Ron said:

...The philosophical question I need help on (in the rhetorical counter 
argument) is "How does Pragmatism explain how truths are verifyable in 
experience? How does it explain how one truth (concept) is better than another?



dmb says:
Basically, ideas are tested in experience and true ideas are the ones that work 
out when you put them into practice. Unlike other truth theories, this cannot 
be reduced to a universal formula because a practice is always particular and 
concrete and there are specific purposes and goals involved that will determine 
the meaning of "works". Like radical empiricism, the idea here is to prioritize 
experience over concepts. 

“…Had pure experience, the naturalist says, been always perfectly healthy, 
there would never have arisen the necessity of isolating or verbalizing any of 
its terms. We should just have experienced inarticulately and unintellectually 
enjoyed. This leaning on ‘reaction’ in the naturalist account implies that, 
whenever we intellectualize a relatively pure experience, we ought to do so for 
the sake of redescending to the purer or more concrete level again; and that if 
an intellect stays aloft among its abstract terms and generalized relations, 
and does not reinsert itself with its conclusions into some particular point of 
the immediate stream of life, it fails to finish out its function and leaves 
its normal race unrun.”
 I think this is what “practical” means in pragmatism; the truth or falsity of 
a concept is determined by the effects of putting it into practice. We want the 
concept to fit in with other related concepts but, according to the pragmatic 
test of truth, it cannot “remain aloft” among them forever. At some point we 
have to bring the concept down to the earth of things and put it to work in the 
concrete realm of experience. Ideas become true in the course of experience, he 
says, and this practical application is all that “true” can ever really mean.
 Again, the general thrust of both doctrines is to prioritize experience over 
conception and so James’s doctrines are both deeply empirical. This is an 
empiricism that goes further than traditional sensory empiricism, one that 
includes sense experience of course but also everything else that is felt and 
known in experience; i.e. feelings, moods, concerns, frustrations and thrills. 
This expanded empiricism counts any concrete experience as real and radical 
empiricism goes so far as to say that “experience and reality amount to the 
same thing”. In other words, experience IS reality and concepts are secondary 
additions, tools we invent as shortcuts for handling empirical reality. And 
basically he is pressing this priority of experience over concepts against its 
opposite; against the priority of intellect over experience, which he, like 
Pirsig finds throughout the history of philosophy going all the way back to the 
ancient Greeks. He is pressing this against what he calls “vicious 
intellectualism” or “vicious abstractionism”.
 Here is how James puts it in “A Pluralistic Universe”… “…Both theoretically 
and practically this power of framing abstract concepts is one of the sublimest 
of our human prerogatives. We come back into the concrete form our journey into 
these abstractions, with an increase both of vision and of power. It is no 
wonder that earlier thinkers, forgetting that concepts are only man-made 
extracts from the temporal flux, should have ended by treating them as a 
superior type of being, bright, changeless, true, divine, and utterly opposed 
in nature to the turbid, restless lower world. The latter then appears as but 
their corruption and falsification.    Intellectualism in the vicious sense 
began when Socrates and Plato taught that what a thing really is, is told us by 
its defintion. Ever since Socrates we have been taught that reality consists of 
essences, not of appearances, and that the essences of things are known 
whenever we know their defintions. So first we identify the thing with a 
concept and then we identify the concept with a definition, and only then, 
inasmuch as the thing IS whatever the definition expresses, are we sure of 
apprehending the real essence of it or the full truth about it. So far no harm 
is done. The misuse of concepts begins with the habit of employing them 
privatively [to negate or exclude] as well as positively, using them not merely 
to assign properties to things, but to deny the very properties with which the 
things sensible present themselves. …It is but the old story, of a useful 
practice first becoming a method, then a habit, and finally a tyranny that 
defeats the end it was used for. Concepts, first employed to make things 
intelligible, are clung to even when they make them unintelligible. Thus it 
comes that when once you have conceived things as ‘independent,’ you must 
proceed to deny the possibility of any connection whatever among them, because 
the notion of connection is not contained in the definition.”

How's that? Maybe you still have questions but, hopefully, now the questions 
are more specific.



                                          
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