Hi Marsha,
I moved this to the new thread because it fits with what I wanted to
talk about with regard to understanding the differences between
Pirisg's MOQ conception for free will and the traditional uses of the
term "free will."
Marsha:
Ms. Albahari's project is to examine self/non-self, but she offers a
way of looking at the issue that is very interesting. She addresses
the self in terms of 'self' and 'sense of self'. She happens to
offers free-will as an example of the way the problem can be
approached.
Marsha quotes:
"...Let us suppose that hard determinism is correct and that there
is no such thing as libertarian free-will (such free-will is
incidentally a feature commonly ascribed to the self that will star in
later chapters). That is, we are supposing that it is not the case
that, given a situation where we seem to exercise agency, we could
have actually chosen (all other things being equal) to do otherwise.
Every action is fully determined by factors of which none pertain to
an agent's freedom to act otherwise. Libertarian free-will does not
exist. Yet we can still entertain the idea that many people do
harbour a deep-seated sense/belief/assumption/feeling that, given an
identical situation, they could have chosen to act otherwise. This
assumption of being a free agent, of having free-will, may well be
real --- despite the fact that free-will does not, on this scenario,
exist. So while (on this given scenario) the sense or assumption of
free-will exists, libertarian freew
ill does not exist: the deep-seated assumption turns out to be a
mistaken one. The hard determinists will attempt to explain the
common belief in free-will not in terms of actual free-will ---
which would subjectively seem to explain it --- but in terms of
cognitive and psychological factors that do not include free-will...)"
(Albahari, Miri, 'Analytical Buddhism: The Two-tiered Illusion
of Self ', pp.17-18)
Marsha oontinues:
I can also see this tying into what Lila says in Chapter 14. Anyway,
it might be interesting to look at 'sense of free-will' compared to
'free-will'.
Steve:
I think that when most people ask about free will, they are looking
for an explanation of that subjective feeling of control accompanied
by intended action in light of the causality science reveals in the
rest of the world. What is strikingly different to me about Pirsig's
usage of the term is the absence of his concern to distinguish between
voluntary acts (those accompanies by the _sense_ of free will) from
involuntary acts. If one's behavior is free to the extent that one
follows DQ, and if the hot stove situation tells us what it is like to
follow DQ, then we have the strange conclusion that Pirsig's "free
will" can refer to an unwilled act (one that is as involuntary and
reflexive as hopping off a hot stove rather than deliberate and
volitional).
Best,
Steve
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