Hello everyone On Sun, Feb 10, 2013 at 10:29 PM, David Harding <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Dan, > > Feel free to answer any responses which you see fit - This post is still > growing.. it would be nice to cut it down a bit..
Hi David I have done as you suggest. Please feel free to address any issues I have left out. > >>> Here's an exchange of ours which I think gets to the heart of the matter: >>> >>>>> Ultimately they do.. But what about objects? Isn't it sometimes a good >>>>> idea to say they exist before we experience them? >>>> >>>> Dan: >>>> How would we know? Isn't that an assumption rooted in the premise that >>>> objects exist separately and apart from our observation of them? >>> >>> Your reluctance to go along with this assumption shows that you see little >>> value in the strength of SOM.. But then to contradict this Pirsig says.. >>> >>> "Within the MOQ, the idea that static patterns of value start with the >>> inorganic level is considered to be a GOOD idea." - Pirsig. >> >> Dan: >> I see no contradiction. This idea works very well as a rule. But I see >> you haven't answered my question. How do you know objects exist prior >> to your experience of them? I realize it is an assumption; for the >> most part I go along with it every day. It is a high quality idea. >> Aren't we here to explore the MOQ, however? Don't you think it points >> to better ways of organizing reality? > > How are these things separate? How is 'the MOQ' separate from the *high > quality idea* that objects exist prior to our experience of them? Dan: It isn't separate. I was pointing out that the MOQ is pure empiricism. I'd like to go back to this exchange in Lila's Child which might better explain what I'm on about here: RMP Annotation 57 In the MOQ time is dependent on experience independently of matter. Matter is a deduction from experience. DG: Could you elaborate on what you mean by “independently of matter”? I can see that time is dependent on experience but am having a difficulty with the rest of your first sentence, especially in the context of your second sentence. RMP: I think the trouble is with the word, “experience.” It can be used in at least three ways. It can be used as a relationship between an object and another object (as in Los Angeles experiencing earthquakes.) It is more commonly used as a subject-object relationship. This relationship is usually considered the basis of philosophic empiricism and experimental scientific knowledge. In a subject-object metaphysics, this experience is between a preexisting object and subject, but in the MOQ, there is no pre-existing subject or object. Experience and Dynamic Quality become synonymous. Change is probably the first concept emerging from this Dynamic experience. Time is a primitive intellectual index of this change. Substance was postulated by Aristotle as that which does not change. Scientific “matter” is derived from the concept of substance. Subjects and objects are intellectual terms referring to matter and nonmatter. So in the MOQ experience comes first, everything else comes later. This is pure empiricism, as opposed to scientific empiricism, which, with its pre-existing subjects and objects, is not really so pure. I hope this explains what is said above, “In the MOQ time is dependent on experience independently of matter. Matter is a deduction from experience.” Dan comments: I think he is saying quite a bit here which pertains to our discussion. First, the MOQ subscribes to pure empiricism as opposed to scientific empiricism "with its pre-existing subjects and objects." He notes how the term 'experience' can be used in different ways and how the subject-object relationship is commonly considered the basis for experimental scientific knowledge (a good idea). He reiterates that subjects and objects are intellectual terms referring to matter and non-matter since scientific matter is derived from the concept (good idea) of substance. Does this help at all with your question: How is 'the MOQ' separate from the *high quality idea* that objects exist prior to our experience of them? > Is there only one 'true' quality idea in the MOQ or are there many depending > on the situation? Dan: It depends on the value of the idea. In the MOQ, truth is a high quality intellectual pattern. Not all intellectual patterns are high quality. Now, since you refuse to answer my question: How do you know objects exist prior to your experience of them? I will answer it for you. You cannot know with certainty that anything exists prior to experience, or that it doesn't exist, for that matter. It is an assumption, albeit a high quality assumption. Remember: "... in the MOQ experience comes first, everything else comes later." > >> >>> >>> Quality first.. then Ideas…. then the *Quality* idea that