Quote, DMB david buchanan aan moq_discuss details weergeven 19:16 (20 uren geleden)
This thread began with passages from William James biography and they were posted to contradict Krimel's misconceptions about the radical empiricism of James and Pirsig. As Robert Richardson says, there was a "serious discrepancy between his account of experience in THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY and his ..new doctrine of 'pure experience'". James's biographer says that in the PRINCIPLES James had "believed that there was an objective world 'out there' that we as individuals could never know" but with this new doctrine of pure experience "James had dropped the old dualism of subject and object and was arguing that experience is all there is." (pp. 465-6.) In other words, he was a SOMer when he wrote his psychology book but dropped that outlook when he wrote his essays on radical empiricism. "In 'Does Consciousness Exist?', "James argues that instead of dueling entities there is only process. ...The result of James's radical empiricism is to move the modern mind away from seventeenth-century Cartesian dualism and toward what we might call process philosophy; to wean us away from falling back on conceptions and to encourage us to trust our perc eptions; to admit feelings to full standing, along with ideas, as aspects of rationality". (pp. 448-51) Since Pirsig's "Quality" is the same as James's "pure experience", this is important to understand for anyone who's interested in the MOQ but it also happens to serve as knock-down evidence against the notion that James's empiricism is not different from James's psychology. "James put forth the doctrine because he thought ordinary empiricism, inspired by the advances in physical science, has or had the tendency to emphasize 'whirling particles' at the expense of the bigger picture: connections, causality, meaning. Both elements, James claims, are equally present in experience and both need to be accounted for. The observation that our adherence to science seems to put us in a quandary is not exclusive to James. For example Bertrand Russell notes the paradox in his Analysis of Matter (1927): we appeal to ordinary perception to arrive at our physical theories, yet those same theories seem to undermine that everyday perception, which is rich in meaning. Radical empiricism relates to discussions about direct versus indirect realism as well as to early twentieth-century discussions against the idealism of influential philosophers like Josiah Royce. This is how Neo-realists like William Pepperell Montague and Ralph Barton Perry interpreted James. The conclusion that our worldview does not need transempirical support is also important in discussions about the adequacy of naturalistic descriptions of meaning and intentionality, which James attempts to provide, in contrast to phenomenological approaches or some forms of reductionism that claim that meaning is an illusion." Comment , Adrie Well thanks for providing an answer to one of my earlier questions about nesting dogma's within reality. Clearly you took the effort to submerge into the matter, the answer is solid.I think it becomes important to me to read James. I will have a look around in the library for translations. If you can advice good title's i will have a lead. Thx in advance , DMB. 2010/9/4 david buchanan <[email protected]> > > This thread began with passages from William James biography and they were > posted to contradict Krimel's misconceptions about the radical empiricism of > James and Pirsig. > As Robert Richardson says, there was a "serious discrepancy between his > account of experience in THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY and his ..new > doctrine of 'pure experience'". James's biographer says that in the > PRINCIPLES James had "believed that there was an objective world 'out there' > that we as individuals could never know" but with this new doctrine of pure > experience "James had dropped the old dualism of subject and object and was > arguing that experience is all there is." (pp. 465-6.) In other words, he > was a SOMer when he wrote his psychology book but dropped that outlook when > he wrote his essays on radical empiricism. "In 'Does Consciousness Exist?', > "James argues that instead of dueling entities there is only process. ...The > result of James's radical empiricism is to move the modern mind away from > seventeenth-century Cartesian dualism and toward what we might call process > philosophy; to wean us away from falling back on conceptions and to > encourage us to trust our perc > eptions; to admit feelings to full standing, along with ideas, as aspects > of rationality". (pp. 448-51) > > > Since Pirsig's "Quality" is the same as James's "pure experience", this is > important to understand for anyone who's interested in the MOQ but it also > happens to serve as knock-down evidence against the notion that James's > empiricism is not different from James's psychology. > > "James put forth the doctrine because he thought ordinary empiricism, > inspired by the advances in physical science, has or had the tendency to > emphasize 'whirling particles' at the expense of the bigger picture: > connections, causality, meaning. Both elements, James claims, are equally > present in experience and both need to be accounted for. > The observation that our adherence to science seems to put us in a quandary > is not exclusive to James. For example Bertrand Russell notes the paradox in > his Analysis of Matter (1927): we appeal to ordinary perception to arrive at > our physical theories, yet those same theories seem to undermine that > everyday perception, which is rich in meaning. > Radical empiricism relates to discussions about direct versus indirect > realism as well as to early twentieth-century discussions against the > idealism of influential philosophers like Josiah Royce. This is how > Neo-realists like William Pepperell Montague and Ralph Barton Perry > interpreted James. > The conclusion that our worldview does not need transempirical support is > also important in discussions about the adequacy of naturalistic > descriptions of meaning and intentionality, which James attempts to provide, > in contrast to phenomenological approaches or some forms of reductionism > that claim that meaning is an illusion." > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > -- parser Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
