Hi dmb,
> dmb said to Steve: > Like I already pointed out, Sam does not deny that we are responsible for our > actions. The "Free Will" that he does deny is a metaphysical notion. > > > > Steve replied: > You've insisted that causality is metaphysical notion, and free will is a > concept that is based on causality, so I can't see how you can make this move > to distinguish a metaphysical versus a non-metaphysical conception of free > will. Plus, since you are interpreting Pirsig to be supporting free will as > the capacity to respond to DQ, and since DQ is a metaphysical concept, then > free will in your take on Pirisg must also be a metaphysical notion. > > dmb says: > Free will is based on causality? DQ is a metaphysical concept? Well, I guess > this would be another major source of confusion. Not sure how many times I've > said it already but I know it's quite a lot. NOBODY IS TALKING ABOUT FREE > WILL AS A METAPHYSICAL CONCEPT, except you. Steve: Whatever. More red herrings. Look, I totally accept that depending on what you mean by metaphysics to the extent that I am talking about metaphysics I am talking about no one in this discussion. But I am NOT talking about metaphysical entities. Yes, Harris denies the existence of a metaphysical soul-like entity to explain free will, but that is obvious. What is interesting is that as a scientist he also denies free will as coherent from an empirical perspective. dmb: You are projecting this metaphysical dimension onto my assertions despite the fact that I have said otherwise at least a dozen times. Steve: I am not. You are the one who keeps bringing this red herring presumably to avoid admitting moral responsibility and free will are not linked as a logical necessity. dmb: > And I have also been saying over and over again that the will is practical > and empirical. AND Dynamic Quality is not metaphysical either. It is called > the immediate flux of life, direct everyday experience and the primary > EMPIRICAL reality. Steve: All I meant was that since DQ/sq is the first cut in Pirsig's metaphysics that is a metaphysical concept. I didn't mean "metaphysics" in and wooly sense. Whether the MOQ is metaphysics as usually defined is a whole other discussion. > Steve said: > When we talk about moral responsibility, Harris says we are talking about the > blameworthiness of those holding bad intentions. Harris wrote, "To say that I > was responsible for my behavior is simply to say that what I did was > sufficiently in keeping with my thoughts, intentions, beliefs, and desires to > be considered an extension of them." It sounds to me that now that you > perhaps understand that Harris was intending to be making the case that moral > responsibility _doesn't_ die with free will ... > > > dmb says: > Those are the same lines I pulled out of the Harris quote. I think it's clear > that he is describing a practical, non-metaphysical version of human agency. > If your actions are a continuation of your intentions and goals then those > actions are an expression of your will. Bad intentions are the whole > difference between an immoral act and mere accidents or a causal chain of > events. Steve: Agreed. The extra step you haven't acknowledged is that Harris says that our intentions and goals are products of mental processes which are inaccessible to the conscious mind. He is a determinist in the sense that he argues that we have no control over what we intend. He would be a reductionist materialist if he thought that these mental processes are exhausted by the chemical reactions that go on in the brain, but he understands that the complexity of the situation is much deeper since it also depends on the organism's interaction with its environment including interacting with the intentions and goals of other people. dmb: It seems pretty clear to me that Sam's book is a confusing and inappropriate way to get at the meaning of Pirsig's reformulation AND I think you are misreading him anyway. The lines above describe what it means to be responsible for our actions and since this is a non-metaphysical claim, this responsibility does not depend on any metaphysical entities, which is what Sam is rejecting when he rejects "Free Will". I think you are confusing these two things. Sam uses "Free Will" to identify this rejected metaphysical notion and he asserts a kind of neurological determinism. The MOQ is not asserting determinism. Steve: First of all, I am NOT using Harris to explain Pirsig's reformulation. I think his writing would be useless in that regard. I am using Harris to answer a particular question you asked. You insisted that free will and moral responsibility are linked as a logical necessity. I disagreed and asked that you explain that logically necessary link. You declined and instead asked me to explain how it could be reasonable to reject free will while maintaining moral responsibility. That is ALL this little tangent in our conversation is about. It isn't about metaphysics or Pirsig. I am using Harris's article "Morality Without Free Will" to explain how you can still have mortality without free will. That is all. It just seems like you are inserting all kinds of other stuff about how frustrated you are that this conversation keeps turning to metaphysics when you are the only one who keeps insisting that we keep talking about metaphysics by insisting that I am talking about metaphysics. Instead, why not just concede that I have answered your question about how moral responsibility can function without free will? As long as we recognize that humans have intentions and consciously deliberate over their actions, we can have moral responsibility without worrying about whether or not people are _free_ to have any intentions that are possible to have or whether intentions are the product of mental processes beyond the individual's control. Agreeing to disagree is stupid, but why not just agree to agree? Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
