dmb, Along with some similarities between the MoQ and W. James' Pragmatism, RMP has pointed to similarities between the MoQ and Buddhism, and RMP is considered a Process philosopher, along with Charles Peirce and Alfred North Whitehead. Look up the word 'process'.
Marsha On Feb 20, 2013, at 9:36 AM, david buchanan wrote: > > > > Here is Marsha's (incorrect and incoherent) definition/explanation of static > patterns of value: > > > Static patterns of value are repetitive processes, conditionally > co-dependent, impermanent and ever-changing, that pragmatically tend to > persist and change within a stable, predictable pattern. Within the MoQ, > these patterns are morally categorized into a four-level, evolutionary, > hierarchical structure: inorganic, biological, social and intellectual. > Static quality exists in stable patterns relative to other patterns: > patterns depend upon ( exist relative to) innumerable causes and conditions > (patterns), depend upon (exist relative to) parts and the collection of parts > (patterns), depend upon (exist relative to) conceptual designation > (patterns). Patterns have no independent, inherent existence. Further, these > patterns pragmatically exist relative to an individual's static pattern of > life history. > > > > Here is dmb's much simpler (and non-contradictory) definition of static > patterns: > Static patterns of value are deductions derived from experience. > > > dmb continues with textual evidence that supports and explains this simple > definition: > > We can see this definition at work in Pirsig's answers, like Annotation 57 of > Lila's Child for example, where time and space are both referred to as being > "dependent" on experience and "deduced" from experience. > "In the MOQ time is dependent on experience independently of matter. Matter > is a deduction from experience." > In chapter 29 of Lila, Pirsig says the same thing about "subjects" and > "objects". They are not the starting points of reality, not the conditions > that make experience possible but rather they are static patterns. Pirsig and > James and all the other radical empiricists agree that they are concepts > derived from experience. > > We also see this in the same annotation (57), where Pirsig elaborates on the > idea that time and space are both static concepts that depend on experience > because they're derived or deduced from experience (DQ). - Dan asked a > follow-up question; "Could you elaborate on what you mean by “independently > of matter”? > > RMP replied: > I think the trouble is with the word, “experience.” ..It is more commonly > used as a subject-object relationship. ...In a subject-object metaphysics, > this experience is between a preexisting object and subject, but in the MOQ, > there is no pre-existing subject or object. Experience and Dynamic Quality > become synonymous. Change is probably the first concept emerging from this > Dynamic experience. Time is a primitive intellectual index of this change. > Substance was postulated by Aristotle as that which does not change. > Scientific “matter” is derived from the concept of substance. Subjects and > objects are intellectual terms referring to matter and nonmatter. So in the > MOQ experience comes first, everything else comes later. This is pure > empiricism, as opposed to scientific empiricism, which, with its pre-existing > subjects and objects, is not really so pure." > > Please notice that in the MOQ "experience and DQ become synonymous" and > "everything else comes later". Please notice that "time" and "change" are > among the static concepts that come later. "Subjects and objects are > intellectual terms," he says, which is only consistent with his original > claims in Lila. > > "The second of James' two main systems of philosophy, which he said was > independent of pragmatism, was his radical empiricism. By this he meant that > subjects and objects were not the starting point of experience. Subjects and > objects are secondary. They are concepts derived from something more > fundamental which he described as 'the immediate flux of life which furnishes > the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories'. In this > basic flux of experience, the distinctions of reflective thought, such as > those between consciousness and content, subject and object, mind and matter, > have not yet emerged in the forms which we make them. Pure experience cannot > be either physical or psychical: It logically precedes this distinction." > (Pirsig 1991) > > Soi what is my point? > > Marsha's definition is not only incorrect, it's a meaningless, verbose, and > incoherent jumble of nonsense that confuses and conflates the MOQ most basic > distinction, the distinction between concepts and reality. By confusing the > static and the Dynamic, apparently, she has come to the conclusion that > concepts and their definitions are undefinable. Marsha has also undermined > the intersubjective cultural context in which these concepts exist so that > definitions are "relative" to the individual's life history and not a shared > inheritance. The inability to share any intelligible meaning with other human > beings must be awfully lonely. > > This is nihilism, relativism, solipsism - and it contains the same > contradictory nonsense I've been complaining about all along. (She says > "static patterns are ...ever-changing" here too.) > > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
