D Morey said:
... Some people round here seem to have got very confused about SQ, they seem
to think that SQ is not experienced, that SQ is about objects and therefore
can't be part of experience... When you really get the MOQ you see that SQ is
part of experience and you do not have to exclude it from experience and try to
turn experience back into boring old SOM subjectivity. Once we see the SQ and
DQ of primary experience we can recognise and make sense of the patterns that
make sense of a world that exists over and above what we experience,... The
Dan/DMB error about SQ returns the MOQ to Kantian idealism, accepts the SOM
division that Kant created between experience and the things-themselves and
then thinks that if there are patterns these have to belong to
things-in-themselves and therefore cannot be experienced, so accepting the SOM
division and destroying the way the MOQ puts DQ and SQ back together again,
where MOQ recognises patterns as part of experience.
dmb says:
I think you're arguing against a position that nobody holds. You're arguing
against a misconception but you're said nothing at all about the actual
distinction in question. Pirsig and James are making a distinction between
concepts and pure experience (or pre-conceptual experience) - but you
mistakenly take this as a claim that concepts are not experienced or that
static patterns cannot be experienced. Not only did I never say such a thing, I
think that claim is absurd. To distinguish concepts from reality is to
distinguish intellect from Quality , is to distinguish static quality from the
undivided empirical flux of reality, is to distinguish primary, unsorted, as
yet unconceptualized experience from secondary, sorted, conceptualized
experience. In the MOQ there is nothing outside of experience and everything
within experience is real in some sense. There no substance behind experience.
There are no Kantian things-in-themselves beyond experience. There are no
Platonic realit
ies beyond appearances. And that's the big difference between Pirsig MOST
philosophers. Radical Empiricism rules out all such metaphysical fictions, all
such trans-experiential entities, "trans-experiential" simply means "outside of
experience".)
I'd be quite surprised if this explanation had any positive effect on you
whatsoever, David. I like surprises.
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