matter comes >>> first.. See how the MOQ solves this problem of materialism vs idealism? >> >> >> Dan: >> >> There is nothing wrong with saying that the City of Los Angeles >> experiences earthquakes as long as it is remembered that we are >> speaking allegorically. > > Why can't the City of LA experience anything? The inorganic particles of the > city of LA can respond to DQ. > > "I think the answer is that inorganic objects experience events but do not > react to them biologically, socially, or intellectually. They react to these > experiences inorganically, according to the laws of physics." - LC Dan: You've just answered your own question. "I think the answer is that inorganic objects experience events but do not react to them biologically, socially, or intellectually." It is okay to say the City of Los Angeles experiences earthquakes as long as we remember it cannot react to them biologically, socially, or intellectually. >> >> Dan: >> The Quality of ZMM becomes Dynamic Quality of Lila. > > That's right.. It does become that. But there's more to it than that for if > the Quality of ZMM becomes the DQ of Lila then what does Pirsig mean in Lila > where he writes: > > "A particularly large amount of this time had been spent trying to lay down a > first line of division between the classic and romantic aspects of the > universe he'd emphasized in his first book. In that book his purpose had been > to show how Quality could unite the two. But the fact that Quality was the > best way of uniting the two was no guarantee that the reverse was true - that > the classic-romantic split was the best way of dividing Quality." > > Dividing Quality.. What does he mean by this? I thought DQ (according to > you) couldn't be divided? Dan: That's what I have been trying to tell you. Once divided, 'it' is no longer Dynamic Quality. Static quality has emerged, which can and is divided. >> >> Dan comments: >> Illusory and imaginary are seen as synonymous. > > These *different* words both have important *different* philosophical > connotations as I describe above. Synonyms don't have exactly the same > meaning - otherwise we wouldn't have use for the thesaurus with which you've > quoted from above.. > > Now can you please speak to my point above about this important difference > between an illusion(which is mystical) and imagination(which is intellectual)? Dan: These are both intellectual terms which are seen as synonymous. I already answered this question. No one is saying synonyms are exact in their meaning but they are close enough to comport to one another. Otherwise, why are there synonyms at all? > > >>> After writing Lila Pirsig realised that SOM fits very nicely into the MOQ.. >>> The first two levels .. inorganic and biological are objects… the top two >>> levels … social and intellectual are subjective.. >>> >>> Your denigration of SOM implies that you don't think that Subjects and >>> Objects are experienced or exist. >> >> Dan: >> Again, please go back and show me where I ever said objects do not >> exist. I've gone to great pains to show you how they do exist. I've >> offered quotes from Lila to show you that static patterns make up an >> encyclopedia of everything. > > The city of LA experienced an earthquake is a wrong sentence to you? Dan: Where did I say this? I am quite sure I said there is NOTHING WRONG with this sentence. > Why is it bad if you agree that it can be a good idea to say that objects > exist before our experience of them? Dan: There is nothing 'bad' about it as long as it is understood this is a high quality idea. Within the MOQ, experience comes first, not pre-existing objects. > >>> What does 'existence' mean to you Dan? What separates something 'existing' >>> from something imagined? >> >> Dan: >> That is a very deep and challenging question, one which I haven't the >> proper time to go into at this time. I would venture to say, however, >> that if, as Phaedrus says, nothing exists outside of the human >> imagination, then there can be no separation. > > This is the heart of our disagreement.. > > Because alternatively - I've got a very simple answer that I don't find > challenging.. Quality is what separates something existing from something > imagined. Dan: Whole careers have been spent attempting to answer this question. Myriad books have been written on the subject. On the surface, it seems very simple, sure. But just saying it doesn't make it so. I would suggest a bit of reading on this but you seem adverse to such things. So I won't. > Quality is what exists outside the human imagination. Dan: How do you know that? Isn't this pure conjecture? If Quality exists outside the human imagination, how can anyone know of it? Yet everyone knows what Quality is. > > It is Quality to say that one thing exists while another one does not.. It > all depends on the situation and the harmony produced by the idea... > > There is a simplicity of this answer which I like.. This answer is a part of > the MOQ and explained by Pirsig where he writes: > > "The MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces ideas, which produce > what we know as matter. The scientific community that has produced > Complementarity, almost invariably presumes that matter comes first and > produces ideas. However, as if to further the confusion, the MOQ says that > the idea that matter comes first is a high quality idea! " Dan: I am not sure you are taking into account the depth of these words. You seem to be skimming stones across the surface of a very deep and mysterious lake and saying to yourself, see? I have it all figured out! > >> >>> >>> Do you think that Subjects and Objects are a part of experience? I've >>> asked this many times but how do they exist if they are not experienced? I >>> mean, you're right - it is ultimately the wrong question. But a reasonable >>> one to anyone who sees value in the idea that things which we experience >>> actually exist and aren't just imagined. >> >> Dan: >> If you've been following me at all, then you must see that our concept >> of the world always lags behind experience. Experience has moved on by >> the time we recognize and categorize the things emerging from 'it.' > > Experience has moved on? Is that DQ? DQ moves? You seem to be confusing DQ > with the physical property of change.. Dan: Please try re-reading what I wrote without taking a few words out of context. >>> >>> Yes actually Lila fully defines the Quality of ZMM. >> >> Dan: >> Ah, so here is a problem. Quality cannot be fully defined. Only static >> quality is defined. > > Yes, I should be clearer - Lila (attempts to) fully define the Quality of > ZMM. Static quality tries to capture that which cannot be caught… But it > still tries... Dan: No it doesn't. Robert Pirsig is quite clear that Dynamic Quality cannot be defined. > >> >>> >>> "What would you call it? Degeneracy, he guessed. Writing a metaphysics is, >>> in the strictest mystic sense, a degenerate activity. >>> >>> But the answer to all this, he thought, was that a ruthless, doctrinaire >>> avoidance of degeneracy is a degeneracy of another sort. That's the >>> degeneracy fanatics are made of. Purity, identified, ceases to be purity. >>> Objections to pollution are a form of pollution. The only person who >>> doesn't pollute the mystic reality of the world with fixed metaphysical >>> meanings is a person who hasn't yet been born — and to whose birth no >>> thought has been given. The rest of us have to settle for being something >>> less pure. " >> >> Dan: >> I think this a great quote but I don't see how it is applicable here. > > Clearly it's applicable - this attempt to capture that which cannot be caught > is degeneracy.. Do you deny that by using intellectual sq your attempting > to define DQ? Dan: Once intellectual patterns have emerged they are no longer Dynamic. >>> >>> It's strange to me that you refuse to say that DQ = experience. If DQ >>> isn't experience - what then is experience? Is it >>> simply 'Dynamic' as you say above? What do you mean by that? Intrigued. >> >> Dan: >> Within the MOQ, Dynamic Quality becomes synonymous with experience. We >> define experience all the time. By the time those static definitions >> emerge, however, 'it' has moved on. So we continually define 'it' and >> yet these definitions are inexhaustible. By saying Dynamic Quality is >> experience or that it equals experience is to completely misunderstand >> the nature of experience. It is to say we have encapsulated experience >> within a static pattern. > > So if experience isn't Dynamic Quality what is it? It seems you want it to be > both static quality and Dynamic Quality or not Dynamic Quality or static > quality at the same time.. What is experience? Dan: What I want is irrelevant. If Dynamic Quality and experience become synonymous in the MOQ, then to define either is beyond the scope of intellect. >>> >>> So you disagree with Pirsig of Lila's Child where he says that Dynamic >>> Quality is infinitely definable? >> >> Dan: >> Of course not. You must be misunderstanding both what I am saying and >> what Robert Pirsig is saying. Once defined, 'it' is no longer Dynamic >> Quality. Yes, I understand it is confusing, especially if one is >> holding onto the notion that we experience the world of objects that >> exist independently of the observer. > > Which I'm not doing. In fact I'm continually telling you otherwise and yet > you're holding onto the idea.. > > I'll say it again for like the 1000'th time… It can be a good idea that > objects exist independently of the observer.. Yes that is an idea - but what > is fundamental is not the idea but