Psychology,
refers to consciousness separate from consciousness of self. James
wrote:Instead of the stream of thought being one of con-sciousness, 'thinking
its own existence along with whatever else it thinks'...it might better be
called a stream of Sciousness pure and simple, thinking objects of some of
which it makes what it calls a 'Me,' and only aware of its 'pure' Self in an
abstract, hypothetic or conceptual way. Each 'section' of the stream would then
be a bit of sciousness or knowledge of this sort, including and contemplating
its 'me' and its 'not-me' as objects which work out their drama together, but
not yet including or contemplating its own subjective being.[1]When James first
introduced "sciousness" he held back from proposing it as a possible prime
reality in The Principles of Psychology, warning that it "traverse[s] common
sense."[2]. He allowed that he might return to a consideration of sciousness at
the conclusion of the book, where he would "indulge in some metaphysical
reflections," but it was not until two years later in his conclusion to the
abridged edition of The Principles that he added:Neither common-sense, nor
psychology so far as it has yet been written, has ever doubted that the states
of consciousness which that science studies are immediate data of experience.
"Things" have been doubted, but thoughts and feelings have never been doubted.
The outer world, but never the inner world, has been denied. Everyone assumes
that we have direct introspective acquaintance with our thinking activity as
such, with our consciousness as something inward and contrasted with the outer
objects which it knows. Yet I must confess that for my part I cannot feel sure
of this conclusion. Whenever I try to become sensible of thinking activity as
such, what I catch is come bodily fact, an impression coming from my brow, or
head, or throat, or nose. It seems as if consciousness as an inner activity
were rather a postulate than a sensibly given fact, the postulate, namely, of a
knower as correlative to all this known; and as if "sciousness" might be a
better word by which to describe it. But "sciousness postulated as a
hypothesis" is a practically a very different thing from "states of
consciousness apprehended with infallible certainty by an inner sense." For one
thing, it throws the question of who the knower really is wide open….[3]Then
thirteen years later, writing solely as a philosopher, James returned to his
"parenthetical digression" of sciousness that "contradict[ed] the fundamental
assumption of every philosophic school."[4] James had founded a new school of
philosophy, called "radical empiricism," and nondual sciousness was its
starting-point. He even wrote a note to himself to "apologize for my dualistic
language, in the Principles."[5] James did not continue to use the word
"sciousness" in later essays on radical empiricism, but the concept is clearly
there as the "plain, unqualified …existence" he comes to call "pure
experience," in which there is "no self-splitting…into consciousness and what
the consciousness is of."[6]Pure experience sciousness was mostly attacked when
first presented.[7] With some notable exceptions, such as Bergson, Dewey, and
Whitehead, Western philosophers rejected James' view. That rejection continues
to this day."
dmb continues:
See, it's not so much that I am "reluctant to use the terms percept and
perception as more precise substitutes for the fuzzier terms used by Pirsig",
as you put it. I'm saying you can't rightly understanding radical empiricism in
terms of psychology. I think you're latching on to the term "perception" so
that you can do exactly that. If this really is your background, then it's only
natural that you'd want to have the debate on your turf, where you feel more
comfortable. Unfortunately, that's exactly what keeps you from grasping the
actual ideas in question. See, what happens is you're trying to understand a
non-dualistic experience in terms of subject-object dualism. You're asserting
SOM to oppose the rejection of SOM, which is like fighting chemotherapy with
cancer.
Want more proof? Check out this excerpt from a recent (flakey new-age) book
review:
Book review on "Sciousness" by Jonathan Bricklin (2007). Reviewed by David
Lorimer, 2010 published in Network Review No 102
The word in the title of his book will be unfamiliar to readers, who will be
surprised to learn that it comes from William James and refers to a quotation
from his Principles of Psychology where he expresses the view that the stream
of consciousness should be called 'Sciousness pure and simple', omitting the
con-, meaning with and implying a false sense of separation. This book brings
together an introductory essay by the editor, various papers by William James
and an essay by Theodore Flournoy on radical empiricism. The editor notes that
William James is the first modern-trained scientist to affirm the prime reality
of non-dual experience, a fact that is also likely to come as a surprise as so
little emphasis has been placed on this aspect of his thought. However, the
editor and James himself make a convincing case for this proposition.
The book begins with a long poem - On Believing in Mind - by the third Zen
patriarch about the nature of the Buddha mind, with lines such as 'The Ground
of all Being contains all the opposites. From the One, all things originate.
The wise man knows that all things are part of the One. The ignorant man sees
differences everywhere.' This sets the scene for the introductory essay, where
we learn almost immediately that James wrote 'The Witness' next to the word
'sciousness' in his own copy of The Principles; this concept will be familiar
to students of the Upanishads. Briefly, sciousness is
consciousness-without-self while consciousness is consciousness-with-self,
implying a relationship between the knower and the known - but then, as the Zen
koan would ask, who is the knower? A parallel thought is expressed in the two
forms of Buddhist samadhi: nirvikalpa (without-bifurcated-thought-construction)
and savikalpa (with-bifurcated-thought-construction). James even suggests that
the phrase 'it thinks' (cf it rains) is a simple and accurate description of
the state of affairs, adding that it is the stream of consciousness that
creates the I, the thought is the thinker, hence Tat Tvam Asi. Bricklin
proposes that to describe the feeling of self without reference to sciousness
is like describing sound without silence.
Krimel said:
But let me restate my original questions: Where is that quote Pirsig cites in
Lila? Has he just confused his own notes on James with actual writing by James?
Please note the recent brouhaha over Arlo's use of quotes. This seems far worse
so I really would be grateful if you can find the actual quote.
dmb says:
It seems you must be very desperate to find fault. It's a scandal for Pirsig
because YOU can't find the quote? C'mon, would you like to learn something or
are you just here to play silly games?
Seriously, Krimel. I haven't said much about the evidence provided to you here
because I think you're capable of reading and thinking and drawing your own
conclusions. Am I right to trust you that much? Do you see it?
>
> Given that "Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or
> sensation." (from Essays...) And that, "Instead of percept I shall often
> speak of sensation, feeling, intuition, and sometimes of sensible experience
> or of the immediate flow of conscious life." (From Some Problems...) Why are
> you reluctant to use the terms percept and perception as more precise
> substitutes for the fuzzier terms used by Pirsig?
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