Dmb, Seems like an unsubstantiated opinion piece. Want to try again?
Marsha On Aug 7, 2011, at 1:19 PM, david buchanan wrote: > > Steve said to Ham: > I wonder if Dennett takes determinism as the belief that natural laws are > true as a metaphysical assertion or a pragmatic one. If the latter I agree > with Dennett and in some weak sense a "determinist." If we take determinism > to mean that there is a degree of predictability about the world, then few > would deny it. But this is not how Pirsig defined determinism as the doctrine > that "man follows the cause-and-effect laws of substance." I deny that sort > of determinism along with Pirsig. Note also that reality is Quality, then > even substances don't follow the cause and effect laws of substance but > rather exercise preference. > > > dmb says: > These are the sorts of comments that make me think it would be reasonable to > describe your positions as a kind of value determinism. Or maybe even better, > a kind of soft determinism, a.k.a. old school compatibilism. Didn't you post > that famous Schopenhauer line? "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will > what he wills". And doesn't Sam Harris's neurological determinism make the > same basic claim? "In other words", Wiki puts it, ", although an agent may > often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is > determined." Sam's version would say those motives are a product of the > brain. But Wiki also says.... > > "Compatibilists are sometimes called "soft determinists" pejoratively > (William James's term). James accused them of creating a "quagmire of > evasion" by stealing the name of freedom to mask their underlying > determinism. Immanuel Kant called it a "wretched subterfuge" and "word > jugglery." Ted Honderich explains that the mistake of Compatibilism is to > assert that nothing changes as a consequence of determinism, when clearly we > have lost the life-hope of origination." > > That pretty well reflect my complaint about your position, wherein freedom > becomes quite meaningless and inert, a mere involuntary reflex action. You're > free to hold this view, of course, but it is going to clash with the MOQ in a > very big way because of the way the whole things pivots around freedom as the > engine and goal of all evolutionary development. That is hardly meaningless > or inert. This Quality doesn't just get you off hot stoves. It is the source > and substance of everything, the ongoing stimulus that created the world, > every last bit of it, Pirsig says. > > Think about the meaning of "involuntary" action as opposed to action that is > natural and spontaneous. I think you'd be making a mistake to a presume that > our actions are either taken on the basis or rational deliberation or they > are as automatic as the heartbeat or breathing. There are more than two > options here, you know? And I'm guessing that you want to frame the issue > around the hot stove example because then you can sort of dismiss DQ as a > biological reflex action. But when we pose the question in terms of Pirsig's > most sustained and elaborate example, fixing motorcycles with artistry and > writing excellent essays, this kind of physiological reductionism will get > you nowhere fast. Being a slave to your biological impulses simply isn't the > same thing as unpremeditated spontaneity. That's the mistake that the hippies > made, according to Pirsig. They confused DQ with biological sq, he says. > Because neither of them is social or intellectual, they were taken to be the > same th in > g. > > Zen and the Art of knee jerk reactions? I don't think so. > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
