Steve said:
That idea agrees with what Putnam said..."Yet James also believed that the 
question of whether we have free will cannot be settled on intellectual 
grounds. Consequently, it is the sort of question one is entitled to answer on 
passional grounds; James asserts he has free will."  ...surely we don't have a 
forced choice between abandoning either science or morality. These "devastating 
logical consequences" are only possible under SOM where either one metaphysical 
belief or the other can be true.  ...After we have abandoned SOM, what 
"passional grounds" even remain for choosing one over the other? What is left 
to get all passionate about once we view free will and determinism as 
intellectual patterns that can be used for whatever purposes they may be good 
for rather than as competing claims about the ultimate nature of reality? It 
seems to me that if someone claiming to have abandoned SOM can still be driven 
into an existential funk while contemplating free will versus determinism, then 
that person has not completely abandoned SOM.



dmb says:
You seem to be saying that once we drop SOM ideas don't really matter. You seem 
to think that being logically consistent or believing one thing instead of the 
other just doesn't matter anymore. That strikes me as absurd in the extreme. 
For the pragmatist, the truth of an idea is measured in terms of its 
consequences in experience. This has nothing to do with what's absolutely true 
or metaphysically true or the really real. It's just about what happens when 
you put the idea to work. If an idea is a logical train wreck, then it clearly 
won't work. If an idea renders your actions inert and your life meaningless, 
then that's a very bad idea, a destructive idea that does not serve life. Quite 
the opposite. If think you can hang determinism in this pragmatic gallery of 
truth, then you probably can't discern good art from bad art. 

One of the central reasons for attacking SOM is that it breeds attitudes of 
objectivity. It denies the passions as meaningless and irrelevant to the truth. 
James and Pirsig both attack the whole history of philosophy on these grounds, 
if fact. (The Hegelians under attack in the James quote, by the way, were 
determinists, the same sort of determinists he attacks in "The Dilemma of 
Determinism.)

"In the past our common universe of reason has been in the process of escaping, 
rejecting the romantic, irrational world of prehistoric man. It's been 
necessary since before the time of Socrates to reject the passions, the 
emotions, in order to free the rational mind for an understanding of nature's 
order which was as yet unknown. Now it's time to further an understanding of 
nature's order by reassimilating those passions which were originally fled 
from. The passions, the emotions, the affective domain of man's consciousness, 
are a part of nature's order too. The central part."  (ZAMM p. 294)
“Certainly, to my personal knowledge, all Hegelians are not prigs, but I 
somehow feel as if all prigs ought to end, if developed, by becoming Hegelians. 
…The ‘through-and-through’ philosophy …seems too buttoned-up and white-chokered 
and clean-shaven a thing to speak for the vast slow-breathing unconscious 
Kosmos with its dread abysses and its unknown tides.…Their persistence in 
telling me that feeling has nothing to do with the question, that it is a pure 
matter of absolute reason, keeps me for ever out of the pale.  …To speak more 
seriously, the one fundamental quarrel Empiricism has with Absolutism is over 
this repudiation by Absolutism of the personal and aesthetic factor in the 
construction of philosophy. That we all of us have feelings, Empiricism feels 
quite sure. That they may be as prophetic and anticipatory as anything else we 
have, and some of them more so than others, can not possibly be denied. But 
what hope is there of squaring and settling opinions unless Absolutism will 
hold parley on this common ground; and will admit that all philosophies are 
hypotheses, to which all our faculties, emotional as well as logical help us, 
and the truest of which will at the final integration of things be found in 
possession of the men whose faculties on the whole had the best diving power?" 
(William James in ABSOLUTISM AND EMPIRICISM, p.96)

Do I need to explain how and why these quotes count as evidence for my claim? 
Do I need to explain what the quotes mean? I sure hope not.





                                          
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