Steve said: ...I can only believe something if I actually think it is true. Clearly we don't choose beliefs freely. In fact there is no "I" outside of such value patterns. Rather we ARE our beliefs (as well as our other patterns of preference.)
Ron jumps in: I agree, but that is not to say they are determined, set in stone, unable to change. As proponants of an MoQ we ought to be re-examining our reasons for our values, reflect on why we hold certain values that make up the "I". In my own experience it's the knee-jerk prejudices that I examine most. It is not easy because as you say we are invested in certain beliefs, we dedfine ourselves by them ALTHOUGH we CAN change them we may exercise the choice, difficult as it is. Having PTSD, it is essential to work on those patterns of value or those values dominate your life. The fundemental belief in freeing ones "self" from rigid values is the belief in the power of choice and change. That is why I think the term "derminism" does not hold an accurate assessment pertaining to ALL static patterns of value and why I disagree with Dan. dmb says to Steve: Right, we can only adopt new beliefs if they fit. They have to harmonize with existing beliefs, our temperament and purposes, etc.. It has to be plausible, it has to work and it has to matter. The new view has to be a "live option", as James called it. We are "wedged and controlled", he said. Our truths are wedged between sensible, concrete realities and the whole set of existing beliefs. But to say there are controlling factors is not the same thing as saying they are determined. Determinism is a pretty strong word. In fact, we don't need to exaggerate or use hyperbole to paint it as a rather drastic view. It says all events are determined by a perfect chain of causality, going all the way back to the big bang or to God, conceived as the First Cause. Ron inserting his 2cents: Agree, it really is an inaccurate portrayal of what we mean by "static patterns of value" in a broad general sense of the term. It is so drastic, and the philosophic consequences so great that to claim that it holds foundational meaning pertaining to the MoQ is disaterous to the whole meaning of the word "Quality". Steve said: The above had the problem I always had with Pascal's Wager. Even if we think it would be good to believe something we think is false, we can't simply will ourselves to do so. dmb says: Yea, and Pascal tries to motivate us to place a bet on God by arguing that eternity is a long time and so there is a great deal at stake. It begs the question because you have to believe in eternal heaven to think there is anything at stake. I can't think of a less pragmatic way to frame it. The consequences of our beliefs will be felt in the afterlife? This is the sort of thing that gave rise to James's notion of beliefs as either dead and living options. For me, pearly gates and golden streets are impossible to believe. Sure, that would be nice and I'd like to believe that I'll live forever but what I CAN believe is that life will go on for millions of years. Hope it includes human life of some kind for a long while. I think we shouldn't say anything about "eternity". I also think mortality has always been a fact of life for everything that has ever lived. It's about time we got used to it. Ron: I think thats why the belief in betterness, cuts away all the rational explanations and leaves with a verifyable empirical reality that is also an answer to those rationalist appeals for ethics and morality, it gives reasons for good besides eternal social appeals to ideals of reward and authority. Steve said: My point was to say that free will/ determinism is an issue with no practical consequences and therefore a fake philosophical problem not that we ought to "choose free will." What could it ever mean to behave as though you don't have any choice in the matter at hand? It is to ask, what would you choose if you had no choice? A nonsensical question. dmb says: Well, the issue sort of dissolves for MOQers because, like you said, the autonomous subject and causality itself are no longer assumed starting points. But the determinism would have profound moral consequences. Nobody could ever be held responsible for their actions and nothing we say or do could ever make a difference. All we can do is play the roles exactly as they were written. Ron: I think You have really touched on the value of holding such a view, the reasons why one would preffer such a belief and why one would hold to it strongly and it all hinges on personal responsibility. DmB: And yes, the debate lends itself to all sorts of seemingly paradoxical claims about being determined to believe in free will or being free to choose determinism. I think these aren't much more than linguistic card tricks. The consequences of believing one or the other would be felt in practical situations, like the courts. What does democracy and political freedom mean in a determined world? In that sense, it's not a fake problem. Ron: Again Dave, a sound conclusion and the reason why I am choosing to disagree with Dan on the issue. Steve said: Outside of a religious context I can't see how the free will/determinism question is one we ought to feel like we need to solve. It is purely philosophical in the derogatory sense of the term unless you need to sort out the theological problem of evil. Ron: True, but as Dave stated above it does support a point of view of not being responsible for your values or reasons for holding them having large philosophical consequences, especially when one claims that it composes a rather large portion of the framework of the MoQ. I agree, MoQ does render the Problem moot that is why I contend that it can't possibly reflect the broad general framework of Pirsigs ideas. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
