Hi Horse, Horse: > Hi Folks > > A couple of things that need to be cleared up in relation to free will as I > see it: > > 1) In a reality in which everything is a moral activity (MoQ) any act is a > moral act - so we can't help but act morally according to the MoQ. The > argument which requires free will in order to act morally would appear to be > irrelevant - we can't help but act morally regardless of the existence of > free will. > > "The Metaphysics of Quality says that if moral judgements are essentially > assertions of value and if value is the fundamental ground-stuff of the > world, then moral judgements are the fundamental ground-stuff of the > world...... > .....So what Phædrus was saying was that not just life, but everything, is > an ethical activity. It is nothing else. When inorganic patterns of reality > create life the Metaphysics of Quality postulates that they’ve done so > because it’s “better” and that this definition of “betterness”—this > beginning response to Dynamic Quality—is an elementary unit of ethics upon > which all right and wrong can be based." > > How does throwing free will into the mix make any difference to inherent > moral behaviour as a pre-requisite of existence? Or is the MoQ wrong when it > states that existence is a moral order?
Steve: Agreed. I have made that point to dmb several times, but he still insists that the link between free will and moral responsibility is a logical necessity. Horse: > 2) There seems to have been a tendency recently to equate free will with DQ. > Equating (or more accurately conflating) the two in this way is a mistake - > in my opinion - as it tends to intellectualise/compartmentalise DQ. Which is > always a mistake. Steve: Agreed. DQ is what gets you off the hot stove _before_ consciously deliberating about it. It is not what gives us a sense of control of our destiny. In fact, if someone upon jumping off a hot stove slammed into someone else knocking them over and injuring them, we would surely not hold that person culpable for the injury inflicted. So defining "free will" as following DQ is not the locus of moral agency sought for in the usual use of the term "free will." Pirsig calls following DQ freedom, but if it isn't a self-conscious choice, then it isn't what is meant by free will in the English language. As Pirsig said in LC, "We must all use terms as they are described in the dictionary or we lose the ability to communicate with each other." The equation of DQ and free will does not add to our understanding of DQ and hinders communication. Horse: > 3) The degree to which we are free to act - i.e. have the greatest choice - > increases as we move up the static value hierarchy but still doesn't appear > to be completely free. Statically, we can only choose between those patterns > that already exist - i.e. we can have a PRE-ference for a PRE-existing > static pattern. If we choose not to prefer an existing pattern and instead > opt for a new pattern of our own creation then we are following DQ. Opting > for another's creation is certainly not following DQ. Steve: Right. In the traditional view of free will, free will is the capacity to, say, choose pepperoni over sausage for my slice of pizza without dependence on previous states of the world. It just doesn't make sense to wonder in such a situation which topping would be the more dynamic choice. Note also that though as we move up the hierarchy there is more freedom in the sense of DQ or versatility, there is also more constraint since each level depends on the level below it for its existence. Biological patterns only depend on inorganic patterns, while intellectual patterns have dependence on social, biological, _and_ inorganic patterns. Horse: > I think this ties in with what Pirsig says re:SQ/DQ and behaviour: > > "In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn’t come up. To the extent > that one’s behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is > without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is > undefinable, one’s behavior is free." > > I think we need to come up with a better way of expressing the idea of free > will cos at the moment it just doesn't seem to be getting too far. Steve: Agreed. Or better yet, let's pick up on Pirsig's notion of freedom as DQ and drop the notion of freedom as conscious willing. These are certainly incompatible views of human freedom. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
