Hi dmb, > dmb said to Harding: > It seems pretty clear to me that you raised all of these objections before > you even finished reading the post. If you'd continued to read carefully, you > might have noticed that your main objection (that James's pragmatic truth > lacks the metaphysical framework of the MOQ) simply isn't true. ...Let me > repeat the crucial moment for you: "For both James and Pirsig, not to mention > Dewey, truths exist within a larger entity. Pirsig calls it DQ whereas James > calls it Pure Experience but both of their terms refer to the primary > empirical reality, refer to cutting edge of experience." > > > David Harding replied: > Quoting yourself is no proof dmb. I have offered quotes where Pirsig > disputes the fact that he and James were saying exactly the same thing. You > might find my line of reasoning a little less bizarre if you stopped for a > second to try and understand what I am saying. > > > dmb says: > But that is a case of disputing a claim that nobody made. Nobody said they > were exactly the same AND I explicitly denied making any such claim. I'm not > going to defend a position I do not hold and I'd be happy to talk about the > differences between Pirsig and James - but not right now. I'm NOT quoting > myself in order to "prove" anything so much as I'm repeating myself because > you're not understanding what my actual claim is. In fact, your main > objection was already addressed by my actual claim before you even raised it. > > I realize that you're raising other objections, David. But please let us > focus on your main objection. We can get to the other issues later, if you > like, but let's take a look at your main objection first. This is not an > evasion, I swear. In fact, I've already worked out a good reply to the > objections you've raised with respect to the misinterpretation of James's > Pragmatic truth as "cash value" and I'd be happy to discuss other related > issues but not right now. Other issues like that will be much easier to deal > with if we address your main concern first. And this time I will include > textual evidence on that point. Okay? > > > > David Harding said to dmb: > Did James ever *specifically* say that he thought the problem was one of > metaphysics? No. Did James ever *specifically* say that the world is best > seen when one places quality first metaphysically and everything else second? > No. ...The MOQ, unlike James alternative, goes much deeper than problems of > utility or the stock exchange. It goes to the problem which is at the very > heart of Western philosophy - SOM. The MOQ is a metaphysics which is an > answer to the problems created by SOM over the last two millennia. This was > never articulated by James because he never saw it worth mentioning. Critics > of Pirsig cannot say he was trying to replace truth with values of the > marketplace. Pirsig has clearly identified the problem (SOM exclusivity) and > the solution - the MOQ. > > > dmb says: > I take this to be your main objection. That is the point I'm addressing in > this post and I'm going to show you that your objection is unfounded. (I > think I already did, actually, but you're not yet seeing that I did.) In > direct opposition to your negative answers to these questions, I can answer > "yes" in each case.
On the contrary, unfortunately you're still misunderstanding me. In fact your mis-production of my original questions below indicates the source of your misunderstanding.. > Did James think the problem of truth was one of metaphysics? YES. Did James > put Quality first and make truth a secondary manifestation? YES. Did James > specifically attack SOM as the problem at the very heart of Western > philosophy? YES. Well I don't disagree with your affirmative responses to the first two of these questions.. But not the third.. The reason being is that you can see above that my actual questions were… Did James ever *specifically* say that he thought the problem was one of metaphysics? No. Did James ever *specifically* say that the world is best seen when one places quality first metaphysically and everything else second? No. See how I've highlighted the word specifically? James's problem wasn't one of understanding the problem. He understood the problem. It was one of how he went about articulating his understanding of the problem and his solution to it. James gets caught out articulating his solution to the problem because he fails to tackle the problem in the fundamental way Pirsig does. Pirsig realised the source of the problem extends all the way back to ancient greek times and that many of our modern day philosophical problems can be traced back to this time when truth was placed before what was good. He thus realised that the problem was a metaphysical one and that thus a new metaphysics is what is required because it doesn't logically follow that the best way to break up what's true is the same as the best way to break up what's good. He gave these *two metaphysics* two different names to highlight their fundamental difference. Again, no other philosopher that