Hi Steve, I read through this post and I liked it. I have a different sense of what Pirsig starts with and ends with. In terms of Will, it is free by definition. Since it is hard to demarcate where Will starts and stops, it is logical to say that such Will must be held by everything from a human idea to the spin of a photon.
Let me use an example. If we claim that there is free will within the intellectual arena, then we have to ask where does it come from. If we focus on the physical aspects of life, which is appropriate since that is what Determinism does, then we can say that according to current theory, an idea is a function of nerve activity in the brain. This can be corroborated though studies involving either general anesthetics, or direct electrode stimulation of the brain. In the former, ideas (or consciousness) disappears; in the latter, ideas can be evoked through electrical stimulation of brain tissue such as during an operation where doctors want to make sure they are not excising important matter. A person will suddenly say they are thinking about a certain song, or a memory or smell. Drugs like LSD lend even more insight into Will. So if we accept this physical psychology premise of brain activity, then we have to ask, what causes a nerve to fire? This is typically due to the depolarization of the dendrite causing an action potential which propagates. Now, is the nerve free to fire at will? Well, the determinists would argue that it is simply a function of cause and effect all the way back to the beginning of time. That is, since the original idea, we are simply carrying out a plan of some sort which cannot be changed. This is at the heart of Monism where God and man are one. Or the new age ideas of the planet as an organism, which would make the universe a single organism by extrapolation. In a dualistic approach, there are two independent entities (just to keep it simple) both of which can act on each other. In this way, we can assume that we are free to drive carefully or to cross over the center divide into oncoming traffic. Of course current American Law assumes free will and that country is based around such a thing. So back to the brain. The nerve can have the Will to fire independently if we assume dualism (God and man as separate for example, or me and you). However, for the nerve to fire it requires that sodium ions pass across a membrane to initiate such firing. The nerve itself cannot force sodium to cross against its will. Now what causes such ion flux? In the same way, we have to assume that each ion of sodium has Will. And so on and so on. When you speak of preferences such as those displayed by a rock or river, I get confused. I assume I have free will to prefer vanilla over chocolate ice cream. In fact, I can change that preference at any time depending on what I have as a main meal. The choice of meal is also a preference of free will. Now, we could say that a river has no preference since it simply follows the bank of the river. That is, it succumbs to gravity and topology. Each molecule must therefore behave in a deterministic fashion as governed by Man's laws of physics. For the river to be running requires evaporation and precipitation which again is governed by how science dictates. My question is, how is water different from that sodium ion in the brain? Obviously it is not! They are all part and parcel of the same thing, that is matter, or the measurable (physical) world. We now return to the original debate on determinism v free-will, which is also a debate on monism v pluralism as William James presented in a book, and also the debate of responsibility or victimization. The human race is based on the assumption of responsibility and accountability, else-wise we would view the world differently. Is it our behavior that creates society, or is it society that creates our behavior, or is it both. If it is both, then this would denote dualism which would completely negate any notion of determinism. Either there is nothing to be done but watch (of course such watching is also determined), or we are free to have fun or not. You decide, I have already made my decision. It wasn't a hard one by the way. Much harder is deciding what kind of ice cream I want. Cheers, Mark On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 3:36 PM, Steven Peterson <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi John, all, > > > John: >> I think we have to interpret the term as significant in indicating at once, >> two differing levels. Social patterns exhibit competing wills, intellect >> frees us from social constraints. Thus, the will that is free, is a 4th >> level phenomenon and "free" is significant because it clarifies this freedom >> from mere social patterns of predictability and control. Everybody has a >> will. But free will, is something gained through intellectual/artistic >> reflection which soars beyond. > > > Steve: > To summarize my conclusions from all the talk since the spring about > the relationship between free will and the MOQ, I would say that we > ought to distinguish between a (I) metaphysical and a (II) > conventional use of the term "free will." > > I. The traditional dilemma between free will and determinism where the > debate is framed around the self as a metaphysical entity is replaced > in the MOQ with Pirsig's notion of DQ as a sort of freedom (as > expressed in Pirsig's "the extent to which one's behavior > follows..."). In this sense, both of the following seem like > reasonable conclusions to me... > a.) The MOQ denies both horns of the traditional philosophical dilemma > since it rejects the premise upon which that dilemma rests. > b.) Alternatively, one could take Pirsig as accepting the free will > horn while redefining what is meant by free will to the extent that it > is no longer what what originally asked about in the traditional > dilemma. In this new Pirsigian usage of the term as the capacity to > respond to DQ, even rocks and trees and atoms can be said to have free > will as Pirsig said in LC. Further, this capacity is not a matter of > will as a deliberate choice since DQ is said to be primary while > concepts are secondary. (See Pirsig's "hot stove" talk.) > > II. In a non-metaphysical conventional usage of the term, free will > can be taken to be the human capacity to deliberate over possible > courses of actions and play out scenarios of possible futures to weigh > the consequences of actions before acting rather than merely acting on > biologically determined impulses or socially conditioned responses. > Free will in this sense translates in the MOQ not as affirming the > capacity to respond to DQ but as affirming the fact that human beings > participate in intellectual patterns of value. (Such a conventional > usage is not explicitly discussed by Pirsig.) > > Also important here is the MOQ's flat rejection of determinism in both > its metaphysical and conventional forms. The MOQ denies that > intellectual patterns are mechanistically determined by inorganic and > biological patterns. In other words, the MOQ denies greedy > reductionism where intellectual patterns are thought to be (even in > theory) exhaustively explainable in terms of inorganic patterns. (See > the stuff in Lila about a novel stored as variations in voltages on a > computer not being a property of the voltages for the best example of > Pirsig's critique on reductionism.) > > Best, > Steve > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
