Hi dmb,

> dmb said:
> ..., the idea that a causally determined act could count as free will is 
> probably one of the stupidest things I ever heard. Free will is exactly NOT a 
> causally determined will.
>
> Steve replied:
>  Ok, that was my understanding of your position as well. But that means that 
> in your book, neither "could have acted differently" nor "ability to act at 
> one's discretion" are sufficient definitions of free will for you. What you 
> are saying is that there is "something extra" which is essential to the 
> definition of free will--that not only are we free to do what we want, but 
> also what you want cannot be causally determined.
>
>
> dmb says:
> No, that's exactly the opposite of what I'm saying.


Inigo Montoyo:
You keep using that word, dmb. I do not think it means what you think it means.

Steve:
Right, Inigo. I think the opposite would be more like, "not only are
we free to do what we want, but also what you want CAN be causally
determined."

dmb:
I'm saying that free will simply is the ability to act at one's
discretion. If you could have acted differently, then you have free
will. Period.


Steve:
Again, neither of those definitions are sufficient since they both
allow for what you yourself would call "determinism." You can act on
your discretion, you can do what you want, if if "what you want" is
causally determined.


dmb:
To say that our will is free IS to say our will is not determined. It
means the same thing.

Steve:
Yes, this is _your_ definition of free will. You are saying that not
only are we capable to will what we want, but our will is also "free"
in the sense that it is not determined. But you still have a problem.
Will is not determined by _anything_? Is it just random?


dmb:
You're not adding anything extra, you're just expressing the same idea
positively instead of negatively. Imagine if I said, it's not a
sufficient definition of ice to say it's cold and solid, you also have
to say it cannot be hot or liquid. That's not adding an extra
something. It's just pointlessly redundant. Like I said, If someone
says, "I am free to choose whatever I want, but what I want is
causally determined," that someone does not understand the meaning of
the terms "free" and "determined" because it's a blatant
contradiction. It's like saying I'm a married bachelor. That claim can
be defeated by any dictionary and it should play no part in an
intelligent conversation.

Steve:
nonsense.

dmb:
> It's very simple, Steve.
> If your will is determined, it is not free will.
> If your will is free, it is not determined.
> The MOQ says we are determined to the extent that we're controlled by static 
> quality and we're free to the extent that we follow DQ. Is there free will in 
> the MOQ, then? Yes, to some extent. Are we determined, then? Yes, to some 
> extent. To what extent, exactly? Depends on who and what and where you are.

Steve:
If will is not determined by anything at all, it is just random and
not worth having.


dmb:
> And the thing is, we want all kinds of conflicting things all the time. If we 
> acted on our wants without any restraint of the will, we'd quickly find 
> ourselves in very deep trouble, if not prison. Isn't it obvious from your own 
> personal experience that we have wants that we decide not to act upon? I 
> think this describes everybody's daily experience.

Steve:
We certainly have wants that we don't act upon, but only because we
don't want to. Sometimes we have conflicting "wants." We therefore
can't act on all our wants at the same time. Perhaps you can explain
which wants correspond with "the will" and which ones don't. If I want
a car, but I don't steal it because I also want to obey the law, is
one of the two wants "the will" and the other something else? Which
one of those wants is "free"?
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