Hi dmb,
> Steve replied: > If someone says "free will is the extent to which we follow DQ," and the > dictionary says something different, is this "improper use"? If the > dictionary says that determinism/free will is about external versus internal > causes for human action, and if the MOQ starts with an entirely different > picture of the situation, is using these terms not "improper use" by your own > definition? > > dmb says: > As I already explained several times, you are conflating two different > things. There is the meaning of term "free will" and then there is taking a > particular position with respect to that term. Steve: We disagree on what the standard usage of "free will" is as well as on the idea that there is such a thing as a _basic_ meaning of the term independent of particular philosophical positions. > dmb said to Steve: > To say that indeterminism is a form of determinism is very like like saying > cold is a form of hot. It's like saying up is a form of down. > > > Steve: > Only in the sense that "hot" is just "cold" with some hot in it. As I > explained and justified with quotes, James's "indeterminism" is just > determinism with some randomness thrown in. It does not mean "free will." It > is just what most post quantum mechanics folks today mean by determinism in > the free will/determinism debate. > dmb says: > And how could post quantum mechanics have anything to do with what James was > saying? That's wildly anachronistic AND, more importantly, you are totally > misconstruing what James actually said. Steve: My point is not anachronistic. I am saying that what James is calling indeterminism is exactly what positivistic types think now that we have quantum mechanics. dmb: James explains exactly why he has to use "chance" instead of "freedom" and the reason is that determinists were abusing the term "freedom" by applying it to their determinism. He dismisses terms like "free-will determinism" as coming out of a "quagmire of evasion" and that's exactly what I'm saying about you and your use of these terms. Steve: So when James says," make no mistake, indeterminism means chance!" what he really means isn't randomness but "free will"???? I think that would constitute "improper use." > Steve said:Otherwise, if we think of indeterminism and determinism as > mutually exclusive and exhaustive we would have to think of free will itself > as a form of determinism (i.e., determined by internal rather than external > causes)... > > dmb says: > That is hair-brained nonsense. Free will is defined in opposition to > determinism. If it is determined by anything, whether it be causal, internal > or external, then you can not rightly call it free will. On top of that, the > MOQ's position on free will is not going to be qualified in terms of causes > or in terms of what is external or internal. Steve: If free will does does not depend on anything at all, then it is just randomness and not any sort of freedom that anyone could want to have. > Steven Pinker: > ...a random event does not fit the concept of free will any more than a > lawful one does, and could not serve as the long-sought locus of moral > responsibility. > > dmb says: > Right. Exactly. Random chance doesn't fit the concept of free will any better > than causal determinism does and without free will there can be no moral > responsibility. Pinker is affirming the logical connection between freedom > and morality, a connection that should be obvious to anyone. Russell makes > the same obvious point, one you have denied many times - for no apparent > reason. Steve: You keep saying that this is an obvious point, but many philosophers call themselves(or get labeled "compatiblists" with regard to the free will/determinism question. Rather than defining free will in opposition to determinism, they see these two ideas as entirely compatible, and they don't mean " a little of each." They insist that free will exists AND determinism is true, and many of them also insist that free will and moral responsibility can have no meaning without determinism. > Paul Russell: > ...the well-known dilemma of determinism. One horn of this dilemma is the > argument that if an action was caused or necessitated, then it could not have > been done freely, and hence the agent is not responsible for it. The other > horn is the argument that if the action was not caused, then it is > inexplicable and random, and thus it cannot be attributed to the agent, and > hence, again, the agent cannot be responsible for it. In other words, if our > actions are caused, then we cannot be responsible for them; if they are not > caused, we cannot be responsible for them. Whether we affirm or deny > necessity and determinism, it is impossible to make any coherent sense of > moral freedom and responsibility. > > dmb says: > Yep, as long as the issue is framed around randomness and causality you can't > have moral responsibility. The ideas of freedom and responsibility do not fit > with either them. They would both preclude human agency. But in the MOQ, > there is no such framing. A chosen act isn't a random act or a caused act. > Choice is denied either way. Steve: You are missing the point. If the options are determinism versus indeterminism, indeterminism if true cannot support free will since it is just chance. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
