Hi Dan, >> Feel free to answer any responses which you see fit - This post is still >> growing.. it would be nice to cut it down a bit.. > > Hi David > I have done as you suggest. Please feel free to address any issues I > have left out.
Okay thank you much appreciated. It's good for a long discussion like this to occasionally have some of the bloat cut out of it otherwise it wouldn't be possible. >>>> Here's an exchange of ours which I think gets to the heart of the matter: >>>> >>>>>> Ultimately they do.. But what about objects? Isn't it sometimes a good >>>>>> idea to say they exist before we experience them? >>>>> >>>>> Dan: >>>>> How would we know? Isn't that an assumption rooted in the premise that >>>>> objects exist separately and apart from our observation of them? >>>> >>>> Your reluctance to go along with this assumption shows that you see little >>>> value in the strength of SOM.. But then to contradict this Pirsig says.. >>>> >>>> "Within the MOQ, the idea that static patterns of value start with the >>>> inorganic level is considered to be a GOOD idea." - Pirsig. >>> >>> Dan: >>> I see no contradiction. This idea works very well as a rule. But I see >>> you haven't answered my question. How do you know objects exist prior >>> to your experience of them? I realize it is an assumption; for the >>> most part I go along with it every day. It is a high quality idea. >>> Aren't we here to explore the MOQ, however? Don't you think it points >>> to better ways of organizing reality? >> >> How are these things separate? How is 'the MOQ' separate from the *high >> quality idea* that objects exist prior to our experience of them? > > Dan: > It isn't separate. I was pointing out that the MOQ is pure empiricism. > I'd like to go back to this exchange in Lila's Child which might > better explain what I'm on about here: > > RMP Annotation 57 > In the MOQ time is dependent on experience independently of matter. > Matter is a deduction from experience. > DG: > Could you elaborate on what you mean by “independently of matter”? I > can see that time is dependent on experience but am having a > difficulty with the rest of your first sentence, especially in the > context of your second sentence. > RMP: > I think the trouble is with the word, “experience.” It can be used in > at least three ways. It can be used as a relationship between an > object and another object (as in Los Angeles experiencing > earthquakes.) It is more commonly used as a subject-object > relationship. This relationship is usually considered the basis of > philosophic empiricism and experimental scientific knowledge. > In a subject-object metaphysics, this experience is between a > preexisting object and subject, but in the MOQ, there is no > pre-existing subject or object. Experience and Dynamic Quality become > synonymous. Change is probably the first concept emerging from this > Dynamic experience. Time is a primitive intellectual index of this > change. Substance was postulated by Aristotle as that which does not > change. Scientific “matter” is derived from the concept of substance. > Subjects and objects are intellectual terms referring to matter and > nonmatter. So in the MOQ experience comes first, everything else comes > later. This is pure empiricism, as opposed to scientific empiricism, > which, with its pre-existing subjects and objects, is not really so > pure. I hope this explains what is said above, “In the MOQ time is > dependent on experience independently of matter. Matter is a deduction > from experience.” > > Dan comments: > I think he is saying quite a bit here which pertains to our > discussion. First, the MOQ subscribes to pure empiricism as opposed to > scientific empiricism "with its pre-existing subjects and objects." > He notes how the term 'experience' can be used in different ways and > how the subject-object relationship is commonly considered the basis > for experimental scientific knowledge (a good idea). He reiterates > that subjects and objects are intellectual terms referring to matter > and non-matter since scientific matter is derived from the concept > (good idea) of substance. > > Does this help at all with your question: How is 'the MOQ' separate > from the *high quality idea* that objects exist prior to our > experience of them? Yes. As you said at the start - it isn't separate. > > >> Is there only one 'true' quality idea in the MOQ or are there many depending >> on the situation? > > Dan: > It depends on the value of the idea. In the MOQ, truth is a high > quality intellectual pattern. Not all intellectual patterns are high > quality. > > Now, since you refuse to answer my question: How do you know objects exist > prior > to your experience of them? I will answer it for you. You cannot know > with certainty that anything exists prior to experience, or that it > doesn't exist, for that matter. It is an assumption, albeit a high > quality assumption. Remember: "... in the MOQ experience comes first, > everything else comes later." Why do you keep arguing with me as if I don't think experience comes first? When did I ever say that it didn't? I've always only said that it is a high quality idea that matter comes first and before we experience it. But it is the quality which is important and not the fact that it is an idea.. >>>> Quality first.. then Ideas…. then the *Quality* idea that matter comes >>>> first.. See