As an aside for Dr Mc Watt so nice to read that you'r an art lover,Anthony.
Whilst investigating Pirsig's journey on the river, i came across the Hudson river school painters; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hudson_River_School especially Cole's work made around the environment of the Cattskills is truly astonishing. Adrie 2013/5/20 Ant McWatt <[email protected]> > Ham, > > On my suggestion, thank you for re-examining Chapter 8 of LILA. > > The least I can do in return is to examine your replies. I can't see > anyone here "de-volving" from the MOQ to the type of SOM saturated > metaphysical system that you suggest but maybe someone new to the MOQ (or > philosophy even?) might learn something from this discussion. > > > On Sat. May 04, 2013 at 9:23 PM, Ant McWatt wrote: > > > That's all very good Ham but how's the "homework" going? > > Chapter 8 of LILA ring a bell? > > > > I'd like to see a discussion about that - as far as YOU ARE concerned - > first. > > > > Thanks anyway, > > > > Ant > > > Hamilton Priday stated May 5th 2013: > > Dear Dr. McWatt -- > > Oh yes, "the assignment" you hung on me (on my birthday, actually). > > Ant McWatt comments: > > You lucky man! I'm afraid I can't promise you that every year! > > > Hamilton Priday continued May 5th: > > I have referred several times to LILA Chpt. 8, but you must realize that I > don't > regard it as my Bible, as most of you folks do. As a consequence, you > won't > like my critique of this chapter. > > The very first sentence is an attempt to sell a premise that makes no sense > from either a philosophical or an epistemological viewpoint -- "the idea > that the world is composed of nothing but moral value." Had Pirsig > eliminated the first paragraph and started with the second (Phaedrus > recalling an experiment involving glasses that made everything appear > upside-down) it would have made more sense, as we might assume he meant > that > creation (existence?) is a valuistic construct. But "moral value" is man's > measure of things, a psycho-emotional response to experience which is > definitely not the stuff of physical reality. > > Ant McWatt comments: > > You're begging the question here, Ham. However, let's have a look at the > whole paragraph so everyone can see exactly what we discussing here: > > > > The idea that the world is > composed of nothing but moral value sounds > > impossible at first. Only objects are supposed to be real. "Quality" is > supposed to be just a vague > fringe word that tells what we think about objects. The whole idea that > Quality can create > objects seems very wrong. But we see subjects and > objects as reality for the same reason we see the world right-side up > although > the lenses of our eyes actually present it to our brains upside down. We > get so used to certain patterns of interpretation we forget the > patterns are there. > > > > If you have been brought-up in an SOM culture as you and I have, sentence > one is indeed true: > > The idea that the world is > composed of nothing but moral value sounds > > impossible at first. > > Most people in the Western world are brought up to think the universe is > either some spirit-like substance (e.g. mind) or some type of inorganic > substance (e.g. physical matter). This Western way of looking at things is > usually only changed by visiting non-SOM cultures (as happened > to Pirsig when he visited Korea in 1947) or reading a text based on an > non-SOM culture (such as the books by D.T. Suzuki that appeared in the > West during the mid-20th century). > > When I first read ZMM, I found it difficult to get it round my head that > any other alternative to the universe being composed of mind, matter (or > some combination of both), was indeed possible. WE are simply not brought > up to think "out-of-the-box" in this way (hence the title of this post). > > It seems therefore that you when you state: > > "'moral value' is man's measure of things, a psycho-emotional response to > experience which is > definitely not the stuff of physical reality." > > you're still well and truly stuck in a traditional SOM metaphysical > prison. You've given us exactly the type of traditional Western way of > thinking that is implied in the first sentence in Chapter 8 of LILA! > > Now, if you look a little deeper into Pirsig's work, he supports the idea > that Quality/values create our moral ideas by first observing that any > man-made metaphysical framework is not definitive; it can't correspond to > any thing "out there" (that is another SOM type of assumption). All we can > do is think of helpful ways of thinking about the world and use them until > better ways of thinking arise. That's called pragmatism (not > relativism!!!) and is why the ideas of modern physics have changed so > radically changed over the last 100 years. > > Before I read Pirsig in the late 1980s, I realised both as a sociologist - > and as a fine artist - that there were indeed metaphysical problems with > values. In sociology there is a problem called the "fact-value problem". > The difficulty with dealing with groups of people/cultures is that > observable behaviour is usually regarded as factual while what's going on > in peoples' heads is subjective and therefore open to "subjective" > interpretation. To give the simplest of example: "Is that guy in the sea > over there with the raised arms, waving or drowning?". > > What I found in the field of sociology (and this is similar with Pirsig's > own experience of anthropology) is that while there have been many > (unsuccessful) attempts to reduce values into facts (to make the field of > sociology "objective" in the sense