Hello Steve,
On Aug 7, 2011, at 9:06 AM, Steven Peterson wrote: > Hi Marsha, > > I moved this to the new thread because it fits with what I wanted to > talk about with regard to understanding the differences between > Pirisg's MOQ conception for free will and the traditional uses of the > term "free will." > > Marsha: > Ms. Albahari's project is to examine self/non-self, but she offers a > way of looking at the issue that is very interesting. She addresses > the self in terms of 'self' and 'sense of self'. She happens to > offers free-will as an example of the way the problem can be > approached. > > Marsha quotes: > "...Let us suppose that hard determinism is correct and that there > is no such thing as libertarian free-will (such free-will is > incidentally a feature commonly ascribed to the self that will star in > later chapters). That is, we are supposing that it is not the case > that, given a situation where we seem to exercise agency, we could > have actually chosen (all other things being equal) to do otherwise. > Every action is fully determined by factors of which none pertain to > an agent's freedom to act otherwise. Libertarian free-will does not > exist. Yet we can still entertain the idea that many people do > harbour a deep-seated sense/belief/assumption/feeling that, given an > identical situation, they could have chosen to act otherwise. This > assumption of being a free agent, of having free-will, may well be > real --- despite the fact that free-will does not, on this scenario, > exist. So while (on this given scenario) the sense or assumption of > free-will exists, libertarian freew > ill does not exist: the deep-seated assumption turns out to be a > mistaken one. The hard determinists will attempt to explain the > common belief in free-will not in terms of actual free-will --- > which would subjectively seem to explain it --- but in terms of > cognitive and psychological factors that do not include free-will...)" > > (Albahari, Miri, 'Analytical Buddhism: The Two-tiered Illusion > of Self ', pp.17-18) > > Marsha oontinues: > I can also see this tying into what Lila says in Chapter 14. Anyway, > it might be interesting to look at 'sense of free-will' compared to > 'free-will'. > > Steve: > I think that when most people ask about free will, they are looking > for an explanation of that subjective feeling of control accompanied > by intended action in light of the causality science reveals in the > rest of the world. Marsha: There seems to be, in your statement, already in place, an established belief in 'free-will' by "looking for an explanation". It seems to be a looking for affirmation for the sense/belief/assumption/feeling that the subjective feeling represents free-will. By comparing 'sense of free-will' to free-will Ms. Albahari is trying to analyze the problem from a more intimate and dynamic point-of-view. But, of course, her main project is to investigate 'self' and 'non-self'. With no-self where would such a 'will' reside? > Steve: > What is strikingly different to me about Pirsig's > usage of the term is the absence of his concern to distinguish between > voluntary acts (those accompanies by the _sense_ of free will) from > involuntary acts. Marsha: I am not always certain how to interpret RMP's explanations. - Not sure either what you mean by "voluntary acts" Do you mean a self that is "really" the sole cause for some desired effect? Maybe there is in reality no 'self' and no 'cause' on which to make such a discernment to begin with. That would justify the lack of concern. As you know, I find 'free-will' irrelevant with the MoQ. Freedom yes, free-will not relevant. > If one's behavior is free to the extent that one > follows DQ, and if the hot stove situation tells us what it is like to > follow DQ, then we have the strange conclusion that Pirsig's "free > will" can refer to an unwilled act (one that is as involuntary and > reflexive as hopping off a hot stove rather than deliberate and > volitional). The term here is 'free' not 'free-will'. And 'one's' seems a neutral term and may not indicate a 'willing self'. The "following DQ experience" and the 'hot stove experience' might have in common a lack-of-SELF. In Chapter 14, Lila, imho, was pointing to the fact that Rigel was quick to establish whatever he thinks, or senses, believes, assumes, or feels, as reality. To me that represents the conventional modus operandi. I hope my points were clear. Marsha > > Best, > Steve > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