how the MOQ solves this problem of materialism vs idealism? > >>> >>> Dan: >>> >>> There is nothing wrong with saying that the City of Los Angeles >>> experiences earthquakes as long as it is remembered that we are >>> speaking allegorically. >> >> Why can't the City of LA experience anything? The inorganic particles of the >> city of LA can respond to DQ. >> >> "I think the answer is that inorganic objects experience events but do not >> react to them biologically, socially, or intellectually. They react to these >> experiences inorganically, according to the laws of physics." - LC > > Dan: > You've just answered your own question. "I think the answer is that > inorganic objects experience events but do not react to them > biologically, socially, or intellectually." It is okay to say the City > of Los Angeles experiences earthquakes as long as we remember it > cannot react to them biologically, socially, or intellectually. Well it can react to them in those ways as well. Biologically the people and plants and animals all move around a whole lot. The society can get together after the earthquake and react to it by providing help for the injured and we can react to it intellectually by analysing the data (and hopefully finding ways of detecting them in the future).. > >>> >>> Dan: >>> The Quality of ZMM becomes Dynamic Quality of Lila. >> >> That's right.. It does become that. But there's more to it than that for if >> the Quality of ZMM becomes the DQ of Lila then what does Pirsig mean in Lila >> where he writes: >> >> "A particularly large amount of this time had been spent trying to lay down >> a first line of division between the classic and romantic aspects of the >> universe he'd emphasized in his first book. In that book his purpose had >> been to show how Quality could unite the two. But the fact that Quality was >> the best way of uniting the two was no guarantee that the reverse was true - >> that the classic-romantic split was the best way of dividing Quality." >> >> Dividing Quality.. What does he mean by this? I thought DQ (according to >> you) couldn't be divided? > > Dan: > That's what I have been trying to tell you. Once divided, 'it' is no > longer Dynamic Quality. Static quality has emerged, which can and is > divided. So we begin with Dynamic Quality and then that becomes static quality which we then divide that into the two static quality categories of Dynamic Quality and static quality? >>> Dan comments: >>> Illusory and imaginary are seen as synonymous. >> >> These *different* words both have important *different* philosophical >> connotations as I describe above. Synonyms don't have exactly the same >> meaning - otherwise we wouldn't have use for the thesaurus with which you've >> quoted from above.. >> >> Now can you please speak to my point above about this important difference >> between an illusion(which is mystical) and imagination(which is >> intellectual)? > > Dan: > These are both intellectual terms which are seen as synonymous. I > already answered this question. No one is saying synonyms are exact in > their meaning but they are close enough to comport to one another. > Otherwise, why are there synonyms at all? Yes, some synonyms are close - others not so much. It depends on their context which synonyms apply and which don't. All synonyms have different definitions. Some synonyms can mean quite different things depending on both their definition and their context. There is an important distinction between imagination and illusion.. By your own recognition below - a 'Myriad' of books have been written on this subject - so they must at least be different no? > >> >> >>>> After writing Lila Pirsig realised that SOM fits very nicely into the >>>> MOQ.. The first two levels .. inorganic and biological are objects… the >>>> top two levels … social and intellectual are subjective.. >>>> >>>> Your denigration of SOM implies that you don't think that Subjects and >>>> Objects are experienced or exist. >>> >>> Dan: >>> Again, please go back and show me where I ever said objects do not >>> exist. I've gone to great pains to show you how they do exist. I've >>> offered quotes from Lila to show you that static patterns make up an >>> encyclopedia of everything. >> >> The city of LA experienced an earthquake is a wrong sentence to you? > > Dan: > Where did I say this? I am quite sure I said there is NOTHING WRONG > with this sentence. Yes. You're right. You did say there is NOTHING WRONG with it…… If that's all you said then that would be fine.. But for some reason you thought it was good to provide a whole lot of unnecessary caveats to that sentence: "I think the confusion here centers on the term 'experience.' Don't you? When is the last time a city told you anything? Does the City of Los Angeles ever correspond with you like I am doing? There is nothing wrong with saying that the City of Los Angeles experiences earthquakes as long as it is remembered that we are speaking allegorically." So you saw it necessary to caveat with not only the fact that in your view there was something ambiguous with the word 'experience' (There isn't) That things which experience something must speak and converse or they don't experience? (How strange) And finally that it must be said via an allegory (It isn't). > >> Why is it bad if you agree that it can be a good idea to say that objects >> exist before our