that physical matter can be > "objectively" investigated), no-one had offered - not until Pirsig that is > - the "impossible" sounding idea that maybe all facts can be reduced to > values. By expanding the traditional notion of values (and don't overlook > this expansion, Ham!), this is exactly what Pirsig does with the MOQ. > > While in fine art, there's been a substantive amount of derivatives of > Marcel Duchamp's "ready mades". (These were initially objects of everyday > use often presented in a twisted way - the first one of which appeared in > 1913, the most famous one being an urinal submitted by Duchamp to the > "Society of Independent Artists of New York" in 1917 under the title of > "Fountain".) > > Now as Duchamp would be the first to tell you, these pieces are all junk > without artistic merit. (This is probably why the first version of > "Fountain" doesn't exist any more - it was thrown out without second > thought). Unfortunately, much of the Art world have either missed the joke > or, (as I highly suspect as the real reason) chosen not to, as it is far > easier to bung a half a sheep in a tank of formaldehyde (or put together a > small pile of house bricks - as illustrated in my MSU presentation) than it > is to create a "Mona Lisa" or a "Flora Zoologica" (to name a piece by a > contemporary fine artist - Alan Aldridge). If you can then find some rich > mug to buy your piece of junk/installation art by writing a "manifesto" > then it's a far easier way to make money than to actually create an > artistic masterpiece (as Aldridge often does). I term this process > "Laughing all the way to the bank with Duchamp's ghost!" > > (I suppose what I object to "Installation Art" above all is that it fills > this precious world of ours with junk rather than beautiful things. Maybe > one day, an enlightened society will make the public display of such > objects a civil offence...). > > Anyway, when I first read LILA in 1991, I realised that the MOQ (and > essentially it's premise of turning the ontological priority of subjects > and objects on its head with values) provided a solution to the social > scientists fact-value problem and also provided a metaphysical framework > where "installation art"is seen (at best), as some type of intellectual > value pattern which could be distinguished (at least in theory) from works > of Art that reflected the Godhead (or to use more Pirsigian terms the > Dynamic beauty of this world). This is why I'd rather have a painting by > the average six year old in my house than a Tracey Emin or Damien Hirst! > > So this is why I accept the first sentence of Chapter 8 as essentially > true. Firstly, you have to recognise you have a problem before you can > solve it. Secondly, it is seen that the MOQ does indeed solve two problems > in the social sciences and the Art World that were previously intractable > by just using some sort of SOM metaphysics. That alone would make it > worthy of merit and certainly two steps ahead of Essentialism! > > OK, I think that will do for now, Ham. (Rest assured, I have carefully > gone through the whole of your May 5th post and will be posting the > remainder of my response to it, in the near future). > > Best wishes, > > Anthony > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > Hamilton Priday continued May 5th: > > Next he states that "the Metaphysics of Quality subscribes to > ...empiricism"! Now how does empiricism -- reliance on knowledge derived > from objective experience -- in any way support Quality as the fundamental > reality? The author himself admits "it flies outrageously in the face of > common experience." Then he goes on to posit a "second principle": "A > thing that has no value does not exist," from which he concludes that > "value > has created the thing", as opposed to the other way around. > > Mind you, I happen to agree that value sensibility is what creates (i.e., > actualizes) our empirical reality. My criticism here lies in the rhetoric > by which he argues the case. He talks about "substance" as a "subspecies > of > value"; yet he offers no epistemology to support this thesis. It's no > wonder that the Pirsigians are confused about what SOM means. > > The reminder of this 10-page chapter is mostly a play on the "platypus" > analogy as a means of deriding substance, science, causation, the Big Bang, > and cultural evolution. > > Don't you find it inconsistent that, despite the author's need to denigrate > these concepts, he fills 24 additional chapters explaining experiential > reality in terms of "static patterns" while romancing us with a cosmology > by > which Dynamic Quality continually evolves toward moral "betterness"? > Good? > Bad? Better? --all subjective criteria that do not exist in the absence > of > conscious awareness, yet are purported to be that ultimate, essential > Reality which, the author still insists, is indefinable. > > Incidentally, I noted that your response to my Apr 14th message was largely > a diatribe against my "right wing" views, including the 'Wicked Witch of > Westminster' quotes and characterization of Ayn Rand as a "hippie". So, > perhaps this assignment was directed toward my conservatism as much as it > was a request to provide a position statement of my philosophy viz-à-viz > Pirsig's MOQ. If you had a metaphysical purpose, however, I'll be most > happy to elaborate on any aspect of Essentialism you don't understand. > > In either case, thanks for your interest, Ant. > > Ham > > ---------------------------------------- > > > > > > . > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > -- parser Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
