Hi David > 12 okt 2013 kl. 17:13 skrev David Morey <[email protected]>: > > Hi JanAnders > > Maybe you can help explain it then, do animals with instinctive behaviors > identify their food and mates using SQ? Yes or no.
Yes. Animals are SQ and their behaviour is SQ experiencing DQ. > > Is this SQ conceptual? Yes or no. Yes. > > Either SQ can be pre-conceptual, which I prefer, but everything > pre-conceptual is DQ for DMB, or animals use concepts, which is a very odd > use of the word concept. If you can clear up this obvious muddle I will be > most grateful. > There is no room for preferring SQ to be pre-conceptual if you correctly understand how RMP puts it his writings. The only pre-conceptual is good-ness which is a personal choice of comfortable nature. The underlying betterness that causes the differentiation into the four levels described in Lila is not a preconceptual pattern, it comes from SQ as time, saved time. Jan-Anders > Jan-Anders Andersson <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Very funny example DM! Because what you should really consider is, just like >> in the color blind test, you're just acting "experince blindly". It is you >> that act as you call Dmb, you apparently doesn't understand what dmb is >> writing. You maybe read dmb's words but doesn't understand RMP's concept of >> "pure experience". >> >> JanAnders >> >>> 12 okt 2013 kl. 01:25 skrev David Morey <[email protected]>: >>> >>> Hi DMB/Ron >>> >>> Quite a lot of crap below as usual attributed to me by DMB that I have >>> never said, wonder why DMB can't argue with what I have actually said, >>> never mind eh! >>> >>> Here is a real empirical example of what real people experience that is >>> impossible for DMB to explain I believe given the definitions he is >>> defending. >>> >>> Take a colour blind test, we have some green dots on a red background, >>> person A can see the dots no problem, person B cannot see these because >>> they are colour blind and it is all just red. What is going on, I say that >>> person B is not experiencing the percept green so they cannot see the dot >>> pattern, person A can see the green, the pattern and the dots. What is >>> person B missing, they are missing the pre-conceptual experience, the >>> missing patterned experience differentiating red and green is absent. How >>> does DMB describe colour blindness, is person B missing a concept of green >>> to stop them seeing the dots, should we give them cognitive behavioural >>> therapy to help them see green, colours are pre-conceptual and >>> differentiated in our experience, person A has that content, person B is >>> missing that content, we have to put this experienced content or qualities >>> somewhere, so does DQ contain colours or is colour a form of >>> pre-conceptual SQ, put them where you like but let's stop denying the >>> colour, it is surely blindingly obvious! >>> >>> Unless you have some better way to explain colour blindness I await your >>> response with great interest indeed, prove me wrong, I'd love to >>> understand what on earth you have been talking about all this time. Get >>> your thinking cap on, of course you could just avoid answering my question >>> as usual, or twist what I am asking, or just bury your head in the sand >>> and hope real colour blindness does not exist. >>> If we could operate on person B and restore their ability to experience the >>> difference between red and green, to see the pattern of the dots, at what >>> point does the operation introduce the concept of green to them? Do they >>> not just have the experience of green, are they not experiencing change, >>> do we not value/respond to all experiences because they change us, move >>> us, as the metaphor goes? We are not detached observers deciding how we >>> are going to respond to experiences, we are the moment of experience, we >>> are in a moment of change, greenness is the moment of change adding >>> greenness to our experience, so that we will never be the same again, a >>> bus hitting us changes us too, but so does green, just not quite so >>> dramatically. >>> >>> >>> All the best >>> David M >>> >>> david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> Ron said: >>>> Trying to classify percepts as primary or secondary is idle, Bertram >>>> Russel said "the belief in the existence of things outside my own >>>> biography must be regarded as a prejudice." but our justifications for >>>> such a belief is pragmatic as C.S. Peirce said "let us not pretend to >>>> doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts". >>>> >>>> >>>> David M replied to Ron: >>>> I believe it is not idle, it tells us the basis of our knowledge is in >>>> experience, it is the basis of empirical evidence and ...it is exactly >>>> what we use to do all the sciences and interestingly and importantly it is >>>> much easier to agree about primary experiences like what is hot and cold, >>>> how fast something is moving for experiencers in the same frame of >>>> reference, then it is to agree about more complex objects like money or >>>> artworks, when we need to think again about ideas and concepts it is >>>> always good to strip these away and get back to what we experience without >>>> our ideas and concepts to consider alternatives and look for something >>>> better, but the challenge is always to get our ideas to make sense of our >>>> pre-conceptual experiences. Obviously ideas and concepts can change what >>>> we experience, they change who we are and how we respond, but I think we >>>> can bracket these as Husserl suggests, doing this is surely the best way >>>> to get under the dominance of SOM, but it surely leaves us looking to try >>>> and understand experience prior to language and culture as far as we can, >>>> saying nothing it is undifferentiated is not very useful when at the same >>>> time we claim it as the source of SQ and as full of potential, well is >>>> this potential simply tapped by concepts? seems unlikely that such a >>>> theory is complete or adequate. This is my problem. >>>> >>>> >>>> dmb says: >>>> There are two major misconceptions at work behind the scenes. These >>>> misconception are the cause of your so-called problem. >>>> >>>> It's not quite explicit but it's still pretty clear that you're using the >>>> idea of "primary experience" in a way that is very different from the >>>> meaning intended by Pirsig and James. We see this in the way you expect >>>> "primary experience" to play a role in the scientific process. But the >>>> kind of "primary experience" Pirsig and James are talking about is better >>>> understood in terms of satori or nirvana. Obviously, this is a very >>>> different sense of the word "experience" than is used in the sciences or >>>> in traditional sensory empiricism. Basically, you're converting their Zen >>>> mysticism into common sense realism. >>>> >>>> The second misconception is in thinking that things like "rock", "red", >>>> "white", "moon", "cold" and "hot" are pre-conceptual or naked percepts, >>>> raw sense data or whatever. It's not just Pirsig who says that seeing >>>> shapes and forms is to intellectualize. All of our perceptions are >>>> "theory-laden", they say. The "myth of the given" has been exposed as >>>> such. There's a number of famous slogans announcing various degrees of >>>> acknowledgement. Even the simplest ideas - like object permanence, the >>>> idea that the biscuit will stay in the tin - are still learned ideas. We >>>> are suspended in a language that always already sorts experience into >>>> these basic categories. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dave M. said: >>>> ...I used the white moon in a black background I am trying to indicate the >>>> differences is percepts that allow us to latch on to something in >>>> experience to base all our responses on, ..that is the very heart of my >>>> point about pre-conceptual experience of difference or pattern. Here for >>>> me the white of the moon is the experience itself, same as the experience >>>> of actually tasting a banana, ..even DMB knows this, he has tasted a >>>> banana surely, but he can't admit that there are patterns and difference >>>> in primary experience. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> dmb says: >>>> Basically, you want primary experience to be a determinate reality. You >>>> don't want pre-conceptual experience to be an indeterminate flux because >>>> you mistakenly believe that this means it is devoid of content and >>>> therefore cannot be the source or substance of our concepts. You >>>> mistakenly believe that it means we can't taste bananas or see the moon? >>>> >>>> I think you need to take a careful look at what these guys are actually >>>> saying about "pure experience". It's non-dual experience, not a subjective >>>> experience of objective realities. This is undivided experience of the >>>> whole situation all at once, not the unprocessed sense data of traditional >>>> empiricism. I mean, you're using Pirsig's terms to refer to things that >>>> Pirsig has rejected and has no place in the MOQ's structure. That creates >>>> tons of confusion and frustration. >>>> >>>> >>>> You can't really even have a problem with their "primary experience" until >>>> you get a handle on what they're saying, unless you grapple what the >>>> term's actual meaning. So far, you've only been objecting to your own >>>> misconceptions of this as some kind of white noise that's devoid of >>>> content. But as I keep telling you, "undifferentiated" simply means that >>>> the content has not yet been conceptualized. >>>> >>>> "Quality is a direct experience independent of and prior to intellectual >>>> abstractions. Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable in the >>>> sense that there is a knower and a known,..." >>>> >>>> "Quality is shapeless, formless, indescribable. To see shapes and forms is >>>> to intellectualize. Quality is independent of any such shapes and forms." >>>> >>>> >>>> DQ = pure experience = sciousness >>>> >>>> "What is “sciousness”? Bricklin explains in his introduction to the book >>>> that “James labeled consciousness-without-self ‘sciousness,’ and >>>> consciousness-with-self ‘con-sciousness.’” For those up to speed on their >>>> Eastern philosophy, “consciousness-without-self” (sciousness) is, of >>>> course, precisely how the Buddha defined nirvana, the traditional goal of >>>> spiritual seeking. Bricklin defines it as a “nondual” state of enlightened >>>> immediacy and wholeness in which the usual distinction between self and >>>> other, knower and known, is dissolved. Ordinary “con-sciousness,” on the >>>> contrary, would be considered dualistic, erroneously split down the middle >>>> between a perceiving subject and the world of objects being perceived." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>>> Archives: >>>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >>> Moq_Discuss mailing list >>> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >>> Archives: >>> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >>> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >> Moq_Discuss mailing list >> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >> Archives: >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >> http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