experience of them? > > Dan: > There is nothing 'bad' about it as long as it is understood this is a > high quality idea. Within the MOQ, experience comes first, not > pre-existing objects. And I've never said it is anything other than a high quality idea so why do you keep assuming I'm saying something to the opposite of what I'm actually saying? > >> >>>> What does 'existence' mean to you Dan? What separates something >>>> 'existing' from something imagined? >>> >>> Dan: >>> That is a very deep and challenging question, one which I haven't the >>> proper time to go into at this time. I would venture to say, however, >>> that if, as Phaedrus says, nothing exists outside of the human >>> imagination, then there can be no separation. >> >> This is the heart of our disagreement.. >> >> Because alternatively - I've got a very simple answer that I don't find >> challenging.. Quality is what separates something existing from something >> imagined. > > Dan: > Whole careers have been spent attempting to answer this question. > Myriad books have been written on the subject. On the surface, it > seems very simple, sure. But just saying it doesn't make it so. I > would suggest a bit of reading on this but you seem adverse to such > things. So I won't. "When the solution is simple, God is answering" - Albert Einstein. Please tell me where I am wrong that Quality is what separates something existing from something imagined? >> Quality is what exists outside the human imagination. > > Dan: > How do you know that? Isn't this pure conjecture? If Quality exists > outside the human imagination, how can anyone know of it? Yet everyone > knows what Quality is. You seem to answer your own question here. But I'll answer as well with a couple of quotes from Pirsig: "But Quality is not a factor synthesized by the mind. Mind is a set of intellectual patterns synthesized by Quality." -RMP (Copleston) Quality is more fundamental than an idea.. To see the world this way is better - it has more harmony - but this is no answer to someone who disagrees - as Pirsig notes: "How do you justify the statement that Quality equals reality?".. The correct answer from a MOQ perspective is, "by the harmony it produces", but this answer is only for people who already understand the MOQ. Those who don't can't see the harmony and for them this answer is meaningless. - RMP Letter to Bodvar. > >> >> It is Quality to say that one thing exists while another one does not.. It >> all depends on the situation and the harmony produced by the idea... >> >> There is a simplicity of this answer which I like.. This answer is a part of >> the MOQ and explained by Pirsig where he writes: >> >> "The MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces ideas, which produce >> what we know as matter. The scientific community that has produced >> Complementarity, almost invariably presumes that matter comes first and >> produces ideas. However, as if to further the confusion, the MOQ says that >> the idea that matter comes first is a high quality idea! " > > Dan: > I am not sure you are taking into account the depth of these words. > You seem to be skimming stones across the surface of a very deep and > mysterious lake and saying to yourself, see? I have it all figured > out! Like all things my understanding of the MOQ can improve. But the MOQ's end point isn't understanding.. It's not the answer to all our moral problems. The MOQ simply gives us a new language with which we can talk about what's good and what's better. So once we 'understand' the MOQ then that's really only just the beginning. So no - I don't feel at all like I have it all worked out. >>>> >>>> Do you think that Subjects and Objects are a part of experience? I've >>>> asked this many times but how do they exist if they are not experienced? >>>> I mean, you're right - it is ultimately the wrong question. But a >>>> reasonable one to anyone who sees value in the idea that things which we >>>> experience actually exist and aren't just imagined. >>> >>> Dan: >>> If you've been following me at all, then you must see that our concept >>> of the world always lags behind experience. Experience has moved on by >>> the time we recognize and categorize the things emerging from 'it.' >> >> Experience has moved on? Is that DQ? DQ moves? You seem to be confusing DQ >> with the physical property of change.. > > Dan: > Please try re-reading what I wrote without taking a few words out of context. I'm trying to understand what you think experience is? Is it DQ? static quality? What is it? > >>>> >>>> Yes actually Lila fully defines the Quality of ZMM. >>> >>> Dan: >>> Ah, so here is a problem. Quality cannot be fully defined. Only static >>> quality is defined. >> >> Yes, I should be clearer - Lila (attempts to) fully define the Quality of >> ZMM. Static quality tries to capture that which cannot be caught… But it >> still tries... > > Dan: > No it doesn't. Robert Pirsig is quite clear that Dynamic Quality > cannot be defined. Who said that we get those definitions right? "Strictly speaking, the creation of any metaphysics is an immoral act since it's a lower form of evolution, intellect, trying to devour a higher mystic one. The same thing that's wrong with philosophology when it tries to control and devour philosophy is wrong with metaphysics when it tries to devour the world intellectually. It attempts to capture