Magnus, Thanks for reading it. I get very excited when I see how well the MoQ and Buddhism fit together and strengthen each other.
Marsha On Aug 17, 2010, at 2:59 PM, Magnus Berg wrote: > Hi Marsha > > Yes, that was an interesting paper, indeed. And it agrees with the MoQ on > many accounts. > > For example: > both the cognitive scientists we have cited and the Indian Buddhists we have > examined concur that disjunctive (vijñāna) as well as synthetic (saüjñā) > cognitive processes occur in nearly every perceptual event, corroborating > psychiatrist Oliver Sacks’ recent observation that “whether it is color or > motion, a double process of breaking down and building up, or decomposition > and recomposition—whatever one likes to call it—seems to be unavoidable.” > > This, in MoQ terms, is the level dependency. When a biological experience > occurs, that experience is also, simultaneously, an intellectual event via > the language of our nerve system. So, we have simply no way of distinguishing > one from the other, they are two aspects of the same event. Not sure why they > insists on dividing the event into decomposition and recomposition though. > > > Page 6: > if cognitive awareness is indeed “a function of the world and our biology > interacting,” then its arising is clearly a function of the responsive > structure of our sense faculties, our “biology,” together with the > correlative stimuli, the “world,” which impinges upon them. These are not two > essentially independent entities that just happen to come together, they are > two aspects of a single, integral event.29 Awareness of the world necessarily > arises in the very forms—the distinctions and categories—determined by the > structures and functions of the neural processes that subserve it. There is, > ordinarily, no other way that perceptions could appear. The categories that > are the “stuff of experience” are the same categories that are the “stuff” of > the world. It is our subsequent analysis that bifurcates them. > > The "single, integral event" is MoQs quality event. The categories they talk > about are different types of biological events, sight, hearing, taste, smell > etc. The "subsequent analysis" is made when the event has been transposed > into an intellectual pattern in our brain, as described above. It can then be > intellectualized further by experiencing that intellectual pattern more > directly. > > > Page 7: > this apparent “world” is therefore also a function of the categories that > constitute sensory awareness.30 This perspective involves the same kind of > inversion we saw between subject and object above: it is not the “world” that > determines the perceptions of an organism, but rather the perceptual > capacities of the organism that determine its “world,”31 its environment. > > We can of course only experience such events that our senses can perceive. > Our reality can't extend beyond that, normally. However, our eyes can't see > ultra-violet light for example. But if we're exposed by too much of it, we > will suffer nonetheless. So in some sense, ultra-violet light *is* a part of > our reality even though we can't see it. We only know about UV-light because > we have external sensory organs that *can* see it. So using such instruments, > we have extended our world. We haven't really objectified it. We're not able > to experience the external sensor in the same way as our internal ones. But > when we hear a good pilot of some vehicle, the vehicle and its instruments > are described as an extension of the pilot's own body. That means that the > world of the pilot is actually extended by those instruments when he drives > the vehicle. The gyro instrument of a plane gets very tightly connected to > the brain through the eyes, he can hear the engine and react very quickly to > variations in revs, a F1-driver can feel the traction of the tyres to the > asphalt and react instinctively when the grip fails, and so on. > > > Page 14: > It is a final irony that it is the virtual, not actual, reference that > symbols provide, which gives rise to this experience of self. The most > undeniably real experience is a virtual reality.... its virtual nature > notwithstanding, it is the symbolic realm of consciousness that we most > identify with and from which our sense of agency and self-control originate. > > > This was a cool quote. To me, the virtual reference is an intellectual > pattern referencing another intellectual pattern in our brain, whereas an > actual reference is an intellectual pattern referencing some other type of > pattern, for example a previous biological experience. A virtual experience > is for example Descarte's "I think". > > > All in all, a great paper, thanks for the link. > > Magnus > > > > > > On 2010-08-17 11:23, MarshaV wrote: >> >> Greetings, >> >> I'm only to page five, but I find this an extremely interesting paper. >> Sorry I >> forgot the url: >> >> http://www.gampoabbey.org/translations2/Co-arising%20of%20SOWS-Waldron.pdf >> >> >> Marsha >> > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
