More on reification from a Buddhist point-of-view:
Tsongkhapa's View of Reality: To understand Tsongkhapa's view of reality, it
is imperative to make the subtle, but crucial, distinction between mere
figments of the imagination and conventionally existent phenomena. Let us begin
with the subject of personal identity. On the basis of our awareness of our own
bodies, behavior, memories, feelings, thoughts, fantasies, consciousness,
possessions, friends, environment and so on, we develop a sense of personal
identity. This self-concept is not static, but varies in accordance with the
personal events that capture our attention from moment to moment and from day
to day. Thus, a very high degree of editing goes into the selection of personal
phenomena upon which we establish our identities. The self so designated is not
identical with any of the phenomena upon which it is is imputed; rather, it is
conceived as the person who possesses those aggregates of the personality and
so on as its own attributes or affiliations. Thus, while t
his self does not exist independently of this conceptual designation, it is
conventionally valid to speak of it as performing actions, experiencing the
consequences of those deeds, and interacting with other people, the
environment, and so forth. In this way the self is said by Tsongkhapa to be
conventionally existent.
There is a powerful, innate tendency, however, to hypostatize, or reify, this
conceptually constructed self, grasping onto it as being inherently existent,
independent of any conceptual designation. Such an intrinsic personal identity,
Tsongkhapa claims, is totally a figment of the imagination, with no basis in
reality whatsoever. A central task of contemplative inquiry is to establish
experientially that such a self has no existence either among the constituents
of one's personality or apart from them. Moreover, if the self is designated on
the basis of non-existent attributes, or by means of a denial of existent
attributes, even the conventionally designated self is a groundless
fabrication, devoid of even conventional existence.
Even if one has a limited degree of insight into the conceptually designated
status of one's identity, there remains the strong tendency to view one's body
and other macro-objects of the physical environment as bearing their own
intrinsic identities. Indeed, as we visually perceive the physical world,
including our own bodies, it appears to exist purely objectively, from its own
side. This mode of appearance, Tsongkhapa declares, is utterly deceptive. All
that seems to appear purely from the side of perceived objects is in fact
thoroughly structured by our conceptual frameworks.
Perceptual objects reified by the mind do not exist in nature, but are solely
fabrications without even conventional existence. In addition, due to objective
sources of illusion or psychological and physiological influences, we may
apprehend objects that do not exist, misidentify objects that do exist, or fail
to perceive objects that do exist and are otherwise accessible to our
perceptions. All of these faulty perceptions constitute errors of apprehension
apart from the tendency of reification.
(Wallace, Alan, 'The Bridge of Quiescence')
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