Hi dmb,
> dmb says:
> No, the idea that causally determined act count as free will is probably one
> of the stupidest things I ever heard. Free will is exactly NOT a causally
> determined will. And, on top of that, causality does not even factor into the
> sort of free will I'm talking about because the MOQ takes causality out of
> the equation altogether and replaces with preferences.
Steve:
Ok, that was my understanding of your position as well. But that means
that in your book, neither "could have acted differently" nor "ability
to act at one's discretion" are sufficient definitions of free will
for you. What you are saying is that there is "something extra" which
is essential to the definition of free will--that not only are we free
to do what we want, but also what you want cannot be causally
determined. I am hammering on this point because you have asserted
that there is a basic definition of free will that every one uses,
while "what all the fuss is about" with regard to free will is what
ought to even count as a basic definition.
Note also that "the stupidest thing" you ever heard is not something I
just made up. Free will as simply the ability to do what you want is
what SEP calls a minimalist version of free will. This version of free
will is said to be compatible with determinism since we can do what we
want even if what we want is determined. I am with you in thinking
that this isn't free will by what most people mean by the term. What
people seem to want is to not only be able to will an act but be free
to will what they will. It is this "something extra" beyond being able
to will an act that people (like you) want in the name of free will.
Yet, somehow you nevertheless keep denying this logical consequence of
your position...
> Steve continued:
> If someone says, "I am free to choose whatever I want, but what I want is
> causally determined," that counts as free will to you?
>
>
> dmb says:
> No, as a matter of fact, I think anyone who says that does not understand the
> meaning of the terms "free" and "determined". The person who says that is
> using the terms improperly or he doesn't mind making a fool of himself. It's
> a blatant contradiction. It's like saying I'm a married bachelor. That claim
> can be defeated by any dictionary and it should play no part in an
> intelligent conversation.
Steve:
You seem to have the idea that whenever someone uses terms in ways you
don't like that they are simply doing it wrong. Daniel Dennet uses
these terms in exactly the way you hate, He is a compatiblist when it
comes to free will and determinism. Is he simply "making a fool of
himself"? I was under the impression that he is one of the most
well-respected contemporary philosophers.
> dmb says:
> I never asked for something extra. Quite the opposite, in fact. It was YOU
> who kept talking about the will to will and wanting our wants and all I ever
> did was ask about this weird redundancy. I keep insisting that there's NO
> good reason for this extra stuff and "free will" just means a will that is
> not determined.
Steve:
This is where you keep contradicting yourself. I keep trying to point
out to you that you _do_ insist on something extra. The ability to
will acts is not sufficient to you as free will. Based on your answers
to my questions, you insist that it only counts as free will if we can
will acts AND what we decide to will is not determined. You yourself
are adding what you call a redundancy. You get around this redundancy
_only_ by rejecting what you have previously put forth as basic
definitions of free will ("the ability to act on one's desires" and
"could have acted differently") since, as Parfit and Dennet argue,
these conceptions of free will are compatible with determinism.
Further, I don't think you even stop there with just adding that the
will is not determined. A definition of free will as "being able to do
what we want to do where what we want to do is not determined" is
sufficient for you, since "not determined" can mean "random." I doubt
that you would see an undetermined but randomly decided set of values
as free. Will has to be determined by _something_ for it to be an
intelligible concept. We both reject a Cartesian self to be plugged in
as that nonrandom and nondetermined uncaused cause, but there has to
be some determiner to refer to as the will. In the MOQ, what could
this possibly be?
So again, I think we are talking about something very different with
Pirsig's conception of freedom from free will. It is not a will that
is not determined. It is not a "could have acted differently." Rather
than putting free will in opposition to determinism as you do and as
is traditionally done with the concepts, Pirsig describes freedom as a
matter of perception rather than a matter of rational deliberation or
willed choice. It is a compatiblist view where the dynamic (the free)
is to be perceived within the static (the determined).
Best,
Steve
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