the Dynamic within a static pattern. But it never does. You never get it right. So why try?" So - you can't define DQ because you never get those definitions right.. Does that mean we should avoid it? Is avoiding it even possible? >>>> "What would you call it? Degeneracy, he guessed. Writing a metaphysics is, >>>> in the strictest mystic sense, a degenerate activity. >>>> >>>> But the answer to all this, he thought, was that a ruthless, doctrinaire >>>> avoidance of degeneracy is a degeneracy of another sort. That's the >>>> degeneracy fanatics are made of. Purity, identified, ceases to be purity. >>>> Objections to pollution are a form of pollution. The only person who >>>> doesn't pollute the mystic reality of the world with fixed metaphysical >>>> meanings is a person who hasn't yet been born — and to whose birth no >>>> thought has been given. The rest of us have to settle for being something >>>> less pure. " >>> >>> Dan: >>> I think this a great quote but I don't see how it is applicable here. >> >> Clearly it's applicable - this attempt to capture that which cannot be >> caught is degeneracy.. Do you deny that by using intellectual sq your >> attempting to define DQ? > > Dan: > Once intellectual patterns have emerged they are no longer Dynamic. Yes, but they are an attempt. When you describe experience - what are you describing? > >>>> >>>> It's strange to me that you refuse to say that DQ = experience. If DQ >>>> isn't experience - what then is experience? Is it >>>> simply 'Dynamic' as you say above? What do you mean by that? Intrigued. >>> >>> Dan: >>> Within the MOQ, Dynamic Quality becomes synonymous with experience. We >>> define experience all the time. By the time those static definitions >>> emerge, however, 'it' has moved on. So we continually define 'it' and >>> yet these definitions are inexhaustible. By saying Dynamic Quality is >>> experience or that it equals experience is to completely misunderstand >>> the nature of experience. It is to say we have encapsulated experience >>> within a static pattern. >> >> So if experience isn't Dynamic Quality what is it? It seems you want it to >> be both static quality and Dynamic Quality or not Dynamic Quality or static >> quality at the same time.. What is experience? > > Dan: > What I want is irrelevant. If Dynamic Quality and experience become > synonymous in the MOQ, then to define either is beyond the scope of > intellect. What you want, what you value - that's the whole thing.. Very far from irrelevant. Without your values you don't exist. So what then is experience if it isn't Dynamic Quality? What is it? static quality? > >>>> >>>> So you disagree with Pirsig of Lila's Child where he says that Dynamic >>>> Quality is infinitely definable? >>> >>> Dan: >>> Of course not. You must be misunderstanding both what I am saying and >>> what Robert Pirsig is saying. Once defined, 'it' is no longer Dynamic >>> Quality. Yes, I understand it is confusing, especially if one is >>> holding onto the notion that we experience the world of objects that >>> exist independently of the observer. >> >> Which I'm not doing. In fact I'm continually telling you otherwise and yet >> you're holding onto the idea.. >> >> I'll say it again for like the 1000'th time… It can be a good idea that >> objects exist independently of the observer.. Yes that is an idea - but >> what is fundamental is not the idea but the quality of it - there is no idea >> beyond this quality. > > Dan: > So this quality is independent of human imagination? And we know of it, how? It's not independent. I never said that. It's before it. I mean - what does it mean - to 'know' something? What do you know? Are you talking about truth here? High quality intellectual patterns? Do they exist without quality? Tell me what an intellectual pattern is with no quality? I'm pretty sure you can't do it. Quality creates these intellectual patterns - not the other way around. >>> Dan: >>> "Dynamic Quality is defined constantly by everyone. Consciousness can >>> be described is a process of defining Dynamic Quality. But once the >>> definitions emerge, they are static patterns and no longer apply to >>> Dynamic Quality. So one can say correctly that Dynamic Quality is both >>> infinitely definable and undefinable because definition never exhausts >>> it." [Lila's Child] >>> >>> Dan comments: >>> I take the term 'both' to mean at the same time. And again, please >>> note the sentence: "... once the definitions emerge, they are static >>> patterns and no longer apply to Dynamic Quality." This is important >>> and pertains directly to our discussion. >> >> I take 'both' to mean at different times . The MOQ is pragmatic - as >> opposed to idealism - and in pragmatism - situation and time are >> important... And this quote does indeed pertain to our discussion - The >> definitions do indeed no longer apply to Dynamic Quality. As soon as they >> are created they apply to their own category - static quality. That is why >> we can make a statement such as "The city of LA experienced an earthquake >> today" - as what we are intellectually describing is one inorganic static >> quality pattern experiencing an inorganic event - an earthquake... > > Dan: > "We are intellectually describing" you say. Yes we are. The city of LA > isn't describing the experience. Plus you seem to finally see that > experience isn't both Dynamic