Greetings,
I found the bundle of quotes below presented without explanation not very helpful. Within the MoQ I do not understand how free-will and determinism (soft or hard) can be other than intellectual static patterns of value. Regardless, here are some lectures that might, at least, explain James' free-will: Marsha --- Here's a six-part talk on William James' Free Will 1. William James' Free Will. Part 1 of 6. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rPWg6tfSx2k 2. The Standard Argument Against Free Will http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=igF_M5r_9So 3. The Two-Stage Model of Free Will http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wuChqgRc7Rc 4. The Two-Stage Model After James http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIBtKupLFOA&feature=related 5. ??? Please let meknow if you find Part 5. Thanks. ---------------------------------------------- 6. Improvements in the Two-Stage Model, Creativity and Free Will http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R3CpxEd12tM&feature=related --- Here's Dennett on the subject: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Utai74HjPJE&feature=related --- Marsha On Sep 29, 2011, at 2:43 PM, david buchanan wrote: > > dmb says: > > Like I've been saying for months, the only metaphysical baggage is the load > you keep adding. Ideas have consequences and that fact does not depend on SOM > or the appearance-reality distinction. You can drop both of those > metaphysical posits and still assert that ideas have consequences. You can > subscribe to the pragmatic theory of truth and still assert that some ideas > are not true because of those consequences. > > That's what Seigfried explains in those quotes you keep ignoring. For the > millionth time, Pirsig and James are both saying that the issue is empirical > and practical, not metaphysical. Why do you keep talking as if I haven't > already said this 50 times? Read what she said, Steve. By refusing, you have > wasted 100 days already. Or would you rather waste another 100 days? Why do > you persist in raising objections to claims that nobody is making and that > have already addressed many times? Your repeated requests to drop the > metaphysical versions are aimed at nobody. The scholarly evidence is already > on the table and ignoring it does not change that fact. Ignoring it only > proves that you're not being honest, that you are being a Lucy. > > > For anyone who's genuinely interested in a Jamesian analysis of free will... > "...The pragmatic method includes directives for validating a belief, whereas > the principle of pure experience includes directives for formulating the > belief in experiential terms...He [James] calls on the principle of pure > experience, for instance, to demonstrate that if activity is to have any > meaning at all, it must be derived from 'some concrete kind of experience > that can be definitely pointed out' (James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, > 81). The first step in the investigation must be to seek 'the original type > and model of what it means' in the stream of experience." (Charlene Seigfried > in "William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy", page 318) > "James then develops his concrete description of human activity; 'But in this > actual world or ours, as it is given, a part at least of activity comes with > definite direction; it comes with desire and sense of goal; it comes > complicated with resistances which it overcomes or succumbs to, and with the > efforts which the feeling of resistance so often provokes; and it is in > complex experiences like these that the notions of distinct agents, and of > passivity as opposed to activity arise. Here also the notion of causal > activity comes to birth. (ERE, 81-2) James culls from experience original > models for understanding not only action, but causality and freedom. > ..."The experience of activity is then described as it is 'lived through or > authentically known' (ERE, 84-5). What activity is 'known-as' is taken from > this 'complete activity in its original and first intention.' H goes into > detail about the 'ultimate Qualiia' of 'these experiences of process, > obstruction,, striving, str ai > n, or release' and concludes that we cannot conceive of it as lived through > except 'in the dramatic shape of something sustaining a felt purpose against > felt obstacles, and overcoming or being overcome'." (Charlene Seigfried in > "William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy", page 319.) > "...We want to know whether we are responsible for our activities or are > determined by events outside of our knowledge and control. The phenomenal > level cannot be superseded if we are even to ask the right questions or frame > the experiments correctly. The issue is precisely whether events which we > experience as ours are in fact so, or whether they should be reductively > attributed to brain cells. In returning to the metaphysical question > James defends the position that the nature, meaning and location of causality > can be determined only at the phenomenal level of concrete experience (Essays > in Radical Empiricism, 91). It it thus not a metaphysical question at all, > but a concrete one, or one answerable within the parameters of radical > empiricism. Not only does he show that the metaphysical question must be > dropped as unanswerable on its own terms, but taking activity at its > face-value, or as we experience it, we also discover 'the very power that > makes facts come and be'. I > n arguing that facts are interactively constituted by us, he has finally > explicitly drawn the consequences of his break with the empiricist assumption > that our percepts passively mirror reality as it is in itself." (Charlene > Seigfried in "William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy", page > 322.) > "To the objection that our felt activity is only an impression and the facts > are to be found elsewhere he responds with the principle of the radically > empiricist philosophy according to which anything, to be considered real, > must be located within experience. If creative activities are to be found > anywhere, 'they must be immediately lived' (ERE, 92). ...What we mean by > causing, even if we mislocate it, are activities of 'sustaining, persevering, > striving, paying with effort as we go, hanging on, and finally achieving our > intentions'. For anything to be called a cause, it must be of the sort of > activity that resembles this 'creation in its first intention,' this > 'causality at work.' To call this phenomenal experience of activity a mere > illusion is to prefer a hidden ontological principle, that can never > experienced and thus never verified, to an experientially verifiable level of > investigation. James, therefore, concludes that 'real effectual causation as > an ultimate nature, a > s a 'category', if you like, of reality is JUST WHAT WE FEEL IT TO BE, just > that kind of conjunction which our own activity-series reveal." > "...Therefore, the nature of causality is not to be found in searching for > such a transcendental cause of causes, if this means a non-experiential > source of what is experienced or some 'more' real, 'unimaginable ontological > principle' mysteriously hidden from our investigations. Furthermore, the > worth or interest of our investigations of activity does not even consist in > discerning the elements of conjunctions of things empirically but 'in the > dramatic outcome of the whole process' (ERE, 94). The only reason for > investigating activity and causality is to help us understand the course and > meaning of life. The pragmatic stance is that we seek to know, not for its > own sake, but to enable us to live better." (Seigfried in "James's Rad > Recon", page 323. Emphasis is James's in the original.) > "It has been the traditional interpretive distinction between a world of > subjective experience and the world of objective reality that has generated > contemporary attacks on objectivity and verifiability. Such REIFIED > distinctions can be dissolved by drawing out the implications of the > perspective that 'The world is surely the TOTAL world, including our mental > reaction." (Seigfried, 356.) > "James appeals to pure experience to keep us from REIFYING these categories: > 'We may, indeed, speculatively imagine a state of pure experience before the > hypothesis of permanent objects behind its flux has been framed; and we can > play with the idea that some primeval genius might have struck into a > different hypothesis' (James, Meaning of Truth, 43). Imagining a state of > pure experience reminds us that the way the world appears to us, the > self-evidenct objectivity of objects, is actually the result of inventive > categories by our ancestors that have been found to be useful and therefore > preserved and passed on to us through our culture and language. However, we > cannot remake the world at our will. As a result of past choices, some > possibilities cannot be realized anymore..." (Seigfried, 358.) > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
