Hi DMB I see so animals can tell what the difference is between say a mate and say something to eat and respond to the undifferentiated dynamic quality of these undifferentiated non-patterned experiences and respond in different ways to these undifferentiated experiences. Yes that really hangs together well, how could I possibly imagine that your definitions of DQ and SQ have become a mess?
David M david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: > >Jan-Anders Andersson said to David Morey: >Very funny example DM! Because what you should really consider is, just like >in the color blind test, you're just acting "experince blindly". It is you >that act as you call Dmb, you apparently doesn't understand what dmb is >writing. You maybe read dmb's words but doesn't understand RMP's concept of >"pure experience". > >dmb says: >Exactly. DM does not understand the meaning of DQ or "pure experience" or any >of the other terms that refer to this "immediate flux of life" and when I >present the evidence or otherwise try to explain it, he just dismisses as >"crap" and ignores it. > >But it's not crap. I've repeatedly provided well-supported answers to his >questions but he just cannot see them. Like I said,... > >It's not quite explicit but it's still pretty clear that DM is using the idea >of "primary experience" in a way that is very different from the meaning >intended by Pirsig and James. We see this in the way he expects "primary >experience" to play a role in the scientific process. But the kind of "primary >experience" Pirsig and James are talking about is better understood in terms >of satori or nirvana. Obviously, this is a very different sense of the word >"experience" than is used in the sciences or in traditional sensory >empiricism. Basically, DM is converting their Zen mysticism into common sense >realism. > >He doesn't want pre-conceptual experience to be an indeterminate flux because >he mistakenly believes that it is devoid of content. He mistakenly believe >that it means we can't taste bananas or see the moon? > >The only reasonable way out of this confusion is to take a careful look at >what these guys are actually saying about "pure experience". It's non-dual >experience, not a subjective experience of objective realities. This is >undivided experience of the whole situation all at once, not the unprocessed >sense data of traditional empiricism. As it now stands, DM is misusing >Pirsig's terms to refer to things that Pirsig has rejected and has no place in >the MOQ's structure. This misuse of terms and the misconceptions that follow >has created tons of confusion and frustration. > >DM can't possibly have a problem with their "primary experience" until he gets >a handle on what they're actually saying, unless he grapples honestly with the >term's actual meaning. So far, he has only been objecting to his own >misconceptions of this flux as some kind of white noise that's devoid of >content. But as I keep telling him, "undifferentiated" simply means that the >content has not yet been conceptualized. Nobody, except Marsha maybe, thinks >pure experience is devoid of content. Apparently, some people take the term >"nothingness" in some literalistic way but it really just means >"no-thingness", which (again) simply means unconceptualized or unpatterned. > >And - holy cannoli - the Pirsigian notion of patterned and unpatterned has >nothing to do with polka dots, stripes, plaids or colorblindness. Frankly, I >think DM's question on colorblindness is sheer nonsense and I cringe with >embarrassment every time he uses a contradictory phrase like "pre-conceptual >patterns". > > >David Morey replied to JanAnders: >Maybe you can help explain it then, do animals with instinctive behaviors >identify their food and mates using SQ? Yes or no. Is this SQ conceptual? Yes >or no. Either SQ can be pre-conceptual, which I prefer, but everything >pre-conceptual is DQ for DMB, or animals use concepts, which is a very odd >use of the word concept. If you can clear up this obvious muddle I will be >most grateful. > > >dmb says: >This is another case where DM keeps asking for an answer that has already been >given several times. This question should not stump anyone and the answer is >pretty simple too. "So you believe babies and animals presumably use >concepts," DM said to me the other day. "No," I answered, "babies and animals >can respond to experience without concepts". Animals can respond to DQ >biologically and our closest cousins even have some basic capacity for >morality, language and even rudimentary theory of mind, i.e. some capacity to >read and predict the behavior of their peers or their prey. Babies, of course, >are going to develop human capacities and will eventually learn to live in the >mythos. But even when that baby grows up and has the full range of concepts, >he can still jump off the hot stove before concepts are deployed, he can still >respond to DQ dynamically or biologically or instinctively. And in the big >picture of the MOQ's static hierarchy, everything has the capacity to respond >to DQ. Even the law of causality is re-concieved as an extremely persistent >pattern of preferences, as an extremely regular response to DQ. >But all of this talk about animals and physics is part of our mythos and how >animals or particles actually experience reality we cannot say. As Thomas >Nagel so famously pointed out, we just can't know what it's like to be a bat. >Animals do not inhabit our mythos. Even if they had concepts (abstractions and >generalizations) in the same sense that we do, we still wouldn't be able to >comprehend their concepts or their mythos. We can't even get inside the >experience of other human beings - except by way of the mythos. > > >“Experience in its immediacy seems perfectly fluent. The active sense of >living which we all enjoy, before reflection shatters our instinctive world >for us, is self-luminous and suggests no paradoxes….When the reflective >intellect gets at work, however, it discovers incomprehensibilities in the >flowing process. Distinguishing its elements and parts, it gives them >separate names, and what it thus disjoins it can not easily put together.” -- >William James > >“If now we ask why we must thus translate experience from a more concrete or >pure into a more intellectualized form, filling it with ever more abounding >conceptual distinctions…..The naturalist answer is that the environment kills >as well as sustains us, and the tendency of raw experience [a.k.a. “pure >experience”] to extinguish the experient himself is lessened just in the >degree in which the elements in it that have a practical bearing upon life are >analyzed out of the continuum and verbally fixed and coupled together…Had pure >experience, the naturalist says, always been perfectly healthy, there would >never have arisen the necessity of isolating or verbalizing any of its terms. >We should just have experienced inarticulately and un-intellectually enjoyed.” >-- William James > > > > > > >Moq_Discuss mailing list >Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >Archives: >http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
