Matt, Okay maybe ""words are so much less than the experience" were not the best choice, but I cannot think of any words that would be better. I'm not a master mediation teacher. I want to say something, but I'm at a loss to find the proper language. It seems the story of my life. Sorry.
Marsha On Nov 18, 2010, at 1:20 PM, Matt Kundert wrote: > > Hi John, > > John said: > I wonder if you could tell me the cash value of pre-conceptual > experience? > > Matt: > If you've been reading my replies to Dave, you'll see that I don't advise > buying a lot of stock in that particular concept, so it is difficult for me > to say what the cash value is because it is lower for me than others, > which means when I try to explain why others find more value in it, it > usually comes out in such invidious-sounding terms as Nietzsche's > "metaphysical comfort." But whatever it is, no, it's not usually faith. > > As I see it, the attempt to recoup "pre-conceptual experience" rests > on 1) a philosophy of language that rests on Kant and 2) a love of > silence. The former, I've been led to think by Rorty, Davidson and > Robert Brandom, won't work. It's a bad philosophy of language. > The latter, on the other hand, is just a reference to sitting and > watching sunsets, enjoying walks in the wilderness, etc. There's no > inherent problem with this at all, though it too has a contentious > rhetorical tradition that we are becoming more and more conscious > of in, for example, literary studies with current interest in ecology. > Ecology has a rhetoric, and an occasionally nasty one that the great > American progressive historian Frederick Jackson Turner first, ahem, > pioneered in The Frontier in American History. (And if you wonder > why I say "nasty," ask an American Indian what "manifest destiny" is.) > > John said: > It seems to me, that if something is pre-conceptual, then we can't > concieve it, think about it, talk about it, poeticize it or contemplate it > in any way. Pragmatically speaking, it doesn't even exist. > > Matt: > That's kind of right. What one wants to say, on the other hand, is > that you can still _experience_ it (which is oddly against Kant). If > you have no concepts, no language, you can still stub your toe. The > empiricist in people cries out for us to acknowledge the existence of > the non-conceptual--stuff that isn't an idea. We might only be able > to do this by pointing with an idea, but how is this any different than > the old mystic trope of pointing at the moon. The big deal, as I see > it however, is all in the prefix: how do we choose between "pre-" > and "non-"? I have no problems with "non-", but I struggle to see > what benefit we get in distinguishing between "non-" and "pre-", > and stressing the importance of "pre-". > > For a kind of dialectical tour around the notion of Dynamic Quality > and this issue, one that arose if I remember correctly in dialogue > with Marsha (and so might be convenient in response to her catcall), > you might check out this post: > http://pirsigaffliction.blogspot.com/2006/04/dynamic-quality-as-pre-intellectual.html > > For Marsha encapsulates quite well the purity-response I don't > understand and the reality-response I think unavailable to > pragmatists and Pirsigians (and I would think self-described relativists, > too). In answer to your question above, she said, "Why don't you find > out for yourself? Being a skeptic, I think that might be the only way > you might appreciate its value, especially when words are so much > less than the experience and you are prone to needing proof." The > rhetorical question is an echo of Bo Skutvik's much acclaimed and > applauded response to Struan Hellier in Lila's Child: go find out more > about reality. It has been applauded over the years because of the > sense most have of what DQ is, but I think that response should be > unavailable to a properly Pirsigian believer in the relativity of static > patterns. And the sentiment that "words are so much less than the > experience" exemplifies the grading we find in purity-responses (in > this case, more a plenitude-response). My reaction now is still the > same as in the post on my site: the sense that words "lose > something" when describing an experience is a function of the > difficulty of articulation, of expressing. If you have a high level of > articulation or a low threshold for success, you might think nothing is > lost between your experience and your words about the experience. > But that relativity in levels on those two different valences obscures > completely our ability to be able to tell if something, _in reality_, is > lost or not. If all we have is experience, and _not_ an invidious > distinction between reality and experience, then it's tough to attain > the authority to tell someone that they may _think_ they've captured > their experience perfectly, but they are _actually_ wrong. You might > convince them otherwise, but that takes words. > > Matt > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
