If you want to believe the ignorant hacks who speak the english language,..
involuntary |inˈvälənˌterē|adjective1 done without conscious control : she gave an involuntary shudder.• (esp. of muscles or nerves) concerned in bodily processes that are not under the control of the will.• caused unintentionally, esp. through negligence : involuntary homicide.2 done against someone's will; compulsory : a policy of involuntary repatriation. unconscious |ˌənˈkän sh əs|adjectivenot conscious : the boy was beaten unconscious.• done or existing without one realizing : he would wipe back his hair in an unconscious gesture of annoyance.• [ predic. ] ( unconscious of) unaware of : “What is it?” he said again, unconscious of the repetition. unpremeditated |ˌənpriˈmedəˌtātid; -prē-|adjective(of an act, remark, or state) not thought out or planned beforehand : it was a totally unpremeditated attack. See note at spontaneous . spontaneous |spänˈtānēəs|adjectiveperformed or occurring as a result of a sudden inner impulse or inclination and without premeditation or external stimulus : the audience broke into spontaneous applause | a spontaneous display of affection.• (of a person) having an open, natural, and uninhibited manner. > Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2011 10:14:05 -0400 > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [MD] Hot Stoves and What To Do About Them > > Hi dmb, > > On Sun, Aug 7, 2011 at 1:19 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > Steve said to Ham: > > I wonder if Dennett takes determinism as the belief that natural laws are > > true as a metaphysical assertion or a pragmatic one. If the latter I agree > > with Dennett and in some weak sense a "determinist." If we take determinism > > to mean that there is a degree of predictability about the world, then few > > would deny it. But this is not how Pirsig defined determinism as the > > doctrine that "man follows the cause-and-effect laws of substance." I deny > > that sort of determinism along with Pirsig. Note also that reality is > > Quality, then even substances don't follow the cause and effect laws of > > substance but rather exercise preference. > > > > > > dmb says: > > These are the sorts of comments that make me think it would be reasonable > > to describe your positions as a kind of value determinism. > > Steve: > That's strange because I don't think I said anything above that you > could disagree with. But I never should have brought myself into it > with Ham in this thread to begin with. My purpose here is to discuss > what Pirsig thinks rather than what I think (that includes what I > think only as far as it concerns what Pirsig thinks about free will > but excludes what I think about about free will). > > back on track... > > dmb: > ...This Quality doesn't just get you off hot stoves. It is the source > and substance of everything, the ongoing stimulus that created the > world, every last bit of it, Pirsig says. > > > > Think about the meaning of "involuntary" action as opposed to action that > > is natural and spontaneous. I think you'd be making a mistake to a presume > > that our actions are either taken on the basis or rational deliberation or > > they are as automatic as the heartbeat or breathing. There are more than > > two options here, you know? > > Steve: > I agree that it is possible to define the terms in such a way as to > make it a continuum rather than a dichotomy. My point is that either > an intention to act arises in the consciousness before the act or it > does not and consciousness only gets involved later for telling > stories about it as in the hot stove example. > > > dmb: > And I'm guessing that you want to frame the issue around the hot stove > example because then you can sort of dismiss DQ as a biological reflex > action. > > > Steve: > I'm just saying that this is one example among many that we need to > come to terms with in understanding what Pirsig could mean when using > it to describe what it means to follow dynamic quality while also > implicitly defining free will as the capacity to follow dynamic > quality. He hammered on the hot stove thing hard enough that I don't > think we ought to sweep it under the rug. > > > dmb: > But when we pose the question in terms of Pirsig's most sustained and > elaborate example, fixing motorcycles with artistry and writing > excellent essays, this kind of physiological reductionism will get you > nowhere fast. Being a slave to your biological impulses simply isn't > the same thing as unpremeditated spontaneity. That's the mistake that > the hippies made, according to Pirsig. They confused DQ with > biological sq, he says. Because neither of them is social or > intellectual, they were taken to be the same thing. > > > Steve: > Even if you want to call involuntary action "unpremeditated > spontaneity" or whatever, we still have an important distinction > between the volitional and the non-volitional, between willed action > and unwilled action. If unwilled action can qualify as following > dynamic quality, then Pirsig has a problem in calling following DQ in > general "free will" since it is not necessarily willed at all. On the > other hand, he didn't literally call it that. Perhaps he sidestepped > the issue of free will in his discussion of free will by substituting > human freedom as a matter of willing with freedom as something quite > different, namely DQ. That is my view anyway--freedom as DQ is > something very different from freedom as a matter of will. > > Best, > Steve > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
