Dear Marsha There is something there, that makes you curious, isn't it? What is it that will eventually tell that you had enough? Someone's blowing a ....
best whistles Jan Anders 8 jul 2012 kl. 16:08 skrev MarshaV <[email protected]>: > > > dmb, > > I agree that direct perceptual (the particular) experience is more immediate > than reflective conceptual (the generalized) experience, but direct > perceptions still cannot be Dynamic Quality or pure experience, which is > undifferentiated. That is my point. The paper you offer might reflect what > James thought, but I am interested in how these are best handled in the MoQ, > and if you cannot explain this I don't see the value to be gained by reading > it. I also acknowledged that static (patterned) value represents all that > human being's can know. But I still have a problem with connecting direct > perceptional experience with Dynamic Quality as I explained. > > > Marsha > > > > > On Jul 8, 2012, at 9:13 AM, david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> Marsha asked: >> How can Dynamic Quality or 'pure experience', which is undifferentiated, >> include perceptions which are differentiated? There is, after all, a >> difference between sensual experiences - smell, sound, taste, sight, and >> feel; percepts require a spacial-temporal framework in which to exist; and >> they are dependent on human sense apparatus? This excludes them from being >> consider Dynamic Quality, the undifferentiated. This represents my >> puzzlement for the past year? And this is why I have a problem with a >> solely preconceptual description of DQ, or pure experience. It seems to me >> that percepts are in the static (patterned) value arena and a more >> appropriate description of DQ would be pre-conceptual and pre-perceptual. >> Dynamic Quality cannot be experienced in any way recognizable by human >> beings. >> >> >> dmb says: >> If you're sincerely interested, there is a paper you might want to read. >> http://queksiewkhoon.tripod.com/varieties_of_pure_experience_joel_w_krueger. >> Until then, here is a piece that'll probably help: >> >> To begin simply, James was suspicious of the idea that conceptual or >> propositional thought functions as the primitive—and thus >> irreducible—interface between self and world. On this conceptualist or >> "intellectualist" line, as James refers to it, all thinking and experience >> involves concepts. No concepts, no experience. James instead argues that the >> phenomenal content of embodied experience as experienced outstrips our >> capacity to conceptually or linguistically articulate it. In other words, >> James insists that many of our basic experiences harbor non-conceptual >> content. That is, many of our experiences have a rich phenomenal content >> that is too fine-grained and sensuously detailed to lend itself to an >> exhaustive conceptual analysis. For example, we can have visual experiences >> of colors and shapes of things for which we lack the relevant concepts (a >> previously unfamiliar shade of magenta or a chiliagon). And this ability >> holds for other sensory modalities as well. For our ability to describe or >> report a wide-range of tastes and smells lags far behind our capacity to >> actually have an experience of a nearly infinite spectrum of tastes and >> smells. In other words, the deliverances of our senses continually run ahead >> of both our descriptive vocabularies as well as our conceptual abilities. >> Though James does not address the notion of non-conceptual content as >> explicitly as many contemporary philosophers of mind—and furthermore, it's >> not clear that he's entirely consistent on this point, as I discuss >> below—James does continually insist that there is a truth to our concrete >> experience of reality that conceptual analysis and the formal truths of >> logic cannot explicate. Thus James is moved to write the following passage, >> which (not surprisingly) caused considerable consternation among many of his >> contemporary commentators: >> I have finally found myself compelled to give up the logic, fairly, >> squarely, and irrevocably. It has an imperishable use in human life, but >> that use is not to make us theoretically acquainted with the essential >> nature of reality. Reality, life, expedience, concreteness, immediacy, use >> what words you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it. >> >> >> >> >> >>>> Marsha said to dmb: >>>> It sounds like you are suggesting that when you drop concepts, the >>>> adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions, you get DQ? Is >>>> this correct? Is this what is being designated as direct experience? >>>> Where are percepts, the sensual stuff such as smell, taste, feel, sight, >>>> sound, in this explanation? These are experiences, are they not? What >>>> does James say about the sensual experiences? >>>> >>>> dmb says: >>>> Again you are asking for an answer that was already supplied. (SEE QUOTES >>>> BELOW) "Pure experience," James says, is "but another name for FEELING OR >>>> SENSATION" and "its purity is only a relative term, meaning the >>>> proportional amount of UNVERBALIZED SENSATION which it still embodies." >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> On Jul 7, 2012, at 5:26 PM, david buchanan wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Marsha asked: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Direct experience of what? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> dmb says: >>>>>> Like the man said, "experience pure in the literal sense ...is NOT YET >>>>>> ANY DEFINITE WHAT, tho ready to be ALL SORTS of WHATs". There can be no >>>>>> WHATs because whats are all secondary products of thought and not the >>>>>> starting points of reality. There are not yet any whats because this >>>>>> immediate FLUX of experience is dynamic is always "changing throughout" >>>>>> such that "no points, either of distinction or of identity, can be >>>>>> caught.". To have the whats, you need to have distinctions and >>>>>> identities, which are static and secondary products of reflection - as >>>>>> opposed to undivided experience. >>>>>> As Pirsig and James both say together, "there must always be a >>>>>> discrepancy between concepts and reality" because concepts "are static >>>>>> and discontinuous" while the immediate flux of life is a "dynamic and >>>>>> flowing" continuum. To put it another way, there will always be a >>>>>> discrepancy between static concepts and dynamic reality, because static >>>>>> patterns are stable and ordered but the ongoing flux of experience is >>>>>> ever-changing and free of patterned habits or ordered structures. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> On Jul 7, 2012, at 3:43 PM, david buchanan wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> “When Zen teachers introduce students to nirvana (which the MOQ >>>>>> translates as the world of pure undifferentiated value) they do not do >>>>>> so with books and thesis. They sit the students in a room until their >>>>>> clutter of intellectual knowledge is abandoned (especially values >>>>>> judgments!) and the pure vision of the newborn infant is regained” >>>>>> (McWatt 2004, 83). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> "Only new-born babes, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, >>>>>> or blows, may be assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense >>>>>> of that which is not yet any definite what, tho ready to be all sorts of >>>>>> whats; full both of oneness and of manyness, but in respects that don't >>>>>> appear; changing throughout, yet so confusedly that its phases >>>>>> interpenetrate and no points, either of distinction or ofidentity, can >>>>>> be caught. Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling >>>>>> or sensation. But the flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill >>>>>> itself with emphases, and these salient parts become identified and >>>>>> fixed and abstracted; so that experience now flows as if shot through >>>>>> with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions. Its purity >>>>>> is only a relative term, meaning the proportional amount of unverbalized >>>>>> sensation which it still embodies." - William James - Essays in Radical >>>>>> Empiricism. >>>>>> >>>>>> " 'There must always be a discrepancy between concepts and reality, >>>>>> because the former are static and discontinuous while the latter is >>>>>> dynamic and flowing.' Here James had chosen exactly the same words >>>>>> Phaedrus had used for the basic subdivision of the Metaphysics of >>>>>> Quality." >>>>>> >>>>>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>>>>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>>>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>>>>> Archives: >>>>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>>>>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >>>>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>>>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>>>> Archives: >>>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>>>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >>>> >>>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>>> Archives: >>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>> Archives: >>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >> >> Moq_Discuss mailing list >> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >> Archives: >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >> http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
