Hi DMB,
On Tue, May 3, 2011 at 1:45 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: > > Steve said: > ...I can only believe something if I actually think it is true. Clearly we > don't choose beliefs freely. In fact there is no "I" outside of such value > patterns. Rather we ARE our beliefs (as well as our other patterns of > preference.) > > dmb says: > Right, we can only adopt new beliefs if they fit. They have to harmonize with > existing beliefs, our temperament and purposes, etc.. It has to be plausible, > it has to work and it has to matter. The new view has to be a "live option", > as James called it. We are "wedged and controlled", he said. Our truths are > wedged between sensible, concrete realities and the whole set of existing > beliefs. But to say there are controlling factors is not the same thing as > saying they are determined. Determinism is a pretty strong word. In fact, we > don't need to exaggerate or use hyperbole to paint it as a rather drastic > view. It says all events are determined by a perfect chain of causality, > going all the way back to the big bang or to God, conceived as the First > Cause. Steve: I am only saying that we cannot as a matter of will make our beliefs other than what they are. That is not to support the notion of determinism. The causal chain "all the way back to the big bang" you mention is a story about how we got from the past to the present. The fact that it is possible to weave such a narrative (or narratives) does not mean that the future is already determined. It only means that we are likely to be able to tell such a story about the present day from the perspective of the future once we arrive there just as we were able to tell stories explain the past in terms of causal chains before. The future is determined by the present only in this very innocuous sense that we will some day tell such stories about today. > Steve said: > My point was to say that free will/ determinism is an issue with no practical > consequences and therefore a fake philosophical problem not that we ought to > "choose free will." What could it ever mean to behave as though you don't > have any choice in the matter at hand? It is to ask, what would you choose if > you had no choice? A nonsensical question. > > dmb says: > Well, the issue sort of dissolves for MOQers because, like you said, the > autonomous subject and causality itself are no longer assumed starting > points. But the determinism would have profound moral consequences. Nobody > could ever be held responsible for their actions and nothing we say or do > could ever make a difference. All we can do is play the roles exactly as they > were written. Steve: True. I suppose this is why the scientific materialistic determinism debate you described is at all of isssue. Would that actually be such a bad thing with regard to our philosophy of criminal justice to see things in light of explanations that don't merely cease at the free choice of a moral agent? The past really can be used to understand the present far better than the notion of an unpredictable autonomous agent that chooses freely how to behave in all circumstances. Understanding the causes of crime is the best hope for curbing it. Does that mean that criminals ought not be incarcerated? Of course not, but our focus would be on prevention and rehabilitation (as it should be) rather than punishment. Such a view would make us far more compassionate and more moral rather than leaving us with a nightmare version of no one being responsible for their actions. On the contrary, a denial of the autonomous agent and a view in terms of causes and effects rather than unmoved movers would tell us that everything we say or do makes a difference, and that knowledge itself would make a positive difference. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