Quality and static quality. Once > defined, it is no longer Dynamic. This is good. Once experience is defined it is no longer Dynamic Quality - I agree.. But at one stage experience is Dynamic Qualtiy… Then it becomes static quality… All is part of experience.. > > >>>> >>>> What actually exists? >>> >>> Dan: >>> The human imagination. >> >> Idealism! >> >> Quality exists. >> >> No wonder you dislike the idea that matter comes first so much. > > Dan: > My likes and dislikes have no bearing here. And how on earth can you > possibly know what I like or dislike, anyway. More conjecture, I > guess. Again, if nothing exists outside the human imagination, then > how can anyone ever know that matter exists independently of it? Or > Quality, for that matter? Without your likes and dislikes you wouldn't exist and so neither would this discussion. I can try and determine what you value by the words you use. To help me in this understanding I have a metaphysics which allows me to categorise your thoughts into its structure of quality. I'm relaying these thoughts of mine back to you so you can point out anything I missed or am wrong about and can thus hopefully improve both my understanding and the words I use to explain it. I've answered your quality query below. > >>> >>> Dan: >>> Ah. So you now see static quality emerges from experience and is no >>> longer experience itself. That's wonderful! >> >> I always agreed with your position on this.. You wanted us to disagree about >> this (still do) but I held two contradictory views at the same time… How do >> I justify this? Because unlike yourself - I think that Quality exists before >> the human imagination - If something is a good idea then that's right - if >> something else at a different time is a good idea then the alternative is >> right.. > > Dan: > How can you know anything exists independent of human imagination? > Think about it. I have. And when I start to think about it I begin to think about what the nature of knowledge is itself and what it actually means to 'know' anything. What is 'knowledge'? If you start talking about what you know - you'll start thinking about things which you value. To know something is to know what's good. This understanding of the world - one which places quality at the start - is fabulously more coherent and more harmonious an understanding than one which does not. That's how I know that Quality exists beyond the human imagination. >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But then, there's this other world of thought.. The intellectual >>>>>> level.. Do I 'imagine' the world of thought or does the intellectual >>>>>> level exist? >>>>> >>>>> Dan: >>>>> According to ZMM, yes. And I should think Lila says the same thing. >>>>> The levels of the MOQ are provisional. They exist in the imagination. >>>>> The intellectual level exists, sure, but it exists in the mind. >>>>> Remember, in the MOQ, intellectual and social patterns correspond to >>>>> the subjective side, or idealism, while biological and inorganic >>>>> patterns correspond to the objective side, or materialism. >>>> >>>> That's right. So the intellectual level along with every other one >>>> exists.. >>> >>> Dan: >>> I never said it didn't. >> >> Well - you deny that matter exists before we think about it. > > Dan: > Where did you get this from? Please supply a quote. By your insistence that all that exists is the human imagination(ideas): "What actually exists? Dan: The human imagination." > >> But that idea is a good idea - something which you do deny… An idea which is >> part of the foundation of the static quality structure of the MOQ.. > > Dan: > Please show me anywhere that I deny this. Quite right. You mustn't disagree with this.. but you do find it necessary to provide such a good idea with a whole bunch of caveats provided above? > >>>>>> Is this intellectual level part of experience? >>>>> >>>>> Dan: >>>>> It is a memory of experience, a map, if you will. >>>> >>>> Ultimately yes. But to avoid the pitfalls of idealism, we say that the >>>> quality of an ideal is what makes it exist and not the ideal existence >>>> itself.. A quality idea is that sq exists and is experienced. >>> >>> Dan: >>> Static quality exists but it is no longer experience. It has emerged >>> from experience. >> >> The idea that static quality exists and is experienced is a good idea.. >> There is no singular truth in the MOQ.. You only need look to see what's >> actually good and logic will follow. > > Dan: > It may be a good idea TO YOU. If so, then fine. Quality isn't just subjective. Quality is universal. Quality creates all things. "And finally: Phædrus, following a path that to his knowledge had never been taken before in the history of Western thought, went straight between the horns of the subjectivity-objectivity dilemma and said Quality is neither a part of mind, nor is it a part of matter. It is a third entity which is independent of the two." >> Well conversely - right now I think that your ideas are higher quality than >> Pirsig's otherwise I wouldn't be participating in this discussion - I'd be >> talking with Pirsig... > > Dan: > What would you say? What would I say to Pirsig? Honestly I don't think I'd say anything - I'm not interested in talking with Pirsig. I'm more interested in our discussion.. Thanks Dan, -David. 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