Hi DMB Thanks for the below, what you say is entirely correct, I have no disagreement here as is obvious if you read what I have actually said, without the words and concepts it is very hard to make sense of or understand our experience, no argument. But thanks for finally conceding what I have been saying all along, it makes perfect sense to distinguish our concepts about colour and the culture we have about these and what underlies these, i.e. the actual colours we experience, hence there are vast riches in experience that precede concepts and culture allowing us to filter and cut up this vastly rich experience, now sure this richness gets the filter and mapping of culture and concepts laid over it to allow us to make it more useful and understandable, culture adds extra differentiation -no problem with that, but underlying culture is what we can actually experience, some people cannot see green, don't matter how they change their concepts, some wave lengths no one can see, some people as you say have access to many more differentiations of colours whether they consciously realise it or not, perfect example of pre-conceptual patterns or differentiations isn't it, so thanks for the example, it covers exactly what I am talking about, why you do not openly recognise that and instead claim it does not fit my proposal is beyond me. Experience is presented with all sorts of primary differentiations, sense ranges and variation, now none of these senses give us objects or things, they are however a complex, changing theatre of senses but they create primary difference, where the white of the moon ends the black of the sky begins, this is primary sense difference, why you would want to deny this and think there is no boundary being experienced here prior to any conception of black or white, sky or moon, would imply that we were not experiencing the differences that leads us to take up the concepts I have just mentioned, otherwise wh at is there to help us decide whether these concepts are useful or not.
You just give me the impression you'd rather spend hours arguing rather badly that pre-conceptual patterns or difference does not exist rather than fixing what is a clearly inadequate and incomplete definition of how SQ and DQ differ, but you just can't admit this for some irrational reason that is beyond me, I hope others are less stubborn. david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: >David Morey said to Ron and dmb: > >Quite a lot of crap below as usual attributed to me by DMB that I have never >said, wonder why DMB can't argue with what I have actually said, never mind >eh! > >Here is a real empirical example of what real people experience that is >impossible for DMB to explain I believe given the definitions he is defending. > > >dmb says: >As I see it, David, you have use the vaguest of insults to dismiss everything >I've said. You're just ignoring the whole thing for no specific reason. >Instead, you have presented a question about color-blindness as a challenge to >the MOQ. Huh? > >I don't see how this is supposed to stump anybody. The causes of >color-blindness are not a mystery. It's just a physiological deficit, a >problem with the cones in the eye. There is some interesting vision-related >science that can shed some light on the points that you are ignoring, however. >Would you like to hear about that? > >The ability to detect color depends on cells in the back of the eye. They're >called cones and almost everyone has three different kinds of cones, giving us >the capacity to see the three primary colors. Color blindness occurs in those >who do not have three kinds of cones but just one or two or maybe even none. >Colorblindness is more common in men than in women. In fact, it is now known >that some women have four kinds of cone cells, which gives them a kind of >super-charged capacity to see color. This is where it gets interesting. > >Because of the way that primary colors can be blended to produce so many >shades and hues, people with normal color vision can detect about one million >different colors. People with only two kinds of cones can only detect about >one thousand different colors. But the women with four kinds of cones can >detect about 100 million colors. That one extra cone has a very dramatic >effect, literally increasing the color of the "world" by 100 times. BUT > >And this is a very big BUT, which brings us to the point that I want to make >(and which you will almost certainly ignore). The women who can see one >hundred times better than you or I usually don't realize it because they are >"seeing" colors for which they have no words. Most people cannot "see" what >they are seeing and so there are no words for it in the language. They see >colors that have no name and so, in effect, they don't realize that there >vision is any different. When they look at a rainbow, it's much wider and more >dazzling to them than to us but they have no way to conceptualize it or talk >about it. > >That's how it is with the primary empirical reality. You can only "see" what >the culture predisposes you to see. Pirsig uses the dharmakaya light as an >example of something we fail to see because our culture doesn't have a word or >concept for it in the language. > >http://discovermagazine.com/2012/jul-aug/06-humans-with-super-human-vision#.UllFxyh4EqY > > > >Moq_Discuss mailing list >Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >Archives: >http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
