. . . The funny thing was that when she said he was trying to kill her, that was insane - but it wasn't entirely incorrect. He was trying to kill her - not the biological Lila, but the static patterns that were really going to kill her if she didn't let go.
>From the static point of view the whole escape into Dynamic Quality seems like >a death experience. It's a movement from something to nothing. How can >'nothing' be any different from death? Since a Dynamic understanding doesn't >make the static distinctions necessary to answer that question, the question >goes unanswered. All the Buddha could say was, 'See for yourself.' When early Western investigators first read the Buddhist texts they too interpreted nirvana as some kind of suicide. There's a famous poem that goes: While living, Be a dead man. Be completely dead, And then do as you please. And all will be well. It sounds like something from a Hollywood horror-film but it's about nirvana. The Metaphysics of Quality translates it: While sustaining biological and social patterns Kill all intellectual patterns. Kill them completely And then follow Dynamic Quality And morality will be served. ... The Metaphysics of Quality translated karma as 'evolutionary garbage.' That's why it sounded so funny as the name of a boat. It seemed to suggest she had arrived in Kingston on a garbage scow. Karma is the pain, the suffering that results from clinging to the static patterns of the world. The only exit from the suffering is to detach yourself from these static patterns, that is, to 'kill' them. On Aug 6, 2011, at 9:08 AM, Steven Peterson wrote: > Hi All, > > I wanted to clean the slate by starting a new thread to discuss the > relationship of the association of free will with dynamic quality > based on a few quotes from Lila. > > First of all, in response to "the ancient free will vs. determinism > controversy." > > Pirsig continues: > "This battle has been a very long and very loud one because an abandonment > of either position has devastating logical consequences. If the belief in > free will is abandoned, morality must seemingly also be abandoned under a > subject-object metaphysics. If man follows the cause-and-effect laws of > substance, then man cannot really choose between right and wrong. > On the other hand, if the determinists let go of their position it would > seem to deny the truth of science. If one adheres to a traditional > scientific metaphysics of substance, the philosophy of determinism is an > inescapable corollary. If "everything" is included in the class of > "substance and its properties," and if "substance and its properties" is > included in the class of "things that always follow laws," and if "people" > are included in the class "everything," then it is an air-tight logical > conclusion that people always follow the laws of substance. > To be sure, it doesn't seem as though people blindly follow the laws of > substance in everything they do, but within a Deterministic explanation > that is just another one of those illusions that science is forever > exposing. All the social sciences, including anthropology, were founded on > the bed-rock metaphysical belief that these physical cause-and-effect laws > of human behavior exist. Moral laws, if they can be said to exist at all, > are merely an artificial social code that has nothing to do with the real > nature of the world. A "moral" person acts conventionally, "watches out > for the cops," "keeps his nose clean," and nothing more. > > In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the extent > that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is > without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which > is undefinable. one's behavior is free. > > The Metaphysics of Quality has much much more to say about ethics, however, > than simple resolution of the Free Will vs Determinism controversy. The > Metaphysics of Quality says that if moral judgments are essentially > assertions of value and if value is the fundamental ground-stuff of the > world, then moral judgments are the fundamental ground-stuff of the world." > > > Steve: > Since Pirsig describes human freedom as "the extent that one follows > Dynamic Quality" and does so in the context of the free will vs. > determinism controversy, it seems that he must be equating the > capacity to respond to Dynamic Quality with free will. Pirsig defines > determinism as "the philosophic doctrine that man, like all other > objects in the universe, follows fixed scientific laws, and does so > without exception." This horn ought to be rejected based on Pirsig's > discussion of Newton's Laws of Gravitation in ZAMM. The idea that > scientific laws come before the particles that are supposed to follow > these laws is just an idea which from an evolutionary perspective > comes _after_ particles. > > He then defines free will as "the philosophic doctrine that man makes > choices independent of the atoms of his body." I contend that "free > will" can't merely be the capacity to make choices and have > preferences. Otherwise philosophers would have regarded animals as > having free will since they exhibit preferences and make choices. > There isn't necessarily any willing involved. Will is not mere agency > as the capacity to take action. It is the capacity to take volitional > action. It has always been matter of distinguishing voluntary from > involuntary action. If an action is involuntary, it is not a willed > act. Will is a matter of intentional behavior, and the question of > freedom with regard to will is then usually a question of whether we > are free to have intentions other than what we have. Where do our > intentions come from? Do we choose them in some sense? Do they come > from us? What do we mean by "us" in this context? These are difficult > questions, but Pirsig avoids the pitfall of trying to make sense of > the self as a metaphysical entity and instead takes freedom to be > about dynamic quality. As Pirsig put it, "When they call it freedom, > that's not right. "Freedom" doesn't mean anything. Freedom's just an > escape from something negative. The real reason it's so hallowed is > that when people talk about it they mean Dynamic Quality." So we can > dispense with the question of whether will is or is not free or rather > understand it to be a matter of dynamic-static tension rather than an > all or nothing. > > But there remains a problem with equating free will with the capacity > to follow dynamic quality. It isn't that following dynamic quality > isn't free. It is by definition. The problem is that following DQ is > at least not always intentional. It is not necessarily a matter of > will (a voluntary act accompanied by a felt intention) at all. > > Consider Pirsig's "hot stove" illustration of what it means to follow > Dynamic Quality as a means for understanding what the equation of > following DQ and free will could mean: > > "When the person who sits on the stove first discovers > his low-Quality situation, the front edge of his experience is Dynamic. He > does not think, "This stove is hot," and then make a rational decision to > get off. A "dim perception of he knows not what" gets him off Dynamically. > Later he generates static patterns of thought to explain the situation." > > If getting off the stove is following DQ and if there was no conscious > decision to get off the stove, then it was not a voluntary act. It was > not a willing. So it would seem to be a serious error to call it free > will when it doesn't involve will. > > On the other hand, if we can find examples of taking voluntary action > to successfully follow DQ, then such examples would be examples of > exercising free will based on Pirsig's formulation and the volition > implied in the word "will." Can you think of any examples? One problem > with finding such examples may be that DQ is pre-intellectual. Does > that inhibit the possibility of making a conscious decision to follow > it that could be correctly regarded as willing an intention? > > Again, since there seemed to be so much miscommunication, I started > this new thread to hopefully reboot the conversation to make sure it > is about Pirsig's philosophy instead of the personalities of the > participants. > > Best, > Steve > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
