Dmb, I would accuse you of misconstruing the argument and James's position but that would be too generous. You're just making stuff up, probably to avoid the burden of addressing the actual argument. You freakin weasel.
Marsha On Jun 24, 2011, at 12:10 PM, david buchanan wrote: > > Steve: > ...I think it was relevant to MY point which was that whatever James lied > awake worrying about as a young man is not necessarily what it means to be > philosophically Jamesian. I should try to be more straight-forward. Sometimes > I forget how slow you are. > > dmb says: > That's not true either. James's depression over determinism was a pivotal > crisis in his life and it had a profound impact on the way he thought about > things. And let me remind you why I mentioned his suicidal days in the first > place. You said that the debate between free will and determinism is a fake > problem with no practical consequences. But all of the biographers and most > of the scholars of James acknowledge the pivotal role that event played in > James's life and thought. To suggest this is not relevant to the formation of > his pragmatism is simply wrong. To suggest that depression and suicide don't > count as practical consequences is to misread the nature of James's pragmatism > > > Steve: > > Please try again to retract your claim that the existential angst you or > James has about an idea should count toward justification that that idea is > true. Talk about relativism. > > dmb says: > In his Pragmatism James defended his position against critics who said > exactly what you are saying. James was pretty scathing about it too. He said > such critics seem to be deliberately misreading him. He said those who accuse > him of endorsing wishful thinking were probably guilty of "impudent slander". > Feelings have nothing to do with it, his critics said. Oh yes they do, James > insisted, and we really ought not pretend otherwise. This is just an > overlooked factor, however, not the standard of truth. The pragmatist's truth > is "wedge and controlled" like no other, he said. The truth is wedged between > the perceptual flux and the conceptual order because our truths must agree > with experience and they have to make sense in relation to the whole system > of thought. Feelings can't override those empirical demands but come into > play when the issue can't be decided on the basis of fact or reason. Have you > ever read his Pragmatism? The Meaning of Truth? It's all quite clear and > precise. > > From Pragmatism, Lecture VI: Pragmatism's Conception of Truth. > > Our duty to agree with reality is seen to be grounded in a perfect jungle of > concrete expediencies. > When Berkeley had explained what people meant by matter, people thought that > he denied matter's existence. When Messrs. Schiller and Dewey now explain > what people mean by truth, they are accused of denying its existence. These > pragmatists destroy all objective standards, critics say, and put foolishness > and wisdom on one level. A favorite formula for describing Mr. Schiller's > doctrines and mine is that we are persons who think that by saying whatever > you find it pleasant to say and calling it truth you fulfil every > pragmatistic requirement. > I leave it to you to judge whether this be not an impudent slander. Pent in, > as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees himself to be, between the whole > body of funded truths squeezed from the past and the coercions of the world > of sense about him, who so well as he feels the immense pressure of objective > control under which our minds perform their operations? If anyone imagines > that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day, says Emerson. We > have heard much of late of the uses of the imagination in science. It is high > time to urge the use of a little imagination in philosophy. The unwillingness > of some of our critics to read any but the silliest of possible meanings into > our statements is as discreditable to their imaginations as anything I know > in recent philosophic history. Schiller says the true is that which ‘works.’ > Thereupon he is treated as one who limits verification to the lowest material > utilities. Dewey says truth is what gives ‘satisfaction.’ He is treated as > one who believes in calling everything true which, if it were true, would be > pleasant. > > > I await your reasonable, polite response. > > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