you mention below has done this.. So I'm not saying that James honestly thought that what's good is 'utility or the stock exchange'. But this is how he articulated his ideas. The difference between them on this point is one of explanatory scope and Pirsig, as opposed to James, gets to the very heart of the problem. > William James in “A World of Pure Experience”: > > “The first great pitfall from which a radical standing by experience will > save us is an artificial conception of the relations between knower and > known. Throughout the history of philosophy the subject and its object have > been treated as absolutely discontinuous entities” and their relations have > “assumed a paradoxical character which all sorts of theories had to be > invented to overcome.” > > > > Robert Pirsig explaining James's radical empiricism in Lila: > > “The second of James’ two main systems of philosophy …was his radical > empiricism. By this he meant that subjects and objects are not the starting > points of experience. Subjects and objects are secondary. They are concepts > derived from something more fundamental which he described as ‘the immediate > flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its > conceptual categories’. In this basic flux of experience, the distinctions of > reflective thought, such as those between consciousness and content, subject > and object, mind and matter, have not yet emerged in the forms which we make > them. Pure experience cannot be called either physical of psychical: it > logically precedes this distinction” (LILA 365). > > > And here is the contemporary scholar John Stuhr explaining Dewey's rejection > of SOM: > > “In beginning to understand his view, it cannot be overemphasized that Dewey > is not using the word ‘experience’ in its conventional sense. For Dewey, > experience is not to be understood in terms of the experiencing subject, or > as the interaction of a subject and object that exist separate from their > interaction. Instead, Dewey’s view is radically empirical” wherein > “experience is an activity in which subject and object are unified and > constituted as partial features and relations within this ongoing, unanalyzed > unity”. > > > Here is Dewey explaining his rejection of SOM in “The Need for a Recovery of > Philosophy”: > “The characteristic feature of this prior notion [SOM] is the assumption that > experience centres in, or gathers about, or proceeds from a centre or subject > which is outside the course of natural existence, and set over against it” > (PCAP 449). This “prior notion” is what radical empiricism is rejecting. It > is seen as a mistake and as the source of many fake problems in philosophy. > As Stuhr puts it, “the error of materialists and idealists alike” is “the > error of conferring existential status upon the products of reflection” (PCAP > 437). > > And finally, David Granger neatly includes all three of our radical > empiricists on this point: > "...Dewey and Pirsig also argue that experience or Quality is ultimately a > continuous, ongoing phenomenon. The sorting process [into conceptual > categories upon reflection] never effects a complete break in the course of > events. Experience, they claim, really begins with the initiation of life and > ends with its cessation. [As Pirsig says, the only ones who don't do > metaphysics are the unborn.] One is at no time 'outside' of it, in other > words, because the 'interaction of the live creature and environing > conditions is involved in the very process of living'. And because it is born > of the continual interaction between organism and environment, qualitative > immediacy is what James famously called 'double-barrelled,' meaning that it > 'recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and material, > subject and object'. This double-barrelledness,.. is a key feature of the > theory of sense-making that came to be known as 'radical empiricism'." > > > dmb continues: > See, here you have five different voices (James, Dewey, Pirsig, Stuhr and > Granger) using slightly different terms and yet they are all attacking SOM in > the same way. Actually, there are six if you count my voice too. > > Now it seems to me that this is more than enough textual evidence to meet > your objection. This is more than enough to shatter that objection into a > million tiny pieces. These quotes are going to be totally convincing if and > only if you understand their meaning. This quotes will register as a valid > response to your objection only if you're able to see that they're all > talking about the same concepts despite the use of various terms for those > concepts. In other words, you have to do some translations. In the last quote > from Granger, for example, we see that in talking about Dewey and Pirsig, he > uses the phrase "experience or Quality" because they are interchangeable > terms, because they both refer to the same idea. This same notion is > variously referred to as "the immediate flus of life," as "Pure Experience," > as an "ongoing, unanalyzed unity," which is very much like Pirsig's > "undivided experience" and his "pre-intellectual cutting edge of experience," > and as a "qualitative immediacy". > > You can see this in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy too: > "For Nishida [leader of the Kyoto school of Japanese Philosophy back in > James's day], experience in its original form is not the exercise of > individuals equipped with sensory and mental abilities who contact an > exterior world; rather it precedes the differentiation into subject > experiencing and object experienced, and the individual is formed out of it. > ..'Pure experience” names not only the basic form of every sensuous and every > intellectual experience but also the fundamental form of reality, indeed the > “one and only reality” from which all differentiated phenomena are to be > understood. [As Pirsig puts it, 'Quality is the source and substance of > everything'.] Cognitive activities such as thinking or judging, willing, and > intellectual intuition are all derivative forms of pure experience but > identical to it insofar as they are in act—when thinking, willing, etc. are > going on. ...Pure experience launches the dynamic process of reality that > differentiates into subjective and objective phenomena on their way to a > higher unity, and the recapture of our unitary foundation is what Nishida > means by the Good. Nishida would deny that his position is a kind of > idealism, either subjective or transcendental, because no subjective mind, > human or divine, is the origin of what is taken as reality, and no > personified or ego-aware spirit is its beginning or end. His notion of pure > experience clearly shows the influence of William James, Ernst Mach, and > others, but it differs from their notions as well..." > I see how they all attack SOM. I have no disagreements with that. But I also see how you are using Pirsig's term "SOM" to describe what each of these thinkers attacks. Without this term "SOM" this discussion would be much poorer as a result. > dmb says: > Pure experience is the centerpiece of a larger, radical empiricism, one that > rejects the assumptions that created the epistemic gap between subjects and > objects in the first place. This gap is predicated on “an artificial > conception of the relations between knower and known,” James says, and this > fake problem is his first target. The history of philosophy has shown that > all sort of theories have been invented to overcome this gap, he says. Some > theories put a mental representation into the gap, common-sense theories left > the gap untouched, believing that our minds could just make the leap and, he > tells us, and the Transcendentalists brought their Absolute in to perform > this epic task. James and Pirsig, on the other hand, say that subjects and > objects are not the conditions that make experience possible. The are not the > starting points of reality, they are products of reflection or secondary > concepts. As James puts it, inner and outer are just names for the way we > sort experience. They are static concepts derived from experience. To > supposed that these terms mirror Nature’s own divisions or otherwise > correspond to pre-existing ontological categories is to reify these concepts. > This reification, as Stuhr puts it, is “the error of conferring existential > status upon the products of reflection”. Under our radical empiricists, > subjects and objects are de-reified or un-reified. They are stripped of their > metaphysical, ontological status and otherwise demoted to the rank of mere > concept – thereby eliminating SOM's dualism and replacing it with an > experiential monism. For our radical empiricists, experience and reality > amount to the same thing. This is the context in which James and Pirsig make > their claims about pure experience or the pre-intellectual cutting edge of > experience. This is how they share a common metaphysical framework and their > common pragmatic theory of truth fits into that framework in the same way. > > That was EXACTLY what is meant by the MOQ. Truth is a static intellectual > pattern WITHIN a larger entity called Quality." (Lila -- Emphasis is > Pirsig's) > > Do you see how all this defeats your objection, David? If not, feel free to > ask for clarifications. I hope my re-articulation of my point here has cleared things up. I don't disagree that other thinkers have attacked SOM. Or indeed there are thinkers, such as James, who say things which are very closely aligned with the MOQ. But none of these thinkers clearly drew a precise intellectual line in the sand between SOM and a new Metaphysical system. Without that clear line our discussion can become very confused, very quickly as a result. This confusion is to the point where it would not be incorrect to say that these other thinkers(while they do indeed attack SOM) are still stuck in its bad philosophy explanatory grip. It is not until that clear line is drawn between SOM and the MOQ that we can clearly articulate whose ideas align with what.. Thanks dmb, -David. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
