Hi Matt, Steve, Matt: > ... if determinism is the > thesis that we are caught up in causal chains, then it is not > destructive of moral reasoning because moral reasoning is > something that occurs partly _because_ of causal chains. Moral > reasoning _needs_ causal chains. And if that's the case, why on > earth would determinism destroy moral reasoning?
Steve: That's basically what Dennett said in the interview Ham and Craig referenced, and it's a great point. Dennett reformulates free will as the human capacity to play out scenarios in our heads before acting them out and then asks, what good would free will be without determinism? If we didn't think that our actions had at least somewhat predictable effects (including effects on other people and what we think they will do in response to what we do), what good would it be to be able to choose among possible actions? Instead of free will opposing determinism, free will depends on determinism. As you point out above, the same goes for the notion of moral responsibility. Moral responsibility cannot be threatened by determinism when moral reasoning can only make sense in the context of determinism. In that interview Dennett also clears up confusion between fatalism and determinism which I think have been confused in this thread. Fatalism means that whatever we do we cannot avoid a given outcome whereas determinism says that what we do matters. Different actions have different consequences. Then there is the issue of _pre_determination which I think is only a concern if you imagine an omniscient super-being, (snip) Ron: I think this really places a finger on the problem in regard to the difficulty being experienced in the discussion. I think it is pointless to carry on the arguement any further until the air has been cleared on just what we mean by "determinism" and how or if freedom or "free will" is concieved within this context. Now, to say that free will vanishes the closer one looks at it , one must take care as to what one means by using the term "free will" . The linch pin statement that all involved should begin from is: "what good would free will be without determinism? If we didn't think that our actions had at least somewhat predictable effects (including effects on other people and what we think they will do in response to what we do), what good would it be to be able to choose among possible actions? Instead of free will opposing determinism, free will depends on determinism." In the light of this statement, "free will" is as "real" as intellectual patterns of Quality, so it does not do it justice to say that free will is a delusional concept simply because it emerges from deterministic patterns of value. But it does beg the question of "how free is free will?" and it does begin a discussion on just what we mean by using the term in the context of our community here on the discuss and the consequences of doing so. To begin to reduce the concept of free will in this context is to begin to trace the notion back to more restrictions on what we typically mean by the term "free". But having said this, and having reduced it to the act of prefference in a more metaphysical and physical explanation of experience in broad general terms we find that static deterministic prefferences emerge from a chaotic "free" state with freedom, absolute freedom, the kind Steve seems to be arguing against as functional to our experience, is a purely dynamic state and this is a good point to take up in the context of intellectual meaning. Does that mean that Dynamic Quality is equated with chaos? if so Dynamic Quality can not be equated with betterness in a purely metaphysical explanation. Only within the context of static determined prefferences does the good emerge from the chaotic. and within the context of what it means to "be" or to say experience, does Dynamic Quality take on the meaning of the source of the good. In the practicality as living beings it holds that particular meaning to us. So it is more useful to us as understood as the source of the good rather than the good itself. What does that mean to the statement that all static patterns migrate toward Dynamic Quality? In light of what was just stated, I believe this statement takes on greater meaning as static patterns migrate toward the source of the good rather than dynamic freedom, which is to say a chaotic state. The statement then has contextual meaning to a static being of experience and less as a more objective abstract metaphysical explanation. Great debate, to all who are involved, could have done without all the shit slinging..Steve but good dialog despite. Thanks ........................................................................................................ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
