Hi dmb, > Steve said to dmb: > So when James says," make no mistake, indeterminism means chance!" what he > really means isn't randomness but "free will"???? I think that would > constitute "improper use." ...If the options are determinism versus > indeterminism, indeterminism if true cannot support free will since it is > just chance. > > > dmb says: > > Again, you have totally mischaracterized James's essay AND you have totally > ignored the James scholars I've quoted on this topic, scholars who are NOT > relying on a single early essay which was written long before his pragmatism > and radical empiricism were developed. Look, I fully expect you to miss the > point no matter how many times I make it but AGAIN James's is using the terms > "chance" and "indeterminism" to talk about freedom. He is refusing to use the > word "freedom" because people like you have ruined that word with your > confused evasions. But that is what he's talking about. "Chance" is just > another word for freedom. He is absolutely NOT talking about merely random > events, nor quantum mechanics.
Steve: If free will does does not depend on anything at all, then it is just randomness and not any sort of freedom that anyone could want to have. An event that is not determined by _anything_ (including "the will") is simply a random event. If the options are determinism versus indeterminism, indeterminism if true cannot support free will since it is just chance. You can call chance a sort of freedom if you want, but chance isn't the sort of freedom anyone wants. > dmb says: > Clearly, James is saying that determinism and indeterminism are unambiguous > terms and the are unambiguously opposed to each other. The former says there > is no possibility to choose because the universe is fixed for eternity and > the latter that's not true. James is saying that they can't both be true, > that taking one position entails a denial of the other. The difference is > "perfectly sharp", as sharp as the difference between "nowhere" and > "somewhere". If you disagree, then I think you're just a very bad reader. > James is clear, precise and beautifully convincing too. Peterson, on the > other hand, is muddy, sloppy and grossly distorting. Steve: We agree that determinism and indeterminism are generally defined in opposition to one another. My point is that saying that indeterminism is true does nothing support free will. (see below) We disagree that free will is necessarily defined in opposition to determinism. Many philosophers call themselves(or get labeled "compatiblists" with regard to the free will/determinism question. Rather than defining free will in opposition to determinism, they see these two ideas as entirely compatible, and they don't mean " a little of each." They insist that free will exists AND determinism is true, and many of them also insist that free will and moral responsibility can have no meaning without determinism. >From SEP: "Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. When she does, she is an ultimate source or origin of her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will. Incompatibilists hold that we act freely in this sense only if determinism is false. Some say little more about what, besides indeterminism, free will requires. And, indeed, the task of providing an incompatibilist account is not an easy one. If the truth of determinism would preclude free will, it is far from obvious how indeterminism would help." Regards, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
