Hi Matt,
> Steve said:
> If experience is reality in the MOQ, then I don't see how we would
> ever need to worry about being in touch with reality. Likewise, if DQ
> is the leading edge of experience, then how is perceiving DQ
> something that "you" can be better or worse at? If this "you" is a set
> of static pattern left in the wake of DQ, then it is always in intimate
> contact with DQ.
>
> Matt:
> Dave has been emphasizing for years whenever I would take this line
> that Pirsig still makes a direct/indirect distinction, and this then would
> appear to fill the role in providing a way of saying that DQ is
> something you can be better or worse at.
>
> I've always had difficulty seeing how the direct/indirect distinction
> doesn't reproduce the problems of the experience/reality distinction.
Steve:
I think it does. We agree that Pirsig isn't as much of a pragmatist as
we would like him to be in that regard, but I still don't think that
Pirsig's direct/indirect distinction can do that ("fill the role in
providing a way of saying that DQ is something you can be better or
worse at"). If we think of experience as having a leading edge which
precedes all concepts, and since that is what Pirsig means by DQ, then
how can anyone say that dmb's experience has a leading edge while Matt
K's doesn't? Or that dmb is closer to that leading edge than Matt K
is? That is nonsense when the leading edge of experience precedes
subjects and objects. "Matt K" and "dmb" are merely static patterns
left in the wake of the leading edge of experience, an edge that
begins where they end and ends where they begin.
Ironically, the direct (preconceptual)/indirect (conceptual)
distinction that dmb is trying to use to push against us itself makes
the so-called "out of touch with DQ" problem impossible or at least
merely "secondary." If this problem is (as dmb must be saying) a
problem with our concepts, it (and even the whole problem of SOM
versus the MOQ) is merely a "secondary" problem. The problem of not
being in touch with primary experience because of our lousy ideas
can't be a problem for being in touch with primary experience since
primary experience precedes all concepts. I suppose that's why Pirsig
said that there already is a metaphysics of quality which he calls
SOM. Whether the first division is static-dynamic or subjects and
objects, there is just no getting around primary experience. There
can't be any problem in philosophy as fake as not being in touch with
primary experience.
Best,
Steve
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