Hi all,
> Steve: > ...I think dmb is asserting a conception of free will when he says that > "could have acted differently" is the same as Pirsig's formulation of freedom > as the extent to which we follow DQ. He is trying to slip the old "free will" > in the back door of the MOQ, but I could be wrong. I see "could have acted > differently" and following DQ as very different ideas. One is Pirsig's > description of freedom. The other is free will as it is usually defined. dmb > thinks these concepts cash out to the same thing, but I don't see how that > works. What I think would help me most would be to understand what the past > conditional "could" refers to in this context. "Could" if only _what_ were > true? ... I just can't make sense of "could have acted differently" without a > "could if _what_ were true?" > > > > dmb says: There are two basic ideas here, two basic questions. The first sticking point, sadly and very frustratingly, is simply finding agreement as to the meaning of the central term, namely "free will". This is why I keep quoting the dictionary. Whatever position you might care to adopt with regard to free will, and there have been many different positions in the history of the debate, you simply can't get started unless and until there is agreement as to what you're even talking about. To say that Pirsig's re-formulation of freedom is something other than a re-formulation of free will is to confuse the basic meaning of the term "free will" with some particular position with respect to the idea of free will. Steve: I disagree. You are calling Pirsig's freedom a special case of free will whereas freedom specifically with respect to the will is a special kind of freedom. Pirsig didn't say our _will_ is what is free. Following or perceiving DQ may sometimes involve will, but it certainly isn't limited to will. dmb: In that sense, the dictionary definition (above) of free will and the introductory descriptions of free will found in the encyclopedia are NEUTRAL. To put this in terms of your question, Steve, this basic definition does not include any conditions or qualifications because those will narrow the basic concept in one direction or another. At that point you're no longer talking about the basic meaning of the term, you're staking out a position on the issue and otherwise making a case for a particular sort of free will or denying free will with a particular kind of determinism. > > If Parfit is asking about the conditions of "could have acted differently", > then he is asking for the conditions of "the ability to act at one's > discretion" (as my dictionary puts it) or the conditions that allow "one's > behavior" to be free (as Pirsig puts it.) I think it's abundantly obvious > that Parfit, Pirsig and the dictionary are all in agreement as to the basic > meaning of free will. One is neutral and the other two have very different > views about it but they are all talking about the same thing; a person's > ability to act freely, as opposed to not being able to act freely. It's like > any other debate. An empiricist doesn't have to be a rationalist in order to > debate rationalism. He simply has to understand the meaning of the term, > regardless of the position he takes toward it and regardless of the specific > form of rationalism held by his rival. The subtle details of the debate can > come out only if they first agree on the basic terms. Otherwise, they aren't > really even on the same topic and the result will be a steamy, hot mess. Steve: What I think comes to light based on Parfit's explication of "could have acted differently" is that you personally don't see "acting at one's discretion" or "could have acted differently" as sufficient for the sort of freedom called "free will" since those phrases don't rule out the possibility that our wants are "determined by fate or necessity." You see that last phrase as essential. In the recent past you called that minimalist view of free will (that we can do what we want, we choose based on our values) merely "value determinism." I keep saying that that is all that we need for moral responsibility (that morally responsibility only depends on the fact that we do what we want rather than on the separate question of whether or not what we want is causally determined), but you insist on a "something extra," as I keep trying to point out to you. You seem to believe that not only must we be free to choose what we want, we must be free to want what we want. But that leads to the sort of regress you yourself have said is a nonsensical notion of free will. So I don't think it is I who has things all muddled. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
