Hi Steve, I've searched high and low for a video of the Tuft's Seminar, but didn't find any. I didn't take Doyle's presentation as more than some kind of presentation of James's explanation of free-will. It's not the end-of-the-story. And I do not see that James's free-will fits well with RMP's explanation of "to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, ... one's behavior is free". Here is a long video of Dennett on free-will at Edinburgh University. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKLAbWFCh1E)
Free-wlll and all the many isms are intellectual static patterns of value: nothing more, nothing less. Marsha On Oct 1, 2011, at 9:03 AM, Steven Peterson wrote: > Hi Marsha, > > I watched all those videos this morning. Thanks for posting them. > > I think this is the missing part 5: > http://www.youtube.com/user/infophilosopher#p/u/34/jNQ_jRU0s6w > > Bob Doyle sure seems to think he's got this problem licked. He seems > more evangelist than philosopher at times. > > The question I have about his two-stage model where first comes chance > them comes choice is this: after indeterminism offers possibilities > HOW does one make a decision among them? Isn't that the original > question still sitting there in the back of the lecture hall? We can > still look into what goes into making a choice and ask whether those > factors are freely chosen or not (if we want to) and so on and so on. > We are back to square one. Aren't we? Why would his model prevent us > from looking for and finding causal explanations for choices? > > Also, what is this "I" that claims to have freely chosen in his model? > Why should this "I" be regarded as the final cause for the given act? > It seems to me that we can always seek causal explanations on higher > or lower levels of description. We can explain the choice as the > desire of an individual and still ask, where do these desires come > from? We can explain choices in terms of the function of a brain in > response to casual laws or random quantum indeterminacy affecting > neurons and lots of other ways without thinking it is meaningful to > ask, which one of all the the possible ways of thinking about a given > act is the ULTIMATELY correct level of description? What is the FINAL > cause of the act in question? The incompatiblist approach to the > question seems to presume that it is meaningful to point to something > as ULTIMATE and other explanations as less real. > > I would LOVE to see Dennett respond to him in that seminar at Tufts he > mentioned. I don't think Doyle is offering any freedom that we want > that we don't have in Dennett's compatiblism. > > Best, > Steve > > > > > On Sat, Oct 1, 2011 at 7:21 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> Greetings, >> >> I found the bundle of quotes below presented without explanation not very >> helpful. Within the MoQ I do not understand how free-will and determinism >> (soft or hard) can be other than intellectual static patterns of value. >> Regardless, here are some lectures that might, at least, explain James' >> free-will: >> >> >> Marsha >> > ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