the quality of it - there is no idea > beyond this quality. Dan: So this quality is independent of human imagination? And we know of it, how? >> >> Dan: >> "Dynamic Quality is defined constantly by everyone. Consciousness can >> be described is a process of defining Dynamic Quality. But once the >> definitions emerge, they are static patterns and no longer apply to >> Dynamic Quality. So one can say correctly that Dynamic Quality is both >> infinitely definable and undefinable because definition never exhausts >> it." [Lila's Child] >> >> Dan comments: >> I take the term 'both' to mean at the same time. And again, please >> note the sentence: "... once the definitions emerge, they are static >> patterns and no longer apply to Dynamic Quality." This is important >> and pertains directly to our discussion. >> > > I take 'both' to mean at different times . The MOQ is pragmatic - as opposed > to idealism - and in pragmatism - situation and time are important... And > this quote does indeed pertain to our discussion - The definitions do indeed > no longer apply to Dynamic Quality. As soon as they are created they apply > to their own category - static quality. That is why we can make a statement > such as "The city of LA experienced an earthquake today" - as what we are > intellectually describing is one inorganic static quality pattern > experiencing an inorganic event - an earthquake... Dan: "We are intellectually describing" you say. Yes we are. The city of LA isn't describing the experience. Plus you seem to finally see that experience isn't both Dynamic Quality and static quality. Once defined, it is no longer Dynamic. This is good. >>> >>> What actually exists? >> >> Dan: >> The human imagination. > > Idealism! > > Quality exists. > > No wonder you dislike the idea that matter comes first so much. Dan: My likes and dislikes have no bearing here. And how on earth can you possibly know what I like or dislike, anyway. More conjecture, I guess. Again, if nothing exists outside the human imagination, then how can anyone ever know that matter exists independently of it? Or Quality, for that matter? >> >> Dan: >> Ah. So you now see static quality emerges from experience and is no >> longer experience itself. That's wonderful! > > I always agreed with your position on this.. You wanted us to disagree about > this (still do) but I held two contradictory views at the same time… How do I > justify this? Because unlike yourself - I think that Quality exists before > the human imagination - If something is a good idea then that's right - if > something else at a different time is a good idea then the alternative is > right.. Dan: How can you know anything exists independent of human imagination? Think about it. >>>> >>>>> >>>>> But then, there's this other world of thought.. The intellectual level.. >>>>> Do I 'imagine' the world of thought or does the intellectual level exist? >>>> >>>> Dan: >>>> According to ZMM, yes. And I should think Lila says the same thing. >>>> The levels of the MOQ are provisional. They exist in the imagination. >>>> The intellectual level exists, sure, but it exists in the mind. >>>> Remember, in the MOQ, intellectual and social patterns correspond to >>>> the subjective side, or idealism, while biological and inorganic >>>> patterns correspond to the objective side, or materialism. >>> >>> That's right. So the intellectual level along with every other one exists.. >> >> Dan: >> I never said it didn't. > > Well - you deny that matter exists before we think about it. Dan: Where did you get this from? Please supply a quote. > But that idea is a good idea - something which you do deny… An idea which is > part of the foundation of the static quality structure of the MOQ.. Dan: Please show me anywhere that I deny this. > >> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Is this intellectual level part of experience? >>>> >>>> Dan: >>>> It is a memory of experience, a map, if you will. >>> >>> Ultimately yes. But to avoid the pitfalls of idealism, we say that the >>> quality of an ideal is what makes it exist and not the ideal existence >>> itself.. A quality idea is that sq exists and is experienced. >> >> Dan: >> Static quality exists but it is no longer experience. It has emerged >> from experience. > > The idea that static quality exists and is experienced is a good idea.. > There is no singular truth in the MOQ.. You only need look to see what's > actually good and logic will follow. Dan: It may be a good idea TO YOU. If so, then fine. > > Well conversely - right now I think that your ideas are higher quality than > Pirsig's otherwise I wouldn't be participating in this discussion - I'd be > talking with Pirsig... Dan: What would you say? Thank you, Dan http://www.danglover.com Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
