Hi Ham, Ham: > Thanks for opening this discussion to the Group. I commend you for having > effectively demonstrated the problems inherent in Pirsig's morality thesis, > especially as it concerns the exercise of free will. > > Daniel Dennett and others have made the case that rational decisions can > only be applied in a system that is consistent and predictable, and the > "determinism" of natural laws makes this feasible. In the interview with > Reason magazine that I quoted back on June 21, Dennett said: "Determinism is > not a problem. What you want is freedom, and freedom and determinism are > entirely compatible. In fact, we have more freedom if determinism is true > than if it isn't. ...If determinism is true, then there's less randomness. > There's less unpredictability. To have freedom, you need the capacity to > make reliable judgments about what's going to happen next, so you can base > your action on it."
Steve: I wonder if Dennett takes determinism as the belief that natural laws are true as a metaphysical assertion or a pragmatic one. If the latter I agree with Dennett and in some weak sense a "determinist." If we take determinism to mean that there is a degree of predictability about the world, then few would deny it. But this is not how Pirsig defined determinism as the doctrine that "man follows the cause-and-effect laws of substance." I deny that sort of determinism along with Pirsig. Note also that reality is Quality, then even substances don't follow the cause and effect laws of substance but rather exercise preference. Ham: > The core problem with Pirsig's Quality theory is not that Nature is > deterministic, but that QUALITY IS ALSO. > Obviously if the Self that makes the decisions is only a pattern of Quality, > and no decision can be made that is not controlled by Quality, then Free > Will is non-existent. No matter how you try to get around this paradox > semantically, the logic is such that Free Will is unsupportable. > > We simply cannot participate as free agents in a perfectly moral universe > when that universe is directing all our moves. Steve: What if we are _part_ of the universe rater than metaphysically divorced from it? Then if there is an aspect of reality which is free (namely DQ) then we are also free to the extent that we are DQ. Where I agree with you is in thinking that we can't "get around" the fact that we have to think of human freedom very differently in the context of the MOQ. When Pirsig describes free will, he is not describing anything much like free will as it has been traditionally understood. > > [Steve, quoting Pirsig]: >> >> ... All the social sciences, including anthropology, were founded on >> the bed-rock metaphysical belief that these physical cause-and-effect laws >> of human behavior exist. Moral laws, if they can be said to exist at all, >> are merely an artificial social code that has nothing to do with the real >> nature of the world. A "moral" person acts conventionally, "watches out >> for the cops," "keeps his nose clean," and nothing more. >> >> In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the extent >> that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is >> without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which >> is undefinable, one's behavior is free. > > There are several fallacies in the author's analysis. While it is true that > moral laws constitute a "social code", man's sensibility to Value has > EVERYTHING "to do with the real nature of the world." Reacting > "conventionally" is a conditioned habit, not moral behavior. This is true, > incidentally, whether the action is jumping off a hot stove (because the > Quality is low) or tipping one's hat upon greeting a lady (because that's > what he is told to do.) > > Also, as many times as this has been quoted, can I be the only one who sees > the absurdity of this statement? > "To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of > quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic > Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free." What Pirsig is > saying is that one's behavior is controlled either by static patterns or by > DQ. Which can only mean that behavior IS NOT free! Steve: Not in the usual sense, no. Since following DQ can mean performing an involuntary (unwilled) action, then he certainly must be talking about something quite different from what is usually meant by free will. > [Steve, valiantly trying to circumvent the dilemma]: >> >> If getting off the stove is following DQ and if there was no conscious >> decision to get off the stove, then it was not a voluntary act. It was >> not a willing. So it would seem to be a serious error to call it free >> will when it doesn't involve will. >> >> On the other hand, if we can find examples of taking voluntary action >> to successfully follow DQ, then such examples would be examples of >> exercising free will based on Pirsig's formulation and the volition >> implied in the word "will." Can you think of any examples? One problem >> with finding such examples may be that DQ is pre-intellectual. Does >> that inhibit the possibility of making a conscious decision to follow >> it that could be correctly regarded as willing an intention? >> >> Again, since there seemed to be so much miscommunication, I started >> this new thread to hopefully reboot the conversation to make sure it >> is about Pirsig's philosophy instead of the personalities of the >> participants. Ham: > Steve, ALL conscious decisions are based on the value-sensibility of a free > volitional agent (as opposed to Quality controlling a pattern or patterns). > I shall say no more now, lest it be considered a reflection of my > essentialistic "personality". Steve: Good idea. I'm not really looking for you to jump in and some solve problem. I am just trying to sort out the differences between what Pirsig means by "free will" and more traditional usages of the term. One important difference seems to be that while free will in other contexts only applies to actions that are willed, free will in the MOQ can refer to actions that are involuntary. I'm not so sure it makes sense to use the term "free will" talk about Pirisg's conception of freedom that being the case. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
