Hi Ron,
> Ron: > The impression given by the phrase "the serpent of causation is thus over > everything. "... > is that it promotes a kind of true description of how things are beyond the > appearence of > "freewill." Steve: I don't want to give that impression. What I mean to call up is the Jamesian claim that the we can't separate a World As It Is from the human contribution to conceptions of reality as we know it. James said, "The trail of the human serpent is thus over everything," and this applies to the notion of causality as well as anything else. We only make the descriptions we do in terms of causality or other terms because we have the needs and desires we have. Description is never neutral, it always has some human purpose. Combined with that idea is this particular pithy little remark was the notion that when we go looking for causes, there is no logical stopping place. We just keep finding/making causes upon causes upon causes with no Ultimate Cause be it the human will or the big bang. Ron: >I think in order to claim a victory in this thread you need to expand apon >this. > Touting DmB's head down MD main street ala Bodvar-esque style is'nt going to > win it. But in order to grasp what the debate is composed of I must allow you > to > finish your appeal. Steve: I have no desire to claim a unilateral victory in a conversation. (Note that dmb has done this at least 10 times, and I have noted that it makes no sense to do so, e.g. "Bang, you're dead! And you don't even know it.") My goal is to get consensus. That is the only sort of victory and it can never be a one-sided win. > Steve continues... > If you are asking whether free will or determinism is REALLY > true--which is the the REAL painting, which one is the one correct > construction of things corresponding to objective reality, then you > aren't asking a question about which the MOQ is about to take sides > > Consider looking at it is in terms of Big Self/small self as I > described a Pirsigian reformulation of the free will/determinism issue > back on April 26. I still stand by this compatiblist view of the MOQ's > position on the matter... > > "The MOQ does not posit the existence of the reified concept of a > chooser, a Cartesian self, a watcher that stands behind the senses and > all valuation, the soul. The MOQ does not posit an extra-added > ingredient above and beyond the patterns of value and the possibility > for patterns to change that are collectively referred to as "I" about > which it could possibly make any sense to ask, "do I have free will?" > This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the extent that it needs to > be unasked. This question presupposes that there is such a thing as > "I" that has important ontological status that transcends those > patterns of value to which it refers. The MOQ makes no such > fundamental postulate. Free will is formulated as a question that is > asked in the SO context. Instead, in MOQ terns we can reformulate the > question where "I" could refer to the static patterns (small self in > Zen terms) or the "I" could refer to the capacity for change, > emptiness, the nothingness that is left when we subtract all the > static patterns that is also the generator and sustainer and destroyer > of those patterns (big Self in Zen terms). That's what Pirsig did with > the question. We can identify with our current patterns of preferences > and the extent to which we do so we are not free. We are a slave to > our preferences. Rather we ARE our preferences. Or we can identify > with the capacity to generate, sustain, or destroy existing patterns > in favor of (we hope) new and better ones. To the extent we do we are > free." > > Ron: > I think what is neglected and the cause of the dispute is explanation of "why" > in this formulation of identifying with "the big self" or "following DQ". > I think ultimately, the arguement, with me atleast, lies in how you mean > favoring or preffering "better" patterns or the capacity to do so. I think > you need > to unpack what you mean by that. One of your arguements was that since > we ARE our prefferences it makes no sense to talk about the capacity of > preffering "better-ness" or better "patterns" or did I get you wrong. Steve: We certainly DO prefer betterness. The only answer I can see to "why prefer betterness?" is simply "because it is better." > Steve continues: > I am determined to the extent we are controlled by static patterns. To > what extent is that? Well, if "I" refers to small self, a collection > of static patterns of all four levels, then 100%. > I am free to the extent that I follow DQ. To what extent is that? > Well, if "I" refers to Big Self, 100%! > > Ron: > OK, lets frame it like that, the "I" refers to the Big Self. To what extent > do we > have the capacity to preffer better-ness if we ARE our prefferences? Steve: "We are our preferences" refers to small self, just the static patterns. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
