> Matt also said: > I think it's a mistake to think that the MoQ "does away with cause and > effect." I don't think that's exactly what Pirsig meant. > > > dmb says: > If we are talking about Pirsig's reformulation of free will and determinism, > then that is exactly what Pirsig meant. He gets rid of causality and replaces > with preferences and values.
Steve: The metaphysical significance of causality in SOM is as an objective law written into the fabric of the cosmos. It is only this metaphysical notion that is replaced in the MOQ with stable patterns of preferences. Making inferences about causality is important pragmatic intellectual activity. Causality understood as an intellectual pattern of value is an epistemological concern with making accurate predictions rather than an ontological claim. This term need not be wiped from our vocabularies. We can still talk about causes just as Pirsig continues to do. In fact, in a very recent pot-calling-the-kettle-black attack you yourself wrote, "Your insistence that we ought to drop the basic terms (because they are superglued to SOM baggage) has CAUSED this paralysis and created all kinds of confusion." Am I to read that as you slipping into SOM? To be clear, once again, I do NOT see any terms as superglued to SOM. My concern is for a perceived sneaking in the back door of the Cartesian self, but if we are explicit about what we mean by the terms we use, we can use whatever terms we want if they help us be understood. Why do you see causality as "superglued" to SOM? Why do you see free will as something that can be rescued from its SOM roots while determinism simply can not? If you were willing to drop the metaphysical baggage from BOTH free will AND determinism you would begin to understand what compatiblism is and how it applies for the MOQ.. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
