I dug this up on stanford encyclopedia, it clears up some of my questions
and affirms my suspicions about just what Rorty is attacking.
Stanford:
"Rorty's mature view of the point and significance of the concept of truth
is first elaborated in "Davidson, Pragmatism and Truth," in ORT. Recent
expressions are found in the first of the two Spinoza Lectures given at the
University of Amsterdam in 1997, "Is it Desirable to Love truth?", in the
paper, "Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Donald Davidson versus Crispin Wright"
(TP), as well as in the introductions to, respectively, TP and PSH. In
these writings Rorty argues that while "truth" has various important uses,
it does not itself name a goal towards which we can strive, over and above
warrant or justification. His argument is not that truth is reducible to
warrant, but that the concept has no deep or substantive criterial content
at all. That is, there are only semantic explanations to be offered for why
it is the case that a given sentence is true just when its truth conditions
are satisfied. So aiming for truth, as opposed to warrant, does not point to
a possible line of action, just as we have no measure of our approximation to
truth other than increasing warrant. Indeed, for Rorty, this is part of what
makes the concept so useful, in a manner not coincidentally analogous with
goodness; it ensures that no sentence can ever be analytically certified as
true by virtue of its possession of some other property. Rorty's attitude to
the concept of truth has been much criticized, often on the grounds that the
very notion of warrant, indeed the concept of belief in general, presupposes
the notion of truth. However, it may be that we can do justice to these
connections without supposing that the notion of truth thus involved backs up
the notions of belief and warrant with any substantive normative content of
its own. Indeed, that neither the concept of truth, nor those of objectivity
and of reality, can be invoked to explain or legitimate our inferential
practices
and our standards of warrant, is the essence of Rorty's conversationalism, or
epistemological behaviorism."
..[Ron]
As I suspected what Rorty seems to be reacting against are analytical
conceptions
of the truth statement. From what I can deduce, for Rorty "truth" is a faculty
of reason
not the dynamic flux inwhich reason aims to clarify, So I think Rorty would not
place truth with dynamic Quality I think he would say that truth is a high
Quality
idea and that makes all the difference in regard to what he is trying to say
with
"epistemological behaviorism".
or am I really reaching to make conversation.
..
..
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