Hello everyone On Sat, Oct 29, 2011 at 4:13 PM, Matt Kundert <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hello Dan, > > Matt said: > I think the endgame of the ZMM ghosts passage is more complex > than you're allowing here, because I think Pirsig in the end would > argue that while it is silly to think that gravity existed before Newton > made it up--because intellectual patterns are incumbent upon > people making them up--on the other hand it is internal to the > correct functioning of that intellectual pattern that it be true for all > previous time, in the past. Not all intellectual patterns have this > flavor, but a lot of the one's out of the natural sciences do. > (Principally, I think, because a lot of the stuff in "nature" was > around before we personally were.) > > Dan said: > Now, I see that [i.e., the parenthetical] as a problematic statement. > While I think it is a high value idea that lots of stuff in nature was > around before we personally showed up how do we know that with > any certainty? Isn't this idea a culmination of social and intellectual > patterns informing us as to the nature of the world we inhabit? > > Matt: > Yes, the idea is a "culmination of social and intellectual patterns." > I'm not sure why you thought my parenthetical statement implied > that it needed a Cartesian-like certainty as opposed to high value, as > I thought we were judging everything by. It is the interlocking of the > high value idea that lots of stuff existed before human civilization and > the high value idea that some ideas about stuff should extend the > length of the stuff's existence that produced my "because," not a > Cartesian-like certainty.
Dan: It was how you phrased your statements: Not all intellectual patterns have this flavor, but a lot of the one's out of the natural sciences do. (Principally, I think, because a lot of the stuff in "nature" was around before we personally were.) You seemed to be saying that certain intellectual patterns pertaining to natural sciences hold a higher value on account of "stuff in nature" being around before we personally were. That is what got a rise out of my intellectual hackles, but I see better now what you were saying... thank you. > > Dan said: > The point is, creationists will write the history of rocks much > differently than a person who believes in the theory of evolution > might write it. There is no one history of rocks that is any more true > than another. > > Matt: > There's something weird in your formulation here. Dan: I understand you saying so... I am pretty much unschooled in philosophy having little interest in it. Everything I say philosophically can be seen as weird, I am sure. Matt: > I'm not sure why > you think that "no one history of rocks is any more true than another" > because on Pirsigian grounds, either you don't judge according to the > notion of truth you just used (which is Platonistic*) but rather > according to their highness or lowness in value, or you redefine > "truth" in Pirsigian terms, which might be something like "a high level > of intellectual value," which means some histories of rocks are more > true than others. Dan: Yes, I agree with that. I was using truth as objective, or Platonistic as you say, as in the history of rocks being about rocks rather than being subjectively about people who write the history of rocks. Certainly some histories of rocks hold higher value than others. If that translates into more truth, then I am mistaken. > > Matt said: > So how could evolutionary history not be the same as personal > history? Two distinct reasons. 1) one should make a distinction > between "persons" and "not persons": rocks have histories, too, > which means that though persons write the rocks' histories, persons > should make a distinction between their own history and rocks' > histories. 2) one should make a distinction between one's "I" and > everyone else's "I," with the recognition that a lot of previous, > now-dead I's have been around. The point here is that the current > crop of I's we see walking around are the inheritors of the evolving > intellectual patterns created by people like Newton. So we should > make a distinction between _my_ personal history (born in > Wisconsin, 1980, etc., etc.) and the histories of _groups_ of persons > that extend beyond the range of a single person's lifespan (like the > US, born in Pennsylvania, 1776, etc., etc.). > > Dan said: > I think that the MOQ views those histories as the same. What we as > living beings have inherited is the culture in which we are born and > which informs us as to the nature of the world. If for example I had > been born in a South American rain forest to a tribe of Indians who > had never had contact with the Western culture, I imagine my ideas > of the world would be quite different. > > I would still be informed by ideas that I inherited from those who > came before me, however. I take those inherited ideas and make > them part of who I am as a person. I may not realize that it is > happening but over the years I am gradually indoctrinated and > educated into believing there exists a separate and distinct history of > the world quite apart from my own personal history. It makes sense. > It is a high value idea to be sure. But still, it is an idea. > > Matt: > I'm afraid I don't see the difference between what you said and > what I had said. Except that you saw yourself as articulating an > alternative view. > > Dan said: > I believe the MOQ says that the relationship exists in our heads > though, not out there in the world apart from us. So I am unsure > there is a right way of distinguishing between them. > > Matt: > I no longer believe that "correctness" needs a notion of "out there in > the world apart from us." Dan: Well then I am not sure what we are disagreeing about either. Your formulation of personal evolutionary history vs. longitudinal evolutionary history led me to the conclusion that you believe there exists a world apart from us. If this isn't correct then why are you attempting to distinguish between them? Isn't the idea itself a distinction? Matt: > I no longer think that using it necessarily > implies that someone is using that notion of "out there," though > some uses of it do require one (for example, the one in my footnote > below). I'm not sure mine did. Dan: I stand corrected. > > Matt > > *The notion of truth in "no one history of rocks is any more true than > another" is Platonistic because it assumes that truth is determined by > its accuracy to a reality against which the histories can be checked. > And because, according to this statement, this reality doesn't exist or > can't be checked against, that is why "no one history of rocks is any > more true than another." Thank you